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ABSTRACT
The 1998 edition ofLatin America and the Caribbean
in the World Economyis divided into four sections.
The first section (chapters I and II) is devoted to
an examination of the international situation and
describes the main short-term trends to be observed in
the global economy together with their impact on
regional trade. It also examines the evolution of major
economic groupings, such as the European Union and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the steps being taken to establish the Free Trade Area
of the Americas, and recent decisions taken by the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Council,
all of which directly or indirectly influences Latin
American and Caribbean products’ access to the
region’s principal markets.
The second section (chapters III, IV and V) deals
with Latin American and Caribbean trade and trade
policy in 1997-1998 and includes a discussion of the
trade policies and performance of the countries of the
region from June 1997 to August/September 1998, an
assessment of the various export promotion tools that
comply with multilateral trading regulations and
standards, and an analysis of the composition of the
region’s trade deficits during the 1990s.
The third section (chapters VI and VII) explores
the concept of regional convergence and outlines the
main stages to be observed in the regional integration
process during the period from June 1997 to August
1998.
The fourth and final section (chapters VIII and IX)
discusses selected aspects of trade activity and trade
policy, compares the experiences of East Asia and
Latin America in relation to industrial and trade
policy,  and analyses the environmental protection
policies of the United States  and how they have
influenced the exports of some Latin American countries.
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SUMMARY
1. The international economy: cyclical and structural trends
In 1998 Latin American and Caribbean exports were
affected by the unfavourable international economic
environment that began to take shape in the second
half of 1997 as a result of the financial crisis in Asia.
The impact of these events was transmitted to the
region through three different channels: sharp
reductions in short-term international capital flows
and the higher cost of external financing; steep
downturns in commodity prices; and a slowdown in
the growth of world trade. An expansion of export
volumes of nearly 8% only partially offset the drop in
prices, and ECLAC estimates indicate that, for the first
time in 12 years, the value of the region’s exports was
lower than it had been the year before. Despite lower
prices for manufactures and petroleum, imports
climbed more steeply than exports in terms of value,
thereby deepening both the trade and current account
deficits.
Between the end of 1997 and November 1998, the
aggregate price index for commodities other than oil
fell by 13%, although this average figure masks
sharply differing trends (covering a range from 3% to
41%) for the various products. During the same
period, oil prices tumbled more than 38%. According
to est imates prepared by the World Trade
Organization (WTO), in 1998 the volume of trade
expanded by somewhat more than 4%. Although this
means that it outpaced the growth of world GDP,
which was not expected to top 2%, it was nonetheless
far below the average for the four preceding years. As
a consequence of weakening average prices levels,
however, the value of trade (in dollars) may actually
have declined for the first time since 1993.
The striking contraction of the East Asian
economies, which had been growing rapidly until that
time, has had a severe impact on a number of markets
for goods and services because these economies are so
fully integrated into world trade. In the past few years,
all the world regions had increased the percentage of
their exports going to Asia, which, thanks to its strong
and mounting demand for imports (financed in part by
private capital inflows), had become an engine for
world economic growth. The slow pace of growth, on
average, seen in the industrialized economies in the
1990s did not halt the expansion of the developing
countries’ trade activity,  a  fact which attests  to  a
weakening of the link between the two groups and to
the increasing importance of trade between the
developing countries of Asia and of Latin America and
the Caribbean.
Since the  late 1980s the  Governments of the
region have been implementing monetary and fiscal
austerity policies to control the macroeconomic
disequilibria generated by the debt crisis of the 1980s.
They have also moved to liberalize and deregulate
their domestic markets and to privatize public-sector
assets in an effort to restructure the system of
incentives for the private sector, improve the operation
of the market and help to place the production units
located within their territory in a more competitive
position at the international level. In a number of
earlier studies, ECLAC has argued that these
measures, while necessary, are not enough in and of
themselves to put the region on a sustainable growth
path, since the countries also need to increase their
presence in the more dynamic types of trade flows and
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to gain greater access to technology, foreign direct
investment and financing.
Be all this as it may, the financial crisis that has
directly affected some of the most successful
economies in the developing world, i.e., those of East
and South-East Asia, has demonstrated that: (i) the
factors influencing the position of the region’s
countries in the world economy are largely beyond the
control of its Governments, since the reactions
triggered by system-wide crises cause all countries
perceived as “emerging markets” to bear the same
costs in order to gain access to capital markets,
regardless of the differences existing in the structural
conditions  in individual  countries; and (ii) strong
linkages to the global economy and a sound
macroeconomy are not enough to block the
devastating effects of external shocks. The high degree
of interdependence existing among the various
national  economies, the  unconstrained mobility of
capital and the imbalances and weaknesses of the
world economy magnify economic disturbances and,
as a result, economic upheavals  that are initially
confined to a few countries  soon spread through
commercial and financial channels to other countries
and regions.
The rapid modernization of the Latin American
and Caribbean countries’ trade policies since the
mid-1980s has not yet brought about a substantive
change in the region’s export profile, and most of its
economies continue to rely on a very limited number
of products or  markets (or both) for their  export
earnings (see figure 1). With the exception of Mexico,
the Latin American and Caribbean countries’ exports
are still made up chiefly of commodities; the more
advanced economies have diversified their exports by
moving into the  production of  complex industrial
goods, but these products are, nonetheless, derived
from the same basic commodities. Mexico, however,
has managed to diversify its exports into more
technologically advanced manufactures based on a
strategy that has entailed a sharp increase in the part
played by the United States in the country’s trade and
investment flows.
The countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean are interested in securing access for their
products to the industrialized countries’ markets,
especially since the steps being taken to create a
single European market have had such a strong
impact on other economies’ trade strategies. The
Government of the United States, in particular, has
begun to relax its traditional opposit ion to
preferential arrangements, has signed the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with
Canada and Mexico, is advocating an ambitious
inter-American cooperation programme that is to
include the formation of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), and has been trying to transform
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Conference, in which Chile, Mexico and Peru
participate, into a forum for the debate of issues
relating to investment and trade liberalization.
The Latin American and Caribbean countries are
readying themselves to take part in a new international
scenario in which they will be playing an important
role, since they are involved in one way or another in
all three  of the major free trade areas now  being
formed. The move to establish the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will, given its
magnitude and scope, have a considerable impact on
Europe’s internal affairs and on the international
monetary system. The political clout and economic
manifestations of the future EMU will surely alter,
albeit gradually, the international monetary system’s
power structure, operations, policies and interlocking
alliances.
All this affords an opportunity to take part in an
important institutional learning process as well.
Europe’s integration exercise provides the Latin
American and Caribbean countries with the chance to
learn more about the institutional and economic
aspects of macroeconomic integration processes. The
APEC negotiations allow the participating Latin
American countries to become familiar with new
working methods and negotiating techniques that they
can put to use in other forums. Valuable experience is
also being gained in the FTAA working groups, and
12 ECLAC
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this has had positive externalities for the countries of
the region in other negotiations. This kind of spillover
is of particular importance within the context of the
multilateral talks in the process of being initiated under
the aegis of WTO.
2. Trade and trade policy in Latin America
and the Caribbean in 1997-1998
Between 1990 and 1997, the region’s imports
increased 40% more, in quantitative terms, than its
exports. At the end of 1997, the real value of imports
was 35% greater than that of exports, even though
since 1995 the general trend in the terms of trade has
been favourable to the region’s exports. Due to the
high income elasticity of the region’s demand for
imports, which is associated with the restructuring of
its production facilities and the increased percentage
of imported inputs in local production,  the  main
growth constraints affecting the region’s imports have
been generated by each country’s level of economic
activity, ability to achieve  a trade  surplus on the
services account, ability to finance large deficits in its
trade in goods and services, or a combination of the
latter two.
Of the 17 Latin American countries under review,
only Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela had trade
surpluses in 1997, measured at current prices, and
even these positive balances were far lower than in
1996. It should be noted that this build-up in
merchandise trade deficits has occurred despite export
growth rates of 10% or above, except in the cases of
Paraguay and major oil-producers such as Ecuador
and Venezuela. The increase was the result of an
upswing in the volume of shipments, since the prices
of the countries’ main export products –in particular
oil,  copper, wheat and  other  grains (except  rice)–
began to plummet in the second half of 1997.
Furthermore, the prices of manufactured goods
showed a drop of nearly 9% from their 1996 levels.
The countries most severely affected by this situation
were Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. On the other
hand, higher banana, coffee, shrimp, fishmeal and beef
prices benefited the Central American countries and,
in the case of Ecuador, offset the downturn in oil
prices.
The persistence of low commodity prices in 1998
is expected to result in sharper increases in
merchandise trade deficits, even though the downward
trend in oil and grain prices did benefit importing
countries. Preliminary data indicate that Venezuela is
the only country with a positive trade balance for 1998,
although it is but a fraction of the country’s 1996
surplus. Starting in July 1997, Mexico began to
register increasingly large deficits. During the first
nine months of 1998, Mexico’s trade deficit amounted
to more than US$ 5 billion, with average monthly
figures in the third quarter in excess of US$ 750
million. Brazil has succeeded in curbing the growth of
imports, partly through the selective enforcement of
controls and partly as a result of the economic
contraction triggered by strict adjustment measures –a
phenomenon also visible in Chile.
In Central America, the catastrophic damage
caused by Hurricane Mitch, whose economic impact
cannot yet be fully assessed, caused the loss of
precious human lives, destroyed decades’ worth of
accumulated social capital in the form of schools,
hospitals and infrastructure, and diminished the
productivity of the land, which is these countries’ main
productive  resource.  For  Honduras and  Nicaragua
and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador and Guatemala, it
will be very difficult to regain the production and
export levels reached in mid-1998. The growth rate for
Central American exports in recent years had been the
highest in the region, although it must be remembered
that, owing to the civil wars that ravaged these
countries until the beginning of the 1990s, they were
starting from very low levels.
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In general, the sharp drop in commodity prices,
caused in part by problems of excess supply and a
contraction of demand, demonstrated the vulnerability
of the Latin American countries’ export activity. Over
the last few decades, various countries have made
significant efforts to diversify their exports in terms of
both products and markets. However, according to the
findings presented in a study on the export markets and
products of the countries belonging to the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA), only
Argentina and Brazil have succeeded in diversifying
their exports in terms of both export products and
target markets; Mexico’s and Uruguay’s exports are
diversified in terms of products, but are concentrated
in a small number of markets: the United States in
Mexico’s case, and Argentina and Brazil in the case of
Uruguay. However, as noted earlier, Mexico alone has
diversified its exports into non-natural-resource-based
manufactures, while Argentina’s and Brazil’s exports
continue to be concentrated in these types of products.
At the other extreme are Chile, Colombia and Peru,
whose exports, though they are concentrated in a small
number  of products, are  sold on a wide range of
markets. Finally, countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador,
Paraguay and Venezuela continue to display a high
degree of vulnerability in this respect owing to the
concentration of their exports in a small number of
products and markets.
To change their export specializations while
continuing to base their export profile on their
endowments of natural resources and labour,  the
region’s Governments have sought to develop
programmes to support the private sector and improve
the systemic competitiveness of their economies. To
this end they have made use of policies and
instruments consistent with the commitments they
have made under the aegis of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Most of the countries have tried
to assist exporters by means of tax, fiscal and credit
incentives, which include access to imported inputs on
preferential terms (drawbacks and temporary
importation) and exemptions from value added tax
(VAT), in combination with the provision of more
flexible and effective instruments. Other countries,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, have
upgraded their institutional capabilities for the design
and implementation of policies aimed at supporting,
promoting and diversifying exports; as part of this
process, they have sought to   consol idate
decision-making authority, which had previously been
scattered among various government agencies, and to
make the relevant programmes more coherent.
The trade measures put into effect in 1997 and
1998 by the region’s Governments have attested to
their commitment to trade liberalization while at the
same time allowing them to gain more practical
experience with the use  of  quota-based protective
measures  and to  give the private sector  access to
markets all over the world, i.e., both industrialized and
developing markets (including those of countries
within the region itself). In various countries, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the public sector
has worked in coordination with the private and
professional sector to identify export barriers in
importing countries beforehand in order to avoid long
and expensive proceedings such as the recent
investigation concerning alleged dumping by Chile in
the United States. Following the example of the United
States, which publishes an annual report on barriers to
its exports, Canada, Japan and the European Union
have begun to gather information on market access
problems. Along the same lines, the Latin American
and Caribbean countries are planning to conduct a
survey of external barriers to trade and investment in
order to provide the public and private sectors with
detailed information on market access conditions, as
well as to contribute to a more vigorous defense of
commercial interests and the development of an active
trade agenda.
Imports play a significant role in the restructuring
of Latin American industry, since capital goods and
inputs are needed to bring the region’s industrial base
into line with today’s technological standards. This
has been demonstrated by a number of studies, which
have shown that trade liberalization and the new types
of incentives and regulations that go along with it have
set in motion a wide-ranging industrial restructuring
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process. Some of the hallmarks of this process are
shifts in national production profiles and an increased
use of imported inputs in local production activities,
together with sweeping changes in patterns of
ownership in many industrial sectors in which local
firms have been unable to compete with imports.
For example, one recent study indicates that the
Latin American manufacturing sector has been
focusing on food products and industrial commodities
while de-emphasizing metal manufactures and
machinery industries,  capital goods  and  consumer
durables.  The  manufacturing sector has ceased  to
exhibit the high degree of vertical integration that
characterized it in previous decades because the lower
costs involved in importing parts and components
mean that this sort of integration is no longer
profitable. In other words, many firms have
substantially increased the percentage of imports they
use in the production of consumer or capital goods
because they are  substituting equivalent imported
parts for components that they or other locally-owned
companies used to produce in the country. In
Argentina, Chile and Mexico, a sharp decrease in local
production has been observed in areas involving more
value added, in-house engineering and technological
development.
Trade liberalization, the relative decline in the
prices of imported products and the growth of the Latin
American economies in the 1990s have given rise to
an upswing in imports of consumer and capital goods.
By permitting the countries to renew their stock of
capital goods, this trend has posed new challenges and
opened up new opportunities for the region’s
producers and exporters. While it is true that some
sectors and firms in Latin America have succeeded in
meeting these challenges and taking advantage  of
these opportunities, the fact remains that the increased
use of imported inputs makes it harder to adjust the
countries’ current account deficits without harming
production and exports.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
have reached a turning point in terms of their export
promotion policies. This is due to the fact, first of all,
that in the past a higher priority had been placed on
reforming macroeconomic and trade policy based on
the belief that by reducing the economies’ anti-export
bias and correcting macroeconomic price levels, the
reformed policies would provide a sufficient stimulus
for exports. However, although these policies
–together with a drop in domestic demand– did
succeed in boosting exports, they did not eliminate the
economies’ anti-export bias. Moreover, the
combination of currency appreciation and rebounding
domestic demand in a number of the region’s countries
has reopened the debate as to what kinds of policies
are most effective in promoting the sustained growth
of non-traditional exports. The FTAA negotiations
have also played a part in pointing up the need for a
reformulation of export promotion policies in most of
the Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The globalization of world trade and its
implications in terms of the increasing competition
faced by the region’s firms on domestic and external
markets have made the Latin American and Caribbean
Governments and private sectors more aware of the
need to set up trade promotion systems that will be of
genuine assistance to firms in meeting the challenges
they will face in the coming years. The commitments
made by the countries of the region in the Uruguay
Round have also fueled the debate concerning the need
to overhaul their export promotion policies. The new
rules applying to multilateral trade, under which
developing countries have access to greater
opportunities and to more equitable dispute settlement
procedures, also have important implications in
relation to subsidies for non-agricultural exports.
The countries of the region differ widely,
however, in terms of what kinds of adaptations are
needed in their export promotion policies. While some
need to undertake major reforms in this area, others
are further along in this process and only need to make
minor adjustments in order to make their export
promotion instruments more effective or to bring them
into compliance with their Uruguay Round
commitments. For example, some Caribbean and
Central American countries will need to make
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substantive changes in their trade promotion policies
and have already begun to do so, whereas in Chile only
relatively minor changes are required, although they
will still have a considerable impact on small-scale
exporters. In Mexico, on the other hand, a very
efficient and fully WTO-compliant export promotion
system is already in operation.
3. The regional integration process in Latin America
and the Caribbean in 1997-1998
The strength of the economic integration process in the
region is evidenced by the steady expansion of trade
observed within its subregional groupings between
January 1997 and July 1998 and by the
intergovernmental agreements concluded by  those
groups during the same period. There is as yet no clear
indication that the outbreak and subsequent deepening
of the present international financial crisis has had
any impact on this process. The possibility cannot be
ruled out, however, that the favourable environment
for integration that has existed up to this point may
be undermined by any of the various repercussions of
the crisis, such as the downturn in the prices of the
commodities exported by the countries of the region,
the competition that the region’s products may face
from Asian goods on its or other markets, or the slump
in export earnings caused by the weakening of Asian
demand.
In 1997, total intraregional trade expanded 17.5%
for Latin America and the Caribbean, whereas the
region’s total exports climbed by slightly less than
11%. As a result, the share of the total represented by
intraregional trade rose from 19% in 1996 to 20% in
1997, when measured at current prices. This average
figure masks the heterogeneity of the region’s trade
flows, however, with one example being the
importance of Mexico’s trade relations with the
United States (see figure 2). In the case of the South
American countries belonging to Mercosur and to the
Andean Community, the proportion of their total trade
accounted for by intraregional transactions increased
relative to trade with outside countries, whereas in the
case of the countries belonging to the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and to the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), transactions
with third parties was the fastest-growing component
of their overall trade flows.
The region’s four integration schemes moved
ahead with the implementation  of their free  trade
regimes and common external tariffs as swiftly as
possible within the constraints imposed by the
economies of their member countries. Meanwhile,
their Governments also sought to address
complementary issues or  to speed  up  the  pace  of
implementation in such areas as institution-building,
the liberalization of the services sector and the
mobility of people and capital. In some cases, initial
steps  were also taken towards  designing effective
dispute settlement procedures.
On the other hand, fewer new free trade
agreements were signed by the countries of the region,
whether because the two countries that had been the
most active in this respect –Chile and Mexico–
succeeded in making all the arrangements of this sort
that they had planned, or because there was increasing
interest in seeking areas of convergence among
existing subregional schemes, as reflected in the
negotiations now under way between Mercosur and
the Andean Community, and in concluding
agreements between integration schemes and
non-member countries, as in the case of CACM and
the Dominican Republic. These types of alliances are
partly a response to the  challenges  posed by the
initiation of hemisphere-wide talks early in 1998, but
they are also a reflection of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries’ desire to broaden the scope of
their economic activity, which is still too narrow to
permit them to deal with international competition
successfully.
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The literature on economic integration frequently
refers to the idea of convergence, although it fails to
provide a precise definition of this concept.
Convergence is a dynamic phenomenon associated
with the steady-state concepts of asymmetry and
heterogeneity. In the context of economic integration,
convergence (which could be defined simply as the
gradual confluence of non-uniform elements towards
a more harmonious whole) can be understood as a
process leading towards a reduction in the differences or
asymmetries originally existing between the independent
components  of a  set. This process  may either be
spontaneous or may be negotiated by Governments
and endowed with some degree of institutionality.
Within the context of regional integration, a
distinction can be drawn between convergence within
integration schemes and convergence between
integration schemes. In its turn, the type of
convergence process seen within a given integration
scheme may relate to different dimensions of that
scheme depending, in essence, on the degree to which
the participating countries are committed to policy
harmonization as a basis for integration. The series of
stages involved in forming a wider market –which are
often described as being those of a free trade area,
customs union, common market, economic union, and
economic, monetary and policy union– entail
increasing degrees of policy harmonization and,
ultimately, convergence. Free trade areas are regarded
as being the least demanding mechanism in terms of
the degree of economic-policy convergence required
among the member countries,  while, at the other
extreme, an economic, monetary and policy union
requires the member countries to refrain almost
entirely from the exercise of national policy.
The type of convergence that may occur between
integration schemes also depends on the nature of the
schemes involved. For example, convergence
between free trade areas and customs unions entails a
reduction in the asymmetries existing between such
arrangements in terms of their basic rules and
standards regarding trade activity and their  tariff
rollback programmes.
The convergence of different schemes’ basic trade
instruments is a preliminary and fairly loose form of
convergence which, because of these very
characteristics, may be the most appropriate for the
current stage of integration of the three subregions in
Latin America and the Caribbean. The intraregional
negotiations now being held with a view to the
establishment of a free trade area between the Andean
Community and Mercosur correspond to this stage.
These talks are focusing on trade facilitation
instruments and on trade policies affecting access to a
broader market of this sort, such as tariffs, rules of
origin, safeguards, customs valuation and technical
standards.
Once the necessary adjustments have been made
in the basic aspects of the regimes agreed upon by the
relevant integration schemes, it can be expected that
as the trade relations among members of the schemes
intensify, there will be increasing calls for the
coordination of other policies that  influence  trade
between these countries and their ability to attract
investment.
Policy convergence in areas other than trade
would appear to be associated with a more advanced
form of integration than the types of processes upon
which the existing subregional schemes are just now
embarking. Examples of these processes would
include the efforts currently being made by the
Andean Community, Mercosur, CACM and
CARICOM to perfect their as yet incomplete customs
unions through the coordination and harmonization of
policies that indirectly affect the growth and operation
of broader markets and competition within them.
These include exchange policy, some types of
monetary and fiscal policies, and policies dealing with
competition, the attraction of foreign investment and,
in general, the unification of relevant economic
legislation and administrative regulations.
In all its various spheres, convergence represents
a challenge that has been gaining in consistency and
immediacy as subregional integration schemes move
towards more advanced stages of the process or begin
to broaden their scope. The proliferation of bilateral
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agreements has also given a great deal of momentum
to regional integration, although it has also led to a
fairly disorganized set of conditions relating to
competition in the region. The recent commencement
of the FTAA negotiation process lends greater
urgency to the objective of forming a fully integrated
regional market, since the agreements that may be
reached within that context could undermine the
raison d’êtreof the regional integration process if it
fails to advance beyond its present stage. On the other
hand, it has also been argued that current conditions
are conducive to convergence, since the countries’
economic policies share a common orientation.
At this juncture a number of different courses of
action may be proposed. The General Secretariat of
LAIA has proposed one such approach for completing
and modernizing its regulations and standards. The
General Secretariat is aware of the limitations of the
Association’s existing rules of origin and system of
safeguards and has drawn up specific proposals for
refining them based on WTO rules and the particular
requirements of intraregional trade. Member countries
have shown little interest in actually supporting this
initiative, however, and appear to prefer to rely on the
regulations established under subregional and
bilateral arrangements. Moreover, it would be very
difficult to bring the rules set forth under existing
bilateral and subregional agreements into line with the
types of regulations being proposed by LAIA, should
they be approved. The countries’ unwillingness to
support such an initiative is based not only on the fact
that the existing rules have been tailored to fit each
agreement, but also on the fear that the country
granting concessions might be inhibited from
expanding  upon  them or extending  them to  other
countries.
Another approach would be, as an outcome of the
FTAA negotiations, to substitute a common
hemisphere-wide set of rules for existing piecemeal
regulations, since the various negotiating groups do
cover all the key areas that would be involved in
setting up a broadly-defined free trade area. A fully
institutionalized and implemented FTAA could
eliminate the need for free trade agreements among
smal ler groupings even if the inst i tut ional
arrangements for these groups’ customs unions and
common markets were to remain in effect. After all,
the formation of a hemisphere-wide free trade area
does not necessarily mean that it would not be
desirable for a more homogeneous group of countries
to participate in a regional common market having
more ambitious objectives in terms of the achievement
of a balanced, integrated form of development. This
line of reasoning would only be strengthened further
if the FTAA talks were to fail to achieve their stated
objective. In any event, it is clear that the more
progress the various regional components can make in
the meantime, the more it will help to strengthen the
region’s negotiating position.
A third option, and there may well be a number of
others, would be for the countries to decide to
consolidate all their various regulations within the
context of LAIA or the proposed South American Free
Trade Area if the FTAA negotiations should prove
unsuccessful. The experience gained in the FTAA
talks would pave the way for this type of initiative,
especial ly since the region’s economic
complementarity agreements would be fully
operational by then and since the remaining
asymmetries among the countries of the region are
relatively minor in scope.
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4. Selected trade and trade policy issues
(a) Trade and industrial policies in the wake of the
Uruguay Round: how East Asia compares with
Latin America
The economic literature of recent decades has
helped to publicize the East Asian Governments’
successes in the area of economic policy, which have
enabled them to rectify a number of different market
failures and thus increase the pace of capital
formation, technical progress and structural economic
change. In other words, State intervention has
permitted a faster rate of economic growth than could
have been achieved withlaissez-fairepolicies. For this
and other reasons, the Latin American countries have
looked to the East Asian countries in an effort to learn
from their experiences.
Because of the recent financial crisis in the
economies of East Asia, however, radical changes
have had to be made in the regulations that used to
protect a number of their markets from international
competition. Specifically, countries that had to resort
to borrowing from multilateral financial institutions
will have to speed up their deregulation and
liberalization of product and factor markets in order to
fulfil the conditions stipulated by those institutions.
A number of other factors have also made it less
likely that the countries of the region could use
selective industrial or trade policies similar to those
successfully applied by their East Asian counterparts.
First of all, the globalization of the region’s markets is
pushing national firms into fierce competition on both
the domestic and external fronts in an arena in which
the ground rules are laid down by the major
transnational corporations. Given this globalization of
the production and financial sectors, the tendency that
is gradually taking hold in WTO and in other forums
is to use multilaterally agreed criteria as a basis for the
harmonization of national policies and standards. Nor
will the new types of regimes that the countries have
accepted at the multilateral level as an outcome of the
Uruguay Round –or those that may result from
pluri-lateral, subregional, regional or hemispheric
agreements– allow the countries to adopt selective
industrial or commercial policies as broad in scope as
those applied in the past by the East Asian countries.
The new round of multilateral trade negotiations
scheduled to begin in late 1999 could also impose
greater constraints with regard to the use of selective
policies. And even if this round of negotiations were
not to take place after all, the member countries of
WTO have already committed themselves to start talks
before the year 2000 on, among other matters, regimes
for  the  protection of  intellectual property and the
further liberalization of trade in agricultural products
and services. By the same token, WTO will need to
assess  the  headway made by the working groups
created in 1996 in addressing issues in the areas of
trade and investment, competition policy and
public-sector procurement.
Many experts feel, however, that the manoeuvring
room available to the region’s Governments in terms
of their non-traditional export promotion policies has
by no means disappeared altogether. Developing
countries need to concentrate on designing and
implementing policies in this area that are compatible
with the rules established in the Uruguay Round and
in other international agreements with a view to
improving the countries’ productive and technological
capabilities.
(b) Environmental barriers to Latin American
shrimp exports
Recent studies indicate that the trade
liberalization policies implemented during the 1990s
have helped to boost the region’s foreign trade in
goods and services, although imports have risen more
steeply than exports. In order to stimulate the growth
of exports, the Governments of Latin America and the
Caribbean have introduced export promotion
instruments aimed at altering their countries’ export
profiles while, however, taking care to maintain their
natural resource-based comparative advantages. The
new types of exports being developed include fishery
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products, and Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru,
Mexico, Brazil and Colombia are, in that order, among
Latin America’s largest exporters of these  items.
Shrimp is one of the products on which such countries
as Ecuador, Colombia and Honduras have focused
their export diversification efforts.
The United States is one of the world’s largest
importers of fishery products and is the market of
preference for many of Latin America’s fishery
exports. In recent years, however, the United States
has taken steps to limit imports in an effort to force
exporters to use production processes that comply
with its legislation regarding endangered species and
other environmental laws. This has sparked a number
of conflicts between trade and environmental interests.
The first such dispute concerned the ban imposed by
the United States Government on imports of tuna that
had been caught using techniques that threaten the
survival of the world’s dolphins. Later, it also moved
to restrict shrimp imports because shrimp trawlers
often catch sea turtles in their nets by accident. (Sea
turtles are protected by federal laws in the United
States under which the sale of all such products are
prohibited.) A number of different studies have
identified this practice as one of the main factors that
is pushing this species towards extinction.
Concern about the serious harm to sea turtles
caused by shrimp trawling has prompted various
environmental groups, including the Earth Island
Institute, to demand that the United States
Government ban these imports in order to force
exporters to change their fishing methods. Other
regulations have also been  established for shrimp
farms (aquaculture) because, without proper
management, they too cause environmental damage
(such as the destruction of adjacent wetlands), and a
great deal of pressure is therefore being brought for a
ban on imports of cultivated shrimp by the United
States as well.
Environmental protection is a legitimate objective
for all countries, regardless of their stage of
development. The possibility that environmental
standards may act as major barriers to international
trade and lead to the imposition of new conditions on
access to industrialized markets is nonetheless a cause
for concern. As a means of contributing to the analysis
of this issue, information is presented regarding the
United States ban on shrimp imports and on the legal
arguments used in the WTO tribunal considering this
unilateral measure, together with some preliminary
findings of an ongoing ECLAC research project
regarding what kinds of steps have been taken by two
Latin American countries (Colombia and Ecuador) in
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Chapter I
TRENDS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THEIR IMPACT
ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
A. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the Governments of Latin
America and the Caribbean have adopted fiscal and
monetary auster i ty pol ic ies to control the
macroeconomic imbalances produced by the debt
crisis of the 1980s; in addition, they have implemented
policies to liberalize and deregulate domestic markets
and programmes to privatize State assets, with a view
to reorganizing the system of incentives for the private
sector, improving the workings of markets and helping
to raise the international competitiveness of production
units located in their territory. Previous ECLAC
documents have pointed out that for these measures to
generate sustainable growth in the region, it is also
necessary for the countries to improve their participation
in dynamic trade flows and their access to technology,
foreign direct investment and financing.1
Despite all this, the financial crisis that has
directly affected some of the most successful
economies in the developing world, those of East and
South-East Asia, has shown that (i) the factors
influencing the position of the region’s countries in the
world economy are largely beyond the control of its
Governments, since the reactions triggered by
systemic crises cause all countries perceived as
“emerging markets” to bear the same costs of access
to capital markets, even if the structural conditions in
individual countries are different; and (ii) good
l inkages to the global economy and sol id
macroeconomic fundamentals are not enough to
prevent the devastating effects of external shocks.2
The high degree of interdependence between national
economies, the unconstrained mobility of capital and
the imbalances and weaknesses of the world economy
amplify any upheavals, so that the crisis confined
initially to a few countries, spreads through
commercial and financial channels to other countries
and regions (see ECLAC, 1998b).
The growth enjoyed by the world economy
between 1994 and 1997 can be attributed to the
economic policies adopted by countries and to the
virtuous interaction that took place between
international trade and financial liberalization and the
globalization of markets.3 On the other hand the scale
of the recent crisis has highlighted the systemic risks
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1 According to a recent ECLAC document, better linkages to the world economy should be reflected in an enhanced ability to take advantage of
growth cycles in international and regional trade, and to weather adverse cycles and financial instability, by diversifying products and markets, seeking
investment and partnerships abroad, applying internal stabilization mechanisms, and achieving better linkage between exports and other production
activities (ECLAC, 1998a, p. 16).
2 A United Nations report says that: “One of the ironies of the crisis is that it has turned the virtue of international openness into a potential source
of vulnerability” (United Nations, 1998, p. xii).
3 For analysis of certain aspects and bibliographical references, see ECLAC 1996, pp. 19-36, and ECLAC 1997a, pp. 23-32.
that globalization entails.4 Systemic financial crises
involve a large number of factors, agents, markets and
interactions, which makes it difficult to produce an
accurate forecast of their severity, scope and duration
and therefore prevents remedial action being taken in
the markets at a sufficiently early stage. Furthermore,
the expectations of market agents play a key role in
generating, prolonging and propagating a crisis.5 In
these circumstances, the actions of the very financial
institutions that ought to be taking the lead in
providing help to countries in crisis may themselves
end up by making matters worse.6
B. THE WORLD ECONOMY: WORLD TRADE AND OUTPUT
DURING THE PERIOD 1997-1998
The severity and scale of the Asian financial crisis,
which began in July 1997 with the devaluation of the
Thai currency (baht), took even experienced analysts
by surprise.7 In just a few months, the currencies of
several Asian countries lost between 40% and 80% of
their value, and other economies that had been
weakened by domestic problems, such as those of
Brazil and Russia, but also Japan’s, experienced strong
pressures in the same direction.8
The spectacular contraction of the economies of
East Asia, which had been growing rapidly until that
time, has had a major effect on a number of markets
for goods and services, given the extent to which these
economies  are  integrated into world trade.  In the
previous few years,  all  regions had increased  the
percentage of their  exports going  to  Asia.9 As is
pointed out in a publication by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
the dynamic Asian economies have become not only
major competitive suppliers on global markets for a
wide range of products, but also increasingly a
“locomotive” for the world economy through their
large and rising demand for imports,  financed  by
inflows of private capital (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 27).10
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4 An International Monetary Fund (IMF) document maintains that the financial crises of recent years differ from those of earlier periods in their
scale and scope (IMF, 1998a, p. 74). A subsequent document analyses the similarities and differences between the external debt crises of the 1980s,
the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 and the Asian crisis. The conclusions reached are that each crisis was preceded by a large influx of capital into the
countries affected, access to international markets on favourable terms, and a rapid rise in borrowing associated with increased exposure to intere t
and exchange rate movements (IMF, 1998b, p. 59).
5 For example, a number of analysts have drawn attention to the destabilizing effect of the risk ratings given by private institutions to countries
and organizations that issue financial instruments. These institutions –the main ones being Standard & Poors and Moody’s– rate countries and
organizations for foreign investors on the basis of their assessment of how likely it is that they will meet the liabilities they have accepted. The
categories range from triple A, which is the highest rating and is held by the most highly industrialized economies such as Germany, the United States
and France, to triple C, which is the lowest, passing through a combination of double and single letters and pluses and minuses.
6 The timing of currency devaluations in the four countries in crisis (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) shows that, for
the market, recourse to IMF meant a weaker currency. IMF has been much criticized for acting on the basis of incomplete diagnoses, for requiring
that policies be applied without regard to the specific origin of the difficultiesbeing faced by the individual countries concerned, and for the insensitivity
of its officials towards the effects of these policies on the markets (Feldstein, 1998; UNCTAD, 1998). Other analysts, such as Jeffrey Sachs, are even
more critical, arguing that IMF is part of the problem and not of the solution, since it encouraged premature liberalization of capital accounts, an error
which IMF itself later acknowledged to be one of the causes of the Asian crisis. Sachs also criticizes the Fund’s support for the policy of raising
interest rates to protect national currencies (Sachs, 1998).
7 As an IMF document points out, at each stage most market agents failed to anticipate the crisis (IMF, 1998b, p. 61). Again, the document points
out that in 1996, given the macroeconomic conditions obtaining at the time, it was difficult to foresee that the Asian economies would suffer from
the turbulence that later ensued (IMF, 1998b, p. 63).
8 By January 1998, the Indonesian currency (rupiah) had lost around 81% of its July 1997 value, the Malaysian currency (ringgit) 46% and the
Thai currency (baht) 55%, while between October and December 1997 the currency of the Republic of Korea (won) lost 55% of its value (IMF,
1998a, p. 2). In October 1997, around US$ 8 billion left Brazil (ECLAC, 1998c, p. 24).
9 In 1996, more than 30% of United States exports went to Asia, and the proportion was even higher in some specific sectors: for example, 40%
of United States agricultural exports were to that region (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 33).
10 In 1996, the total merchandise imports of seven Asian countries (Brunei, Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam), which make up the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), amounted to more than US$ 372 billion, putting ASEAN in
third place in world trade, after the European Union and the United States, and before Japan, which was in fourth place (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 28).
1. World output and its main components
The direct impact of the Asian crisis on the world
economy was not heavily felt in 1997, since despite
the fall in growth rates that took place in the last
quarter of 1997 the Asian countries  affected still
showed an average rate of 5% for the year as a whole,
although this was lower than the rate of 6.4% recorded
in 1996. The growth rate of the developing countries
as a whole declined slightly, but with an average of
5.4% they grew much more quickly than the
industrialized countries, mainly because of the
performance of China (8.8%) and Latin America
(5.3%), which posted one of its highest rates in over
two decades (UNCTAD, 1998, table 1, p. 5; ECLAC,
1998b, pp. 13-14).
The moderate average growth rate (2.7%)
recorded by the industrialized economies in 1997 was
mainly the product of good growth in the United States
(3.9%) and export-led economic recovery in the
European Union (EU) (2.5%). The Japanese economy,
which had expanded by almost 4% in 1996, grew by
less than 1% (UNCTAD, 1998, table 1, p. 5). In 1998
the Japanese economy has been confronted with a
major recession owing to its close ties to the most
severely affected Asian economies, and gross domestic
product (GDP) is expected to show negative growth
of between 1.2% and 2% (ECLAC, 1998h, p. 6).
In 1998,  the decline  in demand from Asia is
expected to affect growth in Europe, mainly owing to
the effects on trade. Nonetheless, given how small a
component extra-European trade accounts for in the
growth of economic activity in the European Union,11
and given the expansion being seen in the internal
market, European output is expected to rise by around
2.8% over the year. Falling stock markets have meant
reductions in interest rates  and increases in  bond
values. Where Europe is concerned, however,
institutional investors dominate both markets, which
should limit the “wealth” effect of these factors on the
economy as a whole (ECLAC, 1998h, pp. 2-3).
In 1998, the United States was in its eighth year
of uninterrupted growth, which has lasted since March
1991, with stable prices and the  lowest  levels of
unemployment seen for 28 years.12 After expanding
by almost 4% in 1997, the United States economy
experienced rapid rates of growth in the first and third
quarters of 1998, although the second quarter was
affected by a strike at the General Motors company.
This growth has been driven by private consumption
and in part by investment, mainly in capital goods
(United States Department of Commerce, 1998).
Strong private consumption has meant an increase in
imports of goods and services and a trade deficit,
which already stood at more than US$ 124 billion at
the  end  of September and  could reach more than
US$ 220 billion by the end of 1998.13 There are some
worrying aspects, such as (i) the high degree to which
private consumption is dependent on stock market
gains (see box I.1)14and (ii) the possibility that share
pr ices may be inf lated owing to company
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions.15
The United States economy has benefited from
the effect that the Asian crisis has had in depressing
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11 According to data from the World Trade Organization (WTO), demand from Asia as a whole (China, Japan and all the other countries) absorbed
less than 10% of European exports in 1996.
12 In April 1998 the unemployment rate was 4.3%, and since 1994 it has held below 6%, the rate which has been defined as the point of equilibrium
between wage pressures and other price pressures (IMF, 1998c, p. 94).
13 In October 1998 the United States Congress set up a commission to study the causes and consequences of the country’s trade deficit; one of its
tasks will be to assess the impact of the deficit on the industrial structure, on wages and on the number and quality of jobs (Trade Deficit Review
Commission). The commission was created as part of the law approving the new United States contributions to the IMF (Americas Trade, 1998).
14 In September 1998 the personal savings rate in the United States stood at less than 0.2%, which reveals that stock market gains have replaced
savings from earned income (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief,5 November 1998).
15 Since May 1998 a number of articles inThe Economisthave drawn attention to the danger that the bubble in which the United States economy
is operating could burst. See in particular the issues for August 29th-September 4th1998; October 17th-23rd1998; November 21st-27th 1998; November
28th-December 4th 1998.
the prices of primary commodities –including energy–
and manufactured goods, and hence reducing
inflationary pressures considerably.16 Nonetheless,
the leading role that the United States has taken on in
sustaining the expansion of world trade and the
inability of other industrialized countries replace it in
this role in the medium term are a source of deep
concern, given the consequences that a sharp fall in
economic growth there could have for growth in Latin
America and Asia.
Box I.1
CONSUMPTION AND THE “WEALTH” EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES
During the 1990s, economic growth in the United States,
when measured either by the increase in wealth or by the
growth of family incomes, has been propelled to a great
extent by stock markets gains. In mid-1998 Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, said
that around US$ 12 billion had been added to the wealth
of Americans between 1994 and 1997 as a result of gains
deriving from increased share prices (The Economist,
1998b, pp. 57 and 58). This increase in wealth has been
paralleled since 1985 by falling household saving rates.
Again, there is evidence that families are using a
substantial part of their wage savings to buy financial
assets, and that wealth is being accumulated in share
assets (Hurst, Ching Louh and Stafford, 1998).
Household consumption is determined by expected
income over the course of a lifetime from both capital and
labour. Changes in financial wealth, whether they derive
from a change in interest rates  or  from asset price
movements, alter the income from capital and thus affect
aggregate consumption. The magnitude of the “wealth”
effect depends on the value of accumulated savings in
relation to income, and on people’s willingness to use
accumulated wealth to finance current spending.  A
number of studies have concluded that the impact of the
“wealth” effect produced by stock market gains differs
sharply from one country to another. In the United States,
an increase of one dollar in wealth from share price gains
tends to raise consumption by between 3 and 5 cents.a
However, analysts believe that these effects take some
time to be felt, with time lags that can vary from one to
three years, and consequently that gains made in 1997 and
early 1998 could contribute to the financing of household
consumption for some time to come.b
Now, since inequality in the distribution of wealth is
quite pronounced, and the distribution of shareholding
wealth even more so, it might be concluded that the share
price effect would benefit only a small part of the United
States population. There are, however, indications to the
contrary. In fact, certain studies suggest that between
1983 and 1992 there was a tendency for direct and indirect
ownership of  shares to become more  widely  spread,
although still highly concentrated: in 1983, 55% of shares
were owned by 0.5% of shareholders, a percentage which
fell to 36.8% in 1992 (Poterba and Samwick, 1995).c
According toThe Economistmagazine, almost 50%
of United States families now own shares, as against 25%
in the period preceding the 1987 stock market crisis. This
figure is  consistent with the finding, obtained from
another source, that between 1989 and 1994 the
proportion of households owning shares rose from 27.9%
to 34.5% (Hurst, Ching Louh and Stafford, 1998, p. 269).
Although the data used in this latter study do not enable
firm conclusions to be drawn, they show that the
distribution of wealth increased in the period 1989-1994,
which means that, when the reserves accumulated in
pension funds are factored in, the growth in net wealth
was large enough to produce a substantial “wealth” effect
on aggregate consumption, which could extend
throughout the period 1995-2000.
a The “wealth” effect is less pronounced in Canada, Japan and other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
b “International”,Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 5 November 1998.
c Concentration is higher if only direct ownership is considered, given that in 1992 0.5% of shareholders owned almost 60% of shares
(Poterba and Samwick, 1995, p. 328). The authors did not find any strong evidence that a “wealth” effect deriving from share price
gains had been having any impact on consumption.
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16 For an analysis of the repercussions of the Asian crisis on specific products, see UNCTAD (1998, annex to chapter II), and IMF, 1998a, pp. 125-130.
2. World trade in 1997-1998
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the volume of merchandise exports grew by 10% in
1997, one of the highest rates seen since 1976, but the
WTO secretariat estimates that in 1998 this growth
rate will fall by half, to 4% or 5%. In dollar terms, the
value of exports will remain unchanged or diminish
slightly, owing to the fall in prices for primary
commodities and manufactured goods, although
prices have tended to fall less for the latter than for the
former (see figure I.1).17 In 1998 dollar prices for
internationally traded goods are expected to decline
for the third consecutive year, which could mean that
average prices for merchandise exports as a whole will
return to the level seen in 1991, the lowest of this
decade (WTO, 1998e).
As far as 1999 is concerned, predictions  are
difficult, but forecasts for growth in world trade have
been revised downwards. The consensus among
analysts seems to be that the most likely outcome is
for a moderate increase in the volume of trade over
1998. Clearly, any increase in the value of world
exports in dollar terms is dependent on recovery in the
prices of primary commodities and on the behaviour
of the dollar. The final outcome must depend to a great
extent on tendencies in the international capital
markets, economic recovery in the Asian countries,
particularly Japan, and the sustainability of growth in
the European countries and the United States.
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17 In March 1998, WTO was predicting that the effects of the Asian crisis would be limited and that the 1998 rate of growth in the volume of
exports would be no more than 25% lower than the 1997 rate (WTO press release, 19 March 1998, on the WTO Website [http://www.wto.org]).
In the first nine months of 1998, Asian exports fell
by 7% and imports by around 16%. The imports of the
five Asian countries most affected by the financial
crisis (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, the Republic
of Korea and Thailand)  fell by 30%,  while their
exports dropped by 3%.18 Japanese exports fell by
8.5% and imports by 19%, so that the country’s trade
surplus increased yet further (WTO, 1998e, pp. 4-5).
The value of intraregional trade fell by around 25%
from the 1997 figure. The collapse of regional markets
explains why Korean exports have recovered much
less strongly than did Mexican exports after the 1994
financial crisis. Before the 1997 crisis, almost half of
all Korean exports went to other countries in Asia.
Moreover, prices for the industrial products in which
the Republic of Korea specializes (memory chips,
computer monitors, hard disks, chemical products,
plastics, textile fibres and iron and steel products,
among others) were falling even before the crisis.19
As mentioned earlier, United States imports grew
strongly in the first nine months of 1998. This growth
has been put at 10% in volume terms, which is almost
double the rate of growth in world trade, whereas
exports grew by no more than 3%.20 By contrast,
Europe and Japan have continued to run trade
surpluses, although in the first half of 1998 EU exports
to third countries fell and imports rose. Intra-European
trade increased by around 3.5%, which is lower than
the rate of growth in imports from third countries. The
more pronounced growth of European trade was due
to the depreciation of European currencies against the
dollar (WTO, 1998e, p. 5).
Despite the severity of the financial crisis and the
harsh adjustment measures taken by the Governments
of affected countries, however, the WTO secretariat
has not found evidence to show that international trade
liberalization policies have suffered at the multilateral,
regional or unilateral levels, even if trade protection
measures aimed at restraining increases in what are
regarded as unfairly-competing imports have been
intensified (see chapter III). WTO is looking for
Governments to maintain this commitment to trade
liberalization as preparations to begin the new round
of multilateral trade negotiations go ahead (see box I.2).
C. THE EFFECTS ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
In December 1998, ECLAC estimated possible growth
in Latin America at around 2.3%, factoring in the
effects of policies to adjust demand, chiefly in Brazil
and Chile; the fall in prices for products exported by
the region, mainly petroleum and cereals; and the
effects of El Niño in Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru,
and  those of Hurricane Mitch in Central America
(particularly in Honduras and Nicaragua) (ECLAC,
1998i, unnumbered table, p. 2).21 The 1998 growth
estimates for Latin America and the Caribbean that
had been produced by ECLAC and other institutions
were revised downwards in the light of events during
the year.22
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18 Despite the devaluation of the Korean currency, the Korean International Trade Association (KITA) expects the value of exports to contract by
5% to 10% in the second half of 1998, which would be the first overall reduction since 1958 (The Economist, 1998, pp. 68-73).
19 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development andThe Economistwarn of the dangers of believing that currency devaluation is
in itself enough to produce export growth (UNCTAD, 1998;The Economist, September 12th-18th 1998, pp. 68-73).
20 According to WTO, in the first nine months of 1998 the prices of imports into the United States dropped by an average of 6%, while export
prices fell by 3%; imports into the United States rose by 4% in value, while the value of exports dropped slightly. Consequently, the difference
between export and import growth is even greater in real terms (i.e., in terms of value net of price fluctuations) than in nominal dollar value terms
(WTO, 1998e, p. 5).
21 The World Bank has estimated that Latin America will grow by 2.5% in 1998 and only 0.6% in 1999 (see the Website of the World Bank, Group
of Economic Prospects).
22 In September 1997, before the effects of the financial crisis had made themselves felt, ECLAC put 1998 growth at 4.3%. At the end of June
1998, the ECLAC secretariat forecast growth of 3%, suggesting that the Asian crisis had taken a little over 1% off regional output growth (ECLAC,
1998c, pp. 13-15).
Box I.2
THE NEW ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
At the second session of the WTO Ministerial
Conference, held in Geneva between 18 and 20 May
1998, the ministers attending decided on a work schedule
to be followed until the third Meeting, which will take
place in the United States between 30 November and 3
December 1999. Under the direction of the WTO General
Council, the representatives of Governments are to begin
the process of implementing existing agreements fully
and preparing for the third Ministerial Meeting. The work
schedule of the General Council will include the
following:
(a) Recommendations concerning:
(i) Issues, including those brought forward by
Members, relating to implementation of the
existing agreements and decisions;
(ii) The negotiations already mandated at Marrakesh,
to ensure that such negotiations begin on schedule;
(iii)Future work provided for under other existing
agreements and decisions taken at Marrakesh;
(b) Recommendations concerning other possible future
work on the basis of the work programme initiated in
Singapore;
(c) Recommendations on follow-up to the High-Level
Meeting on Least-Developed Countries;
Recommendations arising from consideration of other
matters proposed and agreed to by Members concerning
their multilateral trade relations (WTO, 1998e).
In the third session of the Ministerial Conference, the
General Council is to submit recommendations, on the
basis of consensus, for decisions concerning the further
organization and management of the work programme
arising from the above, including the scope, structure and
time-frames that will ensure that the work programme is
begun and concluded expeditiously.
The first task to be undertaken by WTO is
implementation of the Marrakesh agreements, which will
involve executing the “implicit” work programme,
namely, putting into practice the commitments made at
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, according to which
new negotiations are to be commenced at the sectoral
level, chiefly as regards services and agricultural
products, in accordance with a timetable agreed upon in
advance. The impossibility of reaching consensus on all
important issues in the Uruguay  Round negotiations
meant that it was necessary to put together a programme
“implicit” in the different agreements, which enabled
progress to be made without the need to begin formal
negotiating rounds. This programme covers four sets of
issues: (i) pending matters; (ii) special review of the
implementation and functioning of certain mechanisms
provided for in the WTO agreements; (iii) periodic review
of the implementation and functioning of these
mechanisms; and (iv) implementation of the commitment
to begin new negotiations for gradual liberalization of
trade in services in the year 2000, and for ongoing reform
of trade in agricultural products by the end of 1999.a
At the first session of the WTO Ministerial
Conference, held in Singapore in December 1996, three
working groups were set up: one in charge of examining
the relationship between trade and investment; one to
study issues raised by members in relation to the
interaction between trade and competition policy,
including anti-competitive practices,  with a  view  to
identifying any areas that might merit further attention
within WTO, and a third with responsibility for carrying
out a study on the transparency of public procurement
practices, taking national policies into account, and, on
the basis of this study, producing material for inclusion
in an appropriate agreement (ECLAC, 1997a, box I.1, p.
33).b
The main difficulty involved in drawing up the work
programme is to strike a balance between the interests of
all WTO Members, since there are disagreements
between them as regards the characteristics of the new
negotiations, their scope, and what new issues should be
included. The developing countries want to keep the
traditional round format, in which all issues are dealt with
at the same time, and which does not end until balanced
agreements have been reached on all of them (single
agreement). The preference of the United States is for
negotiat ions by subject area, to be conducted
individually, while  the European  Union  is  giving its
backing to negotiations that deal simultaneously with
agriculture, services and other issues as an integrated
whole, all subject to the same timetable, and proposes that
negotiations begin and end within the space of three years
at most.c
a For further details on each of these subjects, see ECLAC, 1996, pp. 148-153.
b The working groups submitted their reports in December 1998 (see these reports on the WTO Website).
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Growth in the volume of regional trade fell from
almost 14% in 1997 to around 8% in 1998, owing to
the decline in world demand (which mainly affected
Chile and Peru), to fiercer competition from Asian
exporters (which affected Brazil and Mexico), and to
the climatic phenomena already mentioned (see
chapter III and table III.2). As detailed in chapter III,
growth in the economies in 1997 and some of 1998 led
to a worsening  balance of trade,  and this  in  turn
exacerbated current account deficits.23
The deter iorat ion of the international
environment is likely to affect the region through three
channels: (i) radical decline in flows of short-term
international capital and more expensive international
financing, (ii)  large falls  in  the  prices of  primary
commodities and (iii) a slowdown in the growth of
world trade, due to lower demand in Asia.
As was pointed out earlier, the spectacular fall-off
in Asian demand has affected the prices of primary
commodities, both mineral and agricultural (see box
I.3). In addition, petroleum and copper have continued
their downward trend, with nominal prices reaching
their lowest levels in several decades (see figure I.2).
The high degree to which most Latin American
countries are dependent on what is still a small number
of products considerably increases the vulnerability of
their external sectors to falls in the prices of these
goods (see table I.1 and box I.3). Obviously, if exports
represent a high proportion of GDP, in the region of
35%, and more than 40% of these exports are
accounted for by a single product, it is not hard to work
out that a drop of 10% in the price of that product will
lead to a fall of almost 1.5% in national income,
assuming that the volume exported remains stable.
If the countries are to be able to make up for price
declines by increasing export volumes, demand must
obviously keep expanding. As has already been
pointed out, however, before the Asian crisis global
export growth was dependent on economic expansion
in the United States and East Asia and, to a lesser
extent, on growing demand in Latin America. The
adjustment programmes applied in Asia and some
Latin American countries have meant a large decline
in demand from these countries, leaving the United
States the main factor in determining whether global
demand expands or contracts. Only a few Latin
American countries send any considerable proportion
of their exports to Asia (see table I.2), but the United
States is a major importer from all the countries in the
region. Chile and Peru, which have been successful in
diversifying their exports into Asian markets, have
been the most affected by the decline in Asian demand.
When the economic circumstances of the Asian
countries improves, however, these diversification
programmes should have beneficial effects for the
economies of Chile and Peru.
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23 In 1998, by contrast with 1997, the region had to resort to some US$ 22 billion from international reserves and compensatory capital to finance
the current account deficit (ECLAC, 1998i, p. 10, ECLAC Website [http://www.eclac.org]).
Box I.3
CHANGES IN THE PRICES OF SOME PRIMARY COMMODITIES
With the exception of a small group of products, primary
commodity prices have  fallen substantially  since the
financial crisis began. According to IMF, between
November 1997 and November 1998 primary
non-petroleum commodity prices fell by an average of
13%, with a drop of 13% for food products, 17% for
beverages (this decline being strongly influenced by the
prices  of  tea and coffee), 15%  for  agricultural raw
materials and 15% for metals. Furthermore, in the same
period the price of crude dropped 38%, while that of
petrol fell 32%.a
Since the beginning of the 1990s the rate of growth in
the consumption of primary goods has been higher in
most of the developing countries of Asia than in the rest
of the world. For example, between  1992  and 1996
consumption by the developing economies of Asia
accounted for approximately 66% of the increase in oil
consumption.b These economies also account for a
substantial share of international demand for some basic
metals and certain foodstuffs (grains, fats and oils). When
specific markets for primary products are analysed, it is
found that the crisis has had a direct impact on the demand
for aluminium, tin, zinc, lead, refined copper, nickel,
natural rubber, cotton, wool  and hides. However, it
appears to have had less of an impact on prices for crude
oil, woods, steel, meat, maize and soya derivatives.
Other factors have affected prices on the supply side.
In the past two years there has been a large increase in the
production of certain agricultural goods: in particular,
grain production has increased by 9.5%, while
consumption has grown by only 5.5%. Production of the
main vegetable oils has increased by almost 9% over the
same period, the highest level of output being reached in
the 1997/1998 season. Sugar production also increased
considerably in 1997, with growth of 7.2%, as against a
4.5% increase in demand in the same year (World Bank,
1998).
The oil price fell again in the third quarter of 1998,
as a consequence of: (i) lower demand due to the Asian
crisis and a mild winter in the northern hemisphere;
(ii) increased production by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and (iii) a rise
in oil stocks at the different stages of the selling chain. In
1996 crude oil accounted for more than 50% of
Venezuelan exports, and it also represented a major share
of exports from Ecuador (31%), Colombia (21%),
Mexico (11%) and Argentina (10%).
The price of copper also fell back substantially.
Between 1992 and 1996, the share of the Republic of
Korea and another four Asian countries in world
copper consumption rose from 5.5% to more than 8%,
and  this share fell because of the crisis. The price
dropped despite increased demand for refined copper
from the United States and Europe owing to a
substantial upturn in the automotive and construction
sectors. This price trend has also been influenced by
an increase in the world supply of copper. In 1996,
copper accounted for almost 40% of Chilean exports
and 18% of Peruvian exports (see table I.1).
The fall in the price of Arabica coffee chiefly reflects
the production situation in Brazil. After a substantial drop
in coffee production during the 1997/1996 season by
comparison with the 1996/1995 season, due to the effects
of El Niño in the main producer countries, the Association
of Coffee Exporters in Brazil announced that they
expected to produce 35,200,000 sacks in the 1998/1999
season, as against 22,000,000 sacks in the 1997/1998
season. In 1996, coffee accounted for 14% of Colombian
exports, and a substantial proportion of the exports of the
Central American countries: Costa Rica (14%), El
Salvador (33%), Guatemala (23%), Honduras (28%) and
Nicaragua (19%).
Since October 1997 the price of bananas has remained
stable, although it increased somewhat during the second
half of the year, mainly because of a decline in supply
from Ecuador and Central America. In 1996 bananas
accounted for around 20% of Ecuadorian exports, while
this percentage was 23% in the case of Costa Rica and
16% in that of Honduras.
a See table 2, “Price indices for primary commodities excluding petroleum, 1995-1998”, on the IMF Website [http://www.imf.org].
Between June 1997 and January 1998, the IMF primary commodities price index fell by 11% in terms of special drawing rights, and
by around 14% in dollar terms (IMF, 1998b, p. 125, note 1).
bBetween 1992 and 1996 the Republic of Korea, together with other less developed Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
and Thailand) increased their share of world petroleum consumption from 5% to 6.5%. See IMF, 1998a, p. 125.
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Table I.1
MAIN COMMODITIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE EXPORTS
OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN 1997
Commodity as a percentage of total exports
Commodity
Between 5%
10% - 20% Over 20%
and <10%
Ores Iron and steel Brazil (12.7)
Copper Peru (16.1) Chile (42.2)




Petroleum Petroleum and Mexico (9.5) Argentina (10.9) Venezuela (82.9)
petroleum products Ecuador  (29.4)
Colombia (23.5)
Foodstuffs Meat Nicaragua (6.1) Uruguay (13.3)
Shrimp Nicaragua (9.0) Ecuador (16.7)
Bananas Guatemala (6.5) Honduras (14.0) Ecuador  (25.4)
Costa Rica (23.2)
Wheat Argentina (5.1)
Rice Uruguay  (9.4)
Maize Argentina (5.1)
Sugar Nicaragua (8.0) Guatemala (10.9)
Coffee Peru (5.9) Colombia (19.6) El Salvador (38.1)
Brazil (5.2) Nicaragua (18.5) Honduras (28.0)
Costa Rica (13.8) Guatemala (25.1)
Food products Fishmeal Peru (15.3)
Soya Paraguay (43.3)
Oil cakes and Bolivia (9.2)
oilseed meal Argentina (8.8)
Brazil (5.1)
Vegetable oils Argentina (8.2)
Raw materials Cotton Paraguay (6.1)
Wool Uruguay  (8.1)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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Table I.2
PARTICIPATION OF ASIA IN TRADE FLOWS OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1990-1997
Imports Exports
Country
1990 1995 1996 1997 1990 1995 1996 1997
Argentina 11.6 12.3 12.0 13.1 10.0 10.2 11.0 10.8
Barbados 10.1 11.9 10.3 12.8 0.4 1.4 0.9 1.1
Bolivia 11.7 16.0 15.9 15.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
Brazil 10.6 13.9 14.6 15.2 16.7 17.1 16.3 14.5
Chile 13.7 18.0 17.1 17.1 26.3 34.8 34.6 35.0
Colombia 10.3 13.6 10.2 11.9 4.6 5.8 4.3 4.3
Costa Rica 12.0 7.1 7.8 … 2.5 3.5 3.2 3.4
Ecuador 12.9 13.9 10.0 10.8 5.7 10.9 11.9 10.8
El Salvador 5.1 8.9 7.8 6.5 1.2 2.1 1.3 1.2
Guatemala 9.7 7.6 6.7 6.9 4.4 7.6 2.6 2.9
Honduras 10.4 5.7 6.5 5.0 6.8 7.4 4.1 4.3
Jamaica 8.2 10.8 8.7 … 1.0 2.5 2.5 …
Mexico 7.6 10.2 9.5 10.1 6.7 2.5 2.9 2.3
Nicaragua 11.6 9.1 10.8 6.8 9.1 2.6 0.6 0.9
Panama 9.8 10.3 10.8 12.0 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.6
Paraguay 30.2 30.3 20.3 19.6 3.8 7.5 2.5 3.5
Peru 9.5 16.9 15.0 15.0 19.1 26.9 26.1 24.5
Saint Lucia 9.7 9.5 10.3 … 0.0 0.2 0.2 …
Trinidad and Tobago 8.6 9.2 9.5 7.9 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.2
Uruguay 6.7 8.9 8.6 10.0 7.3 11.6 11.2 9.8
Venezuela 6.9 8.4 6.9 7.2 4.3 1.9 0.9 0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 9.8 12.4 11.6 12.1 10.5 9.7 8.9 8.2
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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Chapter II
THE LARGE ECONOMIC SPACES
With the selection of the 11 countries that will participate
in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and the formation of the European Central
Bank (ECB), the member States of the European Union
took the final steps toward monetary unification, to be
formalized in early 1999.24The first steps were taken
in 1985, when the European Commission (the
executive organ of the European Union), under the
chairmanship of Jacques Delors, designed and put into
effect the initiative of the single market, Europe 1992.
In the mid-1980s, the movement toward
formation of a single European area had a strong
influence on the strategies of the other industrialized
countries and many developing countries for
improving their linkages with the global economy. In
particular, the Government of the United States
initiated a change in its traditional opposition to
preferential agreements when in 1987 it signed a free
trade agreement with Israel and subsequently in
January of 1988 a broader agreement with Canada.
The process accelerated in June of 1990 when the
Presidents of the United States and Mexico announced
their intent to negotiate a free trade agreement. In
October of that same year, Canada joined the talks, and
on 17 December 1992, the text of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by the
Presidents of the three countries. Lastly, just before
NAFTA took effect, in December of 1994, the first
Summit of the Americas was held in Miami, where the
Presidents and Heads of Government of 34 countries
of the Americas (excluding Cuba) committed to an
extremely ambitious programme of inter-American
cooperation, which included the formation of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Concurrently, starting in 1993, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, in which three
Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico and, starting
in 1998, Peru) participate, was gradually transformed
into a forum for the liberalization of trade and
investment, although with its own characteristics.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
must prepare themselves for this new international
arena, in which they are major players, since they are
involved in one form or another in the three proposals
for large free trade areas. Due to its size and scope the
plan to form a European monetary union will have a
significant impact both on internal conditions in
Europe and on the international monetary system.25
The political clout and the economic expression of the
future EMU will inevitably, although gradually, modify
thepower structure, functioning,policiesand framework
of alliances of the international monetary system.26
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24 On 1 June 1998, the European Central Bank was established, with headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. The Executive Board was composed of
Willem F. Duisemberg, Chairman, and Christian Noyer, Vice-Chairman, plus Eugenio Domingo Solans, Sirkka Hamalainen, Otmar Issing and
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa.
25 For bibliographic references, see Obstfeld (1997).
26 The importance of the euro as a currency of denomination in international trade should increase, given the economic impact of the European
Union. The international monetary system is currently dominated by the dollar, which accounts for more than 60% of international reserves, 80% of
bank loans and 40% of securities issues (see SELA, 1998a).
On the other hand, there is an important
component of institutional learning that must be
emphasized.  The  practice  of  European integration
enables the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean to learn about the institutional and
economic aspects of macroeconomic integration,
while the negotiations within APEC provide the
countries of Latin America that participate in this
forum a knowledge of new working and negotiation
methodologies that can be utilized in other negotiation
forums. Moreover, the experience gained in the FTAA
working groups has also served to enrich and generate
externalities for the negotiating activity of the region’s
countries.
To contribute to this process of knowledge and
learning, this chapter briefly describes some of the
events that have occurred recently in these four large
economic areas in formation. Recent developments in
Latin American and Caribbean integration are
analysed separately in chapter VII.
A. EUROPEAN UNION
The countries of the European Union continue to move
ahead with their schedule of major changes: the
introduction of a single currency and the formation of
the single European area, formalized in the Agenda
2000, presented on 16 July 1997 by the chairman of
the European Commission to the European Parliament
(ECLAC, 1997a, p. 36). Thus the European Union is
facing the dual challenge of deepening economic
integration and expanding the economic area to
include 10 countries of central and eastern Europe.
According to analysts, the economic
consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean of
the creation of the euro may take two forms: one, due
to its effect on growth in the European Union; the
other, through the international value and role of the
euro.27 Therefore, it is anticipated that the impact will
initially be minor, but will increase as the EMU
process is strengthened and the euro has greater
acceptance as a store of value. Most probably, the
effect will be positive in the medium and long term.28
It is hoped that EMU will have to grow at a faster rate
than the rate observed in recent years, since in the
framework of monetary integration, the countries will
have greater incentives to institute economic reforms
enabling their economies to be more dynamic, in a
climate of greater transparency and internal
competition. A market the size of all the countries of
the European Union, unified and growing, should have
a positive impact on exports from Latin America and
the Caribbean.
On 25 March 1998, the European Commission
submitted to the European  Council  and European
Parliament its recommendation for the 11 countries of
that region that met the requirements as to interest rates
and inflation, exchange  rate stability, and budget
deficit, and were thus considered ready to start stage
three of EMU.29 Subsequently, on 2 May 1998, the
European Council decided unanimously that
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27 For a more detailed analysis, see Zahler (1997) and Ramírez (1998).
28 There is a consensus as to the positive effects that the growth of the European capital market will have on the international financial system,
which will expand the region’s opportunities to take in funds and supplement its internal savings. However, the creation of the euro will not necessarily
mean greater stability in foreign exchange fluctuations or in the general behaviour of capital flows in other regions.
29 The Maastricht Treaty defined the convergence requirements that the countries of the European Union would have to meet for admission to the
Economic and Monetary Union, and in January of 1994 it formed the European Monetary Institute, the entity in charge of overseeing convergence
and laying the groundwork for the European Central Bank. The first three requirements refer to the inflation rate (it must not exceed by more than
1.5% the inflation rate of the three members with the lowest inflation), interest rates (long-term interest rates must not exceed by more than 2% the
long-term interest rates of the three countries with the lowest inflation) and exchange rates (they must be stable and be within the margins of normal
fluctuation stipulated in the mechanism of the exchange rates of the European monetary system for at least two years). The fourth requirement,
regarding fiscal policies, sets limits for fiscal deficits and government debt: the general deficit of the Government must not exceed 3% of gross
domestic product (GDP) and the public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP at the start of the Economic and Monetary Union.
11 member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain) met the requirements to adopt the
single currency, the euro, on 1 January 1999.30
The legal and institutional situation of the central
banks was also analysed, especial ly their
independence and the compatibility of their
regulations with the provisions of EMU. Eight
countries (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the  Netherlands and Portugal)  have
legislations  that are currently  compatible with the
Maastricht Treaty. In four countries, Austria, France,
Luxembourg and Spain, legislation has been proposed
that, i f promulgated, wi l l assure adequate
compatibility. For constitutional reasons, the
legislative changes proposed in Sweden cannot be
adopted until the end of 1998; moreover, the
legislative bill and the  Maastricht  Treaty are  still
thought to be incompatible in some respects.
If we consider the characteristics of the 11
countries selected, EMU will constitute a zone of more
than 300,000,000 inhabitants, which will represent
19.4% of world output and 18.6% of international
trade, versus the 19.6% of world output and 16.6% of
international trade corresponding to the United States,
and the 7.7% of world output and 8.2% of international
trade corresponding to Japan.
The European Central Bank and the national
central banks of the member countries of the European
Union will constitute the European System of Central
Banks, which will formulate monetary policy in stage
three of EMU.31 The Administrative Council of the
System (to be composed of the members of the
Executive Board of the European Central Bank and
the governors of the central banks of the countries that
will make up EMU in its third stage) will be in charge
of making monetary policy decisions. Management of
that policy will be concentrated in a supranational
body, the Executive Board of the European Central
Bank, which will be responsible for formulating and
implementing the monetary policy of the euro zone,
by virtue of its own authority and by coordinating the
activities of the central banks of the countries
participating in EMU.
As to fiscal policy, most budgetary decisions will
be under the responsibi l i ty of the national
Governments, although the  community authorities
will have the power to monitor government spending.
At the meeting of the European Council held in
Amsterdam in June 1997, the Stability and Growth
Pact was signed, which sets forth the bases of the
supervision in fiscal matters that will be exercised
during stage three of EMU.32 In early March of each
year, the national authorities will submit a report on
their public finances, on which the Council will make
a ruling in early May. If there is found to be an
excessive deficit, mandatory recommendations will be
made and financial sanctions will be imposed on the
countries that do not adopt the recommendations.
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30 As to the budgetary situation of the member States, the Commission indicated that only three countries have a public debt less than the 60%
reference value. However, the trend in recent years, together with the information on the 1998 budgets and the convergence programmes of the
countries, have made it possible to adopt a positive stance as to the fiscal situation. Denmark and the United Kingdom exercised their right not to
participate in EMU as of 1 January 1999, while, according to the Commission, Greece and Sweden failed to meet the necessary requirements. However,
Greece could be incorporated in stage three of the Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 2001 (European Union, 1998a and 1998b).
31 The European System of Central Banks is composed of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of all the countries of the
European Union. The central banks of the countries that are not EMU members may conduct national monetary policies but do not participate in the
decisions regarding monetary policy for the euro area or its implementation (see the website of the Central European Bank [http://www.ecb.int]).
32 See Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 regarding heightened oversight of budgetary situations and oversight and coordination of economic
policies and Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 regarding acceleration and clarification of the excessive deficit procedure, in theOfficial Journal of
the European Communities, No. L 209, 2 August 1997.
B. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
NAFTA is the first experiment in economic
integration negotiated between two industrialized,
high-income economies (Canada and the United
States) and a semi-industrialized economy (Mexico),
which has an average per capita income level of less
than 21% of the NAFTA average.33 Although it is a
free trade agreement, the term is applied in the broad
sense of trade in goods and services, investment and
technology. Unlike in the European Union, the
institutional apparatus of the NAFTA is fairly small
and inter-governmental in nature.34
At present, the course of the NAFTA is centered
primarily on negotiations between the United States
and  Mexico.  The  main reason  for  this  is that the
Canadian and United States economies are already
highly integrated; moreover, NAFTA was preceded
by the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the
United States, which took effect in January of 1990,
four years before NAFTA took effect.
In Mexico, it will be necessary before the year
2003 to eliminate tariffs on all manufactured products
and most  agricultural products  imported from the
United States, as part of the tariff elimination
commitments.35In the first three years of existence of
NAFTA, the  average tariffs  applied in Mexico to
products originating in the  United  States dropped
nearly 10% to just under 3%, while the tariffs applied
in the United States to Mexican products dropped
2.07% to approximately 0.65%. Nearly 80% of the
products manufactured in the  United States  enter
Mexico duty-free.36
In 1997, Mexico imported a total of US$ 71.4
billion and became the number-two market for the
United States, surpassing Japan. Moreover, the United
States accumulated a trade deficit with Mexico of
nearly US$ 15.4 billion, a reduction of US$ 1.7 billion
compared to the 1996 deficit (Office of the United
States Trade Representative, “Foreign Trade Barriers
(Mexico)”, p. 281 [http://www.ustr.gov]).
The second round of accelerated tariff elimination
occurred during 1997, and at the meeting of the Free
Trade Commission held on 29 April 1998 the
ministers of trade of the  three member countries
agreed to eliminate tariffs by 1 August of that same
year, for a value of approximately US$ 1 billion. The
round of accelerated eliminations resulted in two
parallel agreements, one between the United States
and Mexico and the other between Canada and
Mexico. The lists of products ranges from toys and
textiles to chemical and iron/steel products.37
At the meeting of the Free Trade Commission, the
ministers also agreed on a broad revision of the work
programme implicit in the Agreement, with a view to
redefining mandates or simply eliminating some of the
20 committees and working groups that coordinate the
course of NAFTA, in areas such as rules of origin,
agricultural subsidies, technical standards, trade and
competition, government purchases, services and
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33 These differences contrast with those of the European Union, where in 12 of the 15 member States per capita income is equal to or greater than
the European Union average. Moreover, in the only three countries whose per capita income is below average (Spain, Greece and Portugal), the
percentage is above 65%. However, in the countries of central and eastern Europe, per capita GDP ranges from 17% to 40% of the European Union
average (ECLAC, 1997a, p. 36).
34 The NAFTA Secretariat, composed of Canadian, United States and Mexican sections, is a unique organization, established by the Free Trade
Commission, pursuant to the provisions of article 2002, Chapter 20, of the Agreement. The Secretariat is responsible for administration of the dispute
settlement provisions of the Agreement. It is also responsible for providing assistance to the Commission and support for various non-dispute- related
committees and working groups (see the website of the NAFTA Secretariat [http://www.naftasec-alena.org/english]).
35 A tariff elimination timetable was established based on the tariffs in effect in July of 1991 (Rich, 1997).
36 See the website of the United States Trade Representative [http://www.ustr.gov].
37 The tariff elimination affects only trade between Mexico and the other trading partners because, based on commitments between Canada and
the United States, all reciprocal trade covered by their agreements is free of tariffs (see the website of the United States Trade Representative, “Reques
for Comment on Articles to be Considered for Accelerated Tariff Elimination Under the North American Free Trade Agreement”; “Implementation
of the Second Round of Accelerated Tariff Eliminations under Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement” [http://www.ustr.gov]).
investment, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
clothing and textile products, and financial services.
The results of the revision are to be submitted to the
ministers before the end of 1998, at the Ministerial
Meeting soon to be held in Canada (Americas Trade,
30 April 1998).
In July of 1997, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative submitted a broad report
evaluating the first three years of operation of
NAFTA, to comply with a clause of the relevant law.38
The conclusions were generally not very enthusiastic
as to the main concern of the United States Congress,
namely, the Agreement’s effect on job creation in the
country.  According  to estimates in the  report,  the
positive net effect ranged from 90,000 to 160,000 new
jobs. However, the report was cautious in presenting
the results, due to the difficulty in separating the effect
of NAFTA from other economic and institutional
factors acting on the United States economy. The
report was taken as a reference in the United States
Congress when the Administration submitted a bill
asking for fast track negotiating powers to negotiate
the formation of FTAA; the bill had to be withdrawn
in November of 1997 because it did not have sufficient
votes for approval.
The fourth annual report to the Congress of the
United States on the impact of NAFTA on automotive
exports from the United States to Mexico states that,
although it is difficult to separate the impact of the
Agreement from other economic factors that might be
affecting  United  States exports, it  is unlikely  that
United States automotive exports would have
increased by nearly 750% from 1993 to 1997 without
NAFTA.  According to the  report, the  increase in
Mexican imports of automobiles was due to the
reduced production plans of the companies located in
Mexico, which started to offset lower production with
imports.39
In recent years, some trade disputes have arisen
between the United States and Mexico, and between
Canada and the United States. One of the most
important disputes resulted from the decision of the
United States not to grant national treatment to
Mexican land transportation services, a provision that
should have taken effect on 17 December 1995 for
trucks, and 1 January 1997 for buses. Based on
environmental  protection and  safety concerns,  the
United States does not permit Mexican trucks or buses
to enter its territory.40 In early September 1998, the
Government of Mexico requested a meeting of the
Free Trade Commission to settle the dispute, thereby
initiating  the second stage of the NAFTA dispute
settlement mechanism.41
The main mechanisms for settlement of disputes
under the NAFTA are set forth in chapters 11, 14, 19
and 20 of the Agreement. Disputes as to investments
are dealt with in chapter 11; chapter 14 establishes a
mechanism for settling disputes over financial
services; chapter 19 provides for reviews by binational
panels of final determinations regarding antidumping
matters, countervailing duties and existence of
damage; and chapter 20 refers to disputes over the
interpretation  or  application of NAFTA, including
disputes connected with the provisions of chapter 14
on financial services.42
However, the Government of Mexico has
announced its willingness to take the conflict over land
transportation to the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.
Moreover, the Government of the United States filed
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38 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993, section 512.
39 See the website of the United States Trade Representative, “Fourth Annual Report to Congress on the Impact of the North American Trade
Agreement on U.S. Automotive Exports to Mexico (And on Imports from Mexico)” [http://www.ustr.gov].
40 The Government of Mexico reacted by not granting national treatment to distribution services (small package delivery) from the United States
(Inside U.S. Trade, 1998a, p. 3).
41 “Mexico pursues the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism regarding the opening of cross-border transportation services”, website of the
Mexican Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development [http://www.naftaworks.org].
42 See the website of the NAFTA Secretariat [http://www.naftasec-alena.org/english]).
a complaint with the World Trade Organization
against Canada –subsequently resolved in favour of
the United States– for charging an 80% tax on income
from advertising contained in editions in Canadian
territory of magazines sold both in Canada and abroad,
with ad copy prepared in the United States (ECLAC,
1997a, p. 50).
C. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA)
Between December of 1994,  the  date  of the  first
Summit of the Americas (Miami), and April of 1998,
when the second Summit was held, in Santiago, Chile,
four trade ministerial meetings were held: in Denver,
Colorado, United States, June 1995; in Cartagena,
Colombia, March 1996; in Belo Horizonte, Brazil,
April 1997; and in San José, Costa Rica, March 1998.
At the First Trade Ministerial Meeting, in Denver,
a programme for preparation of negotiations toward
the formation of the FTAA was agreed. The Denver
Declaration reiterated that the FTAA “would build on
existing subregional and bilateral agreements in order
to broaden and deepen  the  hemispheric economic
integration and bring the agreements together”. It was
emphasized that markets must be opened by achieving
high levels of discipline in each agreement existing in
the hemisphere, and that those agreements must
remain consistent with the provisions of the World
Trade Organization. Moreover, in Denver six working
groups were formed, on market access; customs
procedures and rules of origin; investment; standards
and technical barriers to trade; sanitary and
phytosanitary measures; subsidies antidumping and
countervailing duties; plus a working group on the
smaller economies. At the Second Trade Ministerial
Meeting, held in Cartagena in 1996, four other groups
were formed, on services, intellectual property rights,
competition policy, and government procurement. At
the Third Trade Ministerial Meeting (Belo Horizonte,
1997), the terms of reference for a working group on
dispute settlement were defined.
Over the past few years, the working groups have
examined the national legislation in each subject area,
prepared an inventory of rules and procedures,
exchanged information on the scope of the disciplines
achieved in each subregional integration agreement in
the respective matters, and made recommendations for
future negotiations.
At the Third Trade Ministerial Meeting (Belo
Horizonte), a consensus was reached on some
important points: (i) that the negotiations should start
at the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago,
Chile; (ii) that, in principle, no sector would be
excluded from the negotiations; (iii) that the countries
could negotiate individually and or in groups, and
(iv) that it was necessary to form a committee to
coordinate the negotiations and a secretariat to support
the negotiating process.
Lastly, in the San José Ministerial Declaration,
which came out of the Fourth Trade Ministerial
Meeting, it was recommended that the Heads of State
and Government should start the negotiations towards
FTAA during the Second Summit of the Americas, in
accordance with the objectives, principles, structure,
venue and other decisions set forth in the Declaration.
The Declaration also reaffirmed various basic
objectives and principles, including the requirements
that the agreement on FTAA would have to meet,
namely that the agreement should be balanced and
comprehensive and take into account the needs,
economic conditions and opportunities of the smaller
economies, and that the negotiations should be
transparent and based on decisions made by
consensus. The commitment to conclude the
negotiations by the year 2005 and to make concrete
progress towards attaining that objective before the
end of this century was maintained.
An important principle was reaffirmed, namely,
that FTAA could coexist with bilateral and
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subregional agreements, to the extent that the rights
and obligations deriving from such agreements were
not covered by or went beyond the rights and
obligations of the FTAA agreement.
At the same Ministerial Meeting, a trade
negotiations committee at the vice-ministerial level
was formed, with a chairman and a vice-chairman; the
committee in turn would select a chairman and a
vice-chairman for each negotiating group. Nine
negotiating groups were established on: market access;
investment; services; government procurement;
dispute settlement; agriculture; intellectual property
rights; subsidies, antidumping and countervailing
duties; and competition policy. Also formed were a
consultative group on smaller economies; a committee
of government representatives on participation of civil
society, and a joint committee of experts from the
public and private sectors on electronic commerce. An
administrative secretariat for the negotiations was also
formed.43
The decisions contained in the San José
Ministerial Declaration were included in the Plan of
Action of the Second Summit of the Americas,
specifically in section III, on economic integration and
free trade. In particular, in that Plan of Action, Heads
of State and Government urged the trade ministers to
make concrete progress in the negotiations by the year
2000 and to agree on specific business facilitation
measures to be adopted before the end of the century.
In accordance with the schedule approved in San
José, the first meeting of the FTAA Trade
Negotiations Committee was held in Buenos Aires,
from 17 to 19 June 1998. The purpose of the meeting
was to define a work programme for the negotiating
groups and to ensure that the negotiating groups would
start their work by 30 September 1998.44 That first
meeting marked the start of a new stage in the process
of creating FTAA and the end of the preparatory stage.
The next meeting is to be held on 2 and 3 December
1998 in Suriname.
The main  result of that first meeting was the
approval of: (i) work programmes for the nine
negotiating groups; (ii) the schedule of the first
meetings of the negotiating groups; (iii) work
programmes for the Consultative Group on Smaller
Economies, the committee on civil society and the
committee on electronic commerce, and (iv) rules and
procedures for all of them. The Trade Negotiations
Committee decided not to include business facilitation
measures within the work programme of the various
negotiating groups. Instead, the Chair, with the
collaboration of the Tripartite Committee, was to
prepare a document incorporating any proposals made
by Governments on the matter and any proposals that
came out of the business forums, and that document
would be analysed at the next meeting of the
Committee.
The negotiating groups began their work in the
first week of September 1998 and must submit a report
on activities scheduled to September 1999.
The terms of reference of some negotiating groups
turned out to be broader and more precise than the
terms of reference originally proposed in the draft
prepared by the Committee Chair. This is the case with
the negotiating groups on investments; services;
government procurement; intellectual property rights;
competition policy; and subsidies, antidumping and
countervailing duties, which are  still operating  as
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43 Meetings of the negotiating groups are to be held at a single location that will be rotated according to a predefined schedule: from 1 May 1998
to 28 February 2001 in Miami, Florida, United States; from 1 March 2001 to 28 February 2003 in Panama City; from 1 March 2003 to 31 December
2004 in Mexico City, which will be the location of the negotiations until their conclusion, if they extend beyond 2004. The chairmanship of the FTAA
process will rotate among different countries: from 1 May 1998 to 31 October 1999: Canada (Chair) and Argentina (Vice-Chair); from 1 November
1999 to 30 April 2001: Argentina (Chair) and Ecuador (Vice-Chair); from 1 May 2001 to 31 October 2002: Ecuador (Chair) and Chile (Vice-Chair).
Finally, from 1 November 2002 to 31 December 2004, Brazil and the United States will be co-chairs, and that period will extend until the conclusion
of the negotiations.
44 At the meeting in Buenos Aires, the member countries of subregional groups (the Southern CommonMarket (Mercosur), the Andean Community,
the Central American Common Market and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)), acted in concert, with a single spokesperson representing the
respective groups.
technical groups that must examine suitable regulatory
frameworks and the scope and coverage of the
negotiations and develop a better knowledge of the
rights and obligations in each area.
The  group on market access encompasses  all
matters pertaining to negotiations in the areas of tariffs
and non-tariff measures, safeguards, rules of origin,
customs procedures, standards and technical barriers
to trade. This group and the agriculture negotiating
group must work in integrated fashion. The greater
precision of the terms of reference of these two groups
shows the interest that the countries have in starting
the negotiations toward formation of the FTAA with
the elimination of barriers to trade in goods, whether
tariff, non-tariff, technical or phytosanitary.
D. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC)
At the fifth APEC Economic Leaders Meeting, held in
Vancouver, Canada, in November 1997, the
18 Presidents and Heads of Government approved the
decision of the trade ministers to advance the goals
previously agreed to fully liberalize trade and
investments within APEC, based on a voluntary
process of early sector liberalization.45 For that
purpose, nine sectors46were identified for accelerated
tariff elimination as of 1999, and six others for an
immediately subsequent stage. The acceptance of
partial negotiations by sectors, which was agreed at
the Economic Leaders Meeting held in the Philippines,
signified a change in the negotiation focus and the
alteration of  one  of the  fundamental principles of
APEC: unilateral , concerted and voluntary
liberalization that is  applied between its members
must be done on the basis of complete coverage of the
full range of goods and services.
The nine sectors slated for early sectoral
liberalization were: chemical products, fisheries,
energy, forestry products, environment-related goods
and services, jewellery, medical equipment, toys and,
as the ninth sector, the telecommunications mutual
recognition arrangement. The six sectors named for
subsequent liberalization were: automobiles,  civil
aircraft, food products, rubber, fertilizers and seeds,
and oil-seed products.
Subsequently, at the APEC Trade Ministerial
Meeting held in June 1998 in Kuching, Malaysia, to
review the progress in the execution of the decisions
reached in Vancouver, there were signs of differences
of opinion as to the sectoral liberalization exercise.
The Government of Japan specifically opposed
liberalizing the fisheries and forestry sectors
according to the accelerated plan. The Japanese view
was that given the voluntary nature of the forum, any
economy had the right to exclude, any sector it did not
wish to have participate.47 Many countries also felt
that if, in the future, the image of the APEC were
predominantly that of a forum for sectoral
negotiations, its credibility could be seriously
undermined.
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45 In the year 2010 for the developed countries and 2020 for developing countries, the goals proposed in the four prior meetings of APEC will have
been met. At the first one, held in 1994 in Bogor Indonesia, a declaration was issued and a document was drafted on matters pertaining to liberalizing
trade between its members. At the meetings in Osaka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Philippines, held in the two subsequent years, the Action Agenda for
liberalization was set and individual action plans were approved, under which each country agreed to liberalize its trade and investments at it ow
pace (see ECLAC, 1996 and 1997a).
46 The Trade Minister of Malaysia, who chaired the Ministerial Meeting, stated in a press conference that, of the nine sectors identified for early
liberalization, there was consensus only on telecommunications (“APEC ministers fail to reach deal on trade liberalization”,The Nikkei Weekly,
28 June 1998, p. 28).
47 It is important to emphasize that the Bogor Declaration defined the basic APEC objectives of liberalization and facilitation of trade and
investments, and that the Osaka Action Agenda defined the general principles and the framework for liberalization and facilitation. Pursuant to that
Agenda, the Bogor commitments must be achieved by means of individual plans of action (unilateral liberalization and facilitation) and collective
plans of action (coordinated within APEC and in multilateral forums) (APEC, 1998).
The Ministerial Declaration highlights the
concept of f lexibility, in the sense that the
implementation of the commitments must be subject
to the specific circumstances  of  each country.  In
general, it is admitted that flexibility means longer
periods for such compliance, especially in the case of
developing countries.
It should be noted that the early sectoral
l iberalization init iat ive originated with the
Government of the United States, which already in
1996 had used APEC as a testing ground to reach an
agreement of greater scope within the World Trade
Organization (WTO). For example, the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) was proposed during
the first WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, after
being raised as a sectoral liberalization initiative
within APEC (ECLAC, 1997a, box I.1, pp. 33-34).48
The new negotiation strategy adopted by the
Government of the United States is a consequence of
the difficulties that it has had in getting the United
States Congress to grant it negotiating powers.49 At
the same time, the practice of conducting sectoral
negotiations within WTO is worrisome to the
developing countries that are APEC members,
because they fear it might lead to unbalanced final
results.50
Other APEC members, such as Chile and Mexico,
have clearly stated that they will not participate in the
approval or startup of this liberalization process, since
the implicit negotiating approach distorts the basic
principle of broad coverage that was to govern the
APEC. From the viewpoint of those two countries,
with the new course of negotiations there is a danger
of starting down the wrong road of sectoral
liberalizations, where special interests of some
economies with greater negotiating power could
predominate, which would bring about unbalanced
results. At the same time, tariff elimination in the more
complex sectors such as agriculture, would be
deferred, and there would be no incentive for their
liberalization. Moreover, only if negotiations are
comprehensive will it be possible to identify possible
benefits and seek trade-offs between different spheres
of negotiation (such as liberalization of the services
market in exchange for  access to the agricultural
products markets of the developed countries).
Furthermore, sectoral liberalizations might not be
compatible with a parity tariff system such as Chile’s.
Lastly, Chile and Mexico made no offers of tariff
concession under the Information Technology
Agreement.
At the Economic Leaders Meeting in Vancouver,
the admission of Peru, Russia and Vietnam to APEC
was approved, before the date that had been initially
agreed. As of November 1998, the number of member
economies will increase to 21. At that same meeting,
it was resolved to freeze the admission of new
members for a period of 10 years. Infrastructure
matters were also discussed, a topic on which Canada
proposed some recommendations to provide
incentives for the participation of private capital in
infrastructure financing.
With regard  to  the  Asian crisis, a  final press
release from the Vancouver Meeting approved the
emergency plan previously agreed in Manila to
mitigate the economic turbulence that the economies
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48 On 23 June 1998, an official of the Office of the United States Trade Representative stated in a press conference that the United States woul
not apply the voluntary tariff reductions agreed within APEC before their consolidation within WTO (Inside U.S. Trade, 1998b, p. 1).
49 Section 311 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act grants the President of the United states the power to make changes in the tariffs of certain
products. Those products include some or all products corresponding to four sectors that are subjects of negotiations within APEC: toys, forestry
products, seeds and oil-seed products, medical instruments and equipment (SELA, 1998b). However, the President does not have powers to negotiate
tariffs on jewelry or products connected with the environment or energy (Inside U.S. Trade, 1998b, p. 18).
50 The Declaration issued by the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting in Kuching aluded to the importance that the Ministers placed on conducting
a study of the impact of trade liberalization on the APEC economies, in which special consideration would be given to the current period of economic
difficulties and the concerns expressed by various Ministers as to the possible harm from greater liberalization. The Ministers reaffirmed the needto
reach a broad and balanced agreement as to the impact of liberalization, in which its benefits and the cost of the related adjustments must be weighed.
Along those same lines, they emphasized the importance of selecting the sectors with a criterion that appropriately reflected that perspective (APEC,
1998).
of East-Asia were facing, along with the aid plan
proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the strict reforms it was recommending. Emphasis
was placed on the importance of improving the
capacity of the international system to prevent
financial crises insofar as possible and to resolve them
when they arose. In May 1998, the Meeting of Finance
Ministers held in Kananakis (Alberta, Canada)
reaffirmed the need for the countries affected by the
cr isis to cont inue to str ive to re-establ ish
macroeconomic stability, together with the IMF, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
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PART TWO
TRADE AND TRADE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1997-1998
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Chapter III
TRADE AND TRADE POLICY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1997 AND 1998
A. INTRODUCTION
The rapid modernization of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries’ trade policies over the course of
the 1990s has been partially responsible for the recent
increase in their exports, but this process has not yet
dislodged imports from their position as the most
dynamic aspect of the  region’s  linkages with the
international economy. Between 1990 and 1997, the
region’s imports increased 40% more, in quantitative
terms, than its exports.51 At the end of 1997, the real
value of imports was 35% greater than that of exports,
in part because since 1995 the general trend in the
terms of trade has been favourable to the region’s
exports.52 Due to the high income elasticity of the
region’s demand for imports, which is associated with
the restructuring of its production facilities and the
increased percentage of imported inputs in local
production, the main growth constraints affecting the
region’s imports are generated by each country’s level
of economic activity, ability to achieve a trade surplus
on the services account, and ability to finance
large deficits in its trade in goods and services
(see chapter V).53
Of the 17 countries discussed in this chapter, only
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela had trade surpluses,
measured at current prices, in 1997 (see table III.1),
and even these positive balances were far lower than
in 1996. It should be  noted that this build-up in
merchandise trade deficits has occurred despite export
growth rates of 10% or above, except in the cases of
Paraguay and major oil-producers, such as Ecuador
and Venezuela. The increase was the result of an
upswing in the volume of shipments, since the prices
of the countries’ main export products –in particular
oil, copper, wheat and  other  grains (except rice)–
began to plummet in the second half of 1997, as shown
in tables III.2a and III.2b (see chapter I). Furthermore,
the prices of manufactured goods showed a drop of
nearly 9% from their 1996 levels (ECLAC, 1998b, p.
110). The countries most severely affected by this
situation were Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. On the
other hand, higher banana, coffee, shrimp, fishmeal
and beef prices benefited the Central American
countries and, in the case of Ecuador, offset  the
downturn in oil prices.
The persistence of low commodity prices in 1998
(e.g., oil and grain) is expected to result in sharper
increases in merchandise trade deficits, even though
these low price levels did benefit commodity-importing
countries. Preliminary data indicate that Venezuela is
the only country with a positive trade balance for 1998,
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51 Between 1990 and 1997, the volume index for regional exports rose from 100 to 196.7, while the corresponding figure for imports rose from
100 to 263.5 (ECLAC, 1998b, table VIII.1, p. 103).
52 Between 1994 and 1995, the unit value index for exports rose from 100.9 to 110.8, while the figure for imports rose from 102.2 to 106.5 (ECLAC,
1998b, table VIII.1, p. 103).
53 For each percentage point of increase in demand, imports rise by 2.6% (ECLAC, 1998b, p. 104).
although it is but a fraction of the country’s 1996
surplus. Starting in July 1997, Mexico’s deficits began
to increase from month to month once again. During
the first nine months of 1998, Mexico’s trade deficit
amounted to more than US$ 5 billion, with average
monthly figures in the  third quarter in excess of
US$ 750 million. Brazil has succeeded in curbing the
growth of imports, partly through the pragmatic
enforcement of controls and partly as a result of the
economic contraction triggered by strict adjustment
measures –a phenomenon also visible in Chile.
In Central America, the catastrophic damage
caused by Hurricane Mitch, whose economic impact
cannot yet be fully assessed, caused the loss of
precious human lives, destroyed decades’ worth of
accumulated social capital in the form of schools,
hospitals and infrastructure, and diminished the
productivity of the land, which is these countries’ main
productive resource.  For Honduras and Nicaragua
and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador and Guatemala, it
will be very difficult to regain the production and
export levels reached in July 1998. The growth rate for
Central American exports in recent years had been the
highest in the region, although it must be remembered
that, owing to the civil wars that ravaged these
countries until the beginning of the 1990s, they were
starting from very low levels.
In general, the sharp drop in commodity prices,
caused in part by problems of excess supply and a
contraction of demand, demonstrated the vulnerability
of the Latin American countries’ export activity. Over
the last few decades, various countries have made
significant efforts to diversify their exports in terms of
both products and markets. However, according to a
study on the export markets and products of  the
countries belonging to the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), only Argentina and Brazil have
succeeded in diversifying their exports in terms of both
export products and  target markets; Mexico’s and
Uruguay’s exports are diversified in terms of products,
but are concentrated in a small number of markets: the
United States in Mexico’s case, and Argentina
and Brazil in the case of Uruguay. However
Mexico alone has diversified its exports into
non-natural-resource-based manufactures, while
Argentina’s and Brazil’s products continue to be based
primarily on such resources. At the other extreme are
Chile, Colombia and Peru, whose exports, though they
are concentrated in a small number of products, cover
more markets.  Finally,  countries such as Bolivia,
Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela continue to display
a high degree of vulnerability in this respect owing to
the concentration of their exports in a small number of
products and markets (Contador, 1997, pp. 3 and 4).
To change their export specializations while
continuing to base their export profile on their
endowments of natural resources and labour, the
region’s Governments have sought to develop
programmes to support the private sector and improve
the systemic competitiveness of their economies. To
this end they have made use of policies and
instruments  consistent with the  commitments they
have made under the aegis of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Most of the countries have tried
to assist exporters by means of tax, fiscal and credit
incentives, which include access to imported inputs on
preferential terms (drawbacks and temporary
importation) and exemptions from value added tax
(VAT), in combination with the provision of more
flexible and effective instruments. Other countries,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, have
upgraded their institutional capabilities for the design
and implementation of policies aimed at supporting,
promoting and diversifying exports; as part of this
process, they have sought to   consol idate
decision-making authority, which had previously been
scattered among various government agencies, and to
make the relevant programmes more coherent (see
chapters IV and VIII).
The trade measures put into effect in 1997 and
1998 by the region’s Governments have attested to
their commitment to trade liberalization while at the
same time allowing them to gain more practical
experience with the use  of  quota-based protective
measures and to provide more effective support to the
private sector in its efforts to overcome problems that
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l imit exporters’ access to industrialized and
developing markets, including those of countries
within the region itself. In various countries, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the public sector
has worked in coordination with the private and
professional sector to identify export barriers in
importing countries beforehand in order to avoid long
and expensive proceedings such as the recent
investigation concerning alleged dumping by Chile in
the United States. Following the example of the United
States, which publishes an annual report on barriers to
its exports, Canada, Japan and the European Union
have begun to gather information on market access
problems (ECLAC, 1998d). Along the same lines, the
Latin American and Caribbean countries are planning
to conduct a survey of external barriers to trade and
investment in order to provide the public and private
sectors with detailed information on market access
conditions, as well as to contribute to a more vigorous
defense of commercial interests and the development
of an active trade agenda.
B. MERCOSUR COUNTRIES AND CHILE
1. Merchandise trade and the trade balance
In 1997, the value of the exports (in current dollars) of
Argentina, Brazil and Chile rose by 10% while
Uruguay posted an increase of 13%; in  contrast,
Paraguay’s registered sales decreased (see table III.1).
According to ECLAC estimates, the upswing in the
value of the first four of these countries’ exports was
the result of an increase in quantity that exceeded the
average growth rate for the volume of international
trade, since the prices, in the aggregate, of products
exported by those countries increased at a rate of less
than unity (see table III.2a and chapter I).
Argentina was severely affected by the downward
trend in commodity prices, which checked the steadily
rapid rate of expansion that Argentine exports had
enjoyed from 1992 to 1996.54 In 1997, imports grew
more than expected (28%), and this translated into a
trade deficit of US$ 4,153 million dollars (see tables
III.1 and III.2b). Imports of capital goods rose
considerably (37%), but there was also a sharp
increase in imports of consumer durables (30%). The
aggregate value of farm exports rose slightly (1.6%)
but fuel sales were down. Therefore, the small increase
in total 1997 exports can be attributed to the upswing
in sales of manufactures, 60% of  which went  to
Mercosur, with the Brazilian market playing a
particularly important role in this respect.55 Sales to
Mercosur rose 13.5%, which was slightly more than
the aggregate figure, and subregional sales
consequently represented 36% of Argentina’s total
exports.
During the first half of 1998, commodity prices
continued on their downward trend, and the value of
Argentine exports was nearly 4% above the figure
recorded for the first half of 1997. Imports rose 12%
during the same period. As to the origin of these goods,
imports from Brazil registered an above-average
increase (16%). An expansion of close to 17% in sales
of industrial manufactures was chiefly accounted for
by shipments of motor vehicles to Brazil. ECLAC
estimates indicate that the growth of Argentine
imports in 1998 was a function of an increase in
quantity (see table III.2b).
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54 The drop in export prices was concentrated in commodities and fuels and was especially pronounced in grains. Also, the fall in wheat, corn and
oil prices extended into 1998, with values clearly below those of previous years.
55 There was a 65% increase (to US$ 2.5 billion) in vehicle exports; nevertheless, the automotive sector’s trade deficit deepened because of increased
purchases of parts and finished goods.
Table III.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MERCHANDISE
TRADE BALANCE, 1997-1998
(Millions of dollars)
Exports Imports Trade balance
Countries
1997 1998a 1997 1998a 1997 1998a
Mercosurh and Chile
Argentina 26 235 13 531 30 388 15 761 - 4 153 - 2 230
Brazil b 52 986 39 460 61 352 43 271 -8 366 -3 811
Chile g 16 923 12 579 18 218 15 027 -1 295 -2 448
Paraguayb c 2 643 877 4 037 1 705 - 1 394 - 828
Uruguayd 2 730 1 89 23 478 2 308 -748 -416
Andean Community
Bolivia d 1 272 819 1 894 1 409 -621 -643
Colombia 11 681 5 462.5 14 409 9 507 -2 728 -4 045
Ecuadore 5 190 2 166 4 667 2 520 597 -354
Peru 6 814 2 527 8 552 4 222 -1 738 -1 695
Venezuelae 23 711 8 820 12 311 6 083 11 400 2 737
Mexico b e 110 431 86 671 109 808 91 851.5 623 -5 180
CACM i and Panama
Costa Ricaf 4 282.5 1 960 5 067 2 238 -784.5 -278
El Salvador 2 416 1 353 3 739 1 970 -1 323 -617
Guatemala 2 386 1 508 3 852 2 179 -1 466 -671
Honduras 1 447 974 2 048 1 124 -601 -150
Nicaragua 704 371 1 454 812 -750 -441
Panama 658 341 2 992 1 429 -2 334 -1 088
Source:National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), Argentina; Department of Foreign Trade Operations of the Secretariat of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (DECEX/SECEX/MICT), Brazil; Central Bank of Chile,Informe
económico y financiero, Santiago, Chile, 15 November 1998; The Economist Intelligence Unit,Country Report (Paraguay), July
1998; Department of International Economics, Economic Research Division, Central Bank of Paraguay, September 1998; Central
Bank of Uruguay, 1998,“Boletín Mensual: Intercambio comercial de bienes del Uruguay”:(i) data as of December 1997; (ii) data
as of August 1998; National Institute of Statistics, Bolivia; National Planning Department (DNP) of the Macroeconomic Analysis
Unit, Indicadores de coyuntura económica, vol. 8, June 1998, table 5.2, and vol. 10, September 1998, tables 5.2 and 5.4 (DNP Web
page: http://www.dnp.gov.co); Central Bank of Ecuador; Central Reserve Bank of Peru; Central Bank of Venezuela; Banco de
México (Web page: http://www.banxico.org.mx); Central Bank of Costa Rica; Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador; Banco de
Guatemala; Central Bank of Honduras; Central Bank of Nicaragua; Central Bank of Panama.
aPreliminary figures for the first half of 1998.
b1998 figures are for the period January-September.
cRegistered exports and imports.
dJanuary-August.
eOn an f.o.b. basis for exports and imports.
f Includes value added by themaquilaindustry in the export processing zone (EPZ).
gJanuary-October.
h Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
i CACM = Central American Common Market.
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In June 1998,Brazil’s trade balance registered a
slight surplus for the first time in 24 months.56 In
September 1997, the annualizeddeficit peaked at
US$ 9.7 billion, after which it gradually declined,
more on account of slow import growth than an
increase in exports. In the first nine months of 1998,
the value of imports diminished by almost 5%
compared with the same period of 1997, and although
the value of exports was only slightly above the figure
for 1997, the cumulative deficit fell by 34%, from
US$ 5,778 million to US$ 3,811 million (see table
III.1).  The  decline  in  imports  was due  to various
factors: (i) lower international oil and fuel prices,
(ii) the slowdown in the Brazilian economy caused by
its fiscaladjustmentprocess,and(iii)aseriesofmeasures
adopted by the Government in 1997 and 1998 to curb
import growth, as discussed in more detail below.57
According to information gathered by the Centre
for Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (FUNCEX), the
recovery of Brazilian exports that began in the second
Table III.2a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICES OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, FOB
(Indices 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
1996 1997 1998a 1996 1997 1998a 1996 1997 1998a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 111.8 124.6 122.8 99.5 97.2 88.9 112.4 128.1 138.1
Argentina 113.6 125.1 125.5 102.0 96.3 87.8 111.4 129.9 142.8
Bolivia 108.7 112.1 106.6 83.9 83.0 75.3 129.6 135.1 141.6
Brazil 102.7 113.9 109.7 99.3 100.8 94.8 103.4 113.0 115.7
Chile 96.1 105.6 94.2 83.7 83.0 71.4 114.9 127.2 132.0
Colombia 104.2 114.3 110.8 100.6 103.9 93.5 103.6 110.0 118.5
Costa Rica 108.1 123.6 153.2 94.6 98.3 96.6 114.3 125.8 158.5
Ecuador 111.1 119.3 101.8 108.1 109.7 95.4 102.8 108.8 106.7
El Salvador 107.7 145.4 148.8 85.9 93.0 91.1 125.4 156.3 163.2
Guatemala 103.5 120.4 131.0 71.0 82.4 82.0 145.7 146.2 159.7
Haiti 107.8 140.6 156.6 96.0 101.8 97.7 112.3 138.1 160.3
Honduras 111.3 126.0 137.6 83.4 99.5 99.9 133.5 126.6 137.8
Mexico 120.7 138.8 147.3 100.6 94.4 89.0 120.0 147.1 165.5
Nicaragua 127.5 133.7 115.9 93.2 85.3 85.1 136.8 156.8 136.2
Panama 95.9 110.3 108.6 98.1 100.1 93.4 97.8 110.2 116.3
Paraguay 94.6 85.3 80.0 110.2 127.1 114.4 85.9 67.1 70.0
Peru 105.5 121.9 100.5 97.8 103.2 88.8 107.9 118.1 113.3
Dominican Republic 114.8 131.5 134.7 99.2 100.5 94.3 115.8 130.8 142.8
Uruguay 114.0 129.5 135.3 94.8 92.4 91.5 120.3 140.1 147.9
Venezuela 124.2 124.2 92.8 112.5 108.8 81.1 110.4 114.2 114.5
Source:ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1998(LC/G.2051-P), Santiago, Chile, 1998.
United Nations publication, Sales No: E.98.II.G.15.
a Preliminary figures.
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56 “Balança comercial e outros indicadores conjunturais”,Revista brasileira de comercio exterior (RBCE), No. 143, June/September 1998, p. 2.
57 According to the indicators of the Centre for Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (FUNCEX), the reduction in imports (excluding petroleum and
petroleum products) was due to a decrease in the quantity imported.
quarter of 1997 was driven first by commodity sales
–particularly soy and coffee– and then by sales of
manufactures, in particular motor vehicles.
Commodity exports climbed from US$ 11.9 billion to
US$ 14.4 billion (21%) between 1996  and 1997.
Nevertheless, the first nine months of 1998 saw a
decline of almost 5% in the value of these exports,
despite the fact that their volume held steady, due to
the drop in prices, with a cumulative decrease of 19%
for coffee, 20% for soybeans and 36% for soy meal
(see tables III.2a and III.2b).
Chile’s foreign trade performance suffered
heavily from the effects of the financial crisis affecting
the Asian economies, which pushed down the prices
of copper and wood pulp and dampened foreign
demand for forest products. As a result, the recovery
in the prices of the country’s main export products
(except for copper) that had begun in late 1997 came
to a halt, and prices declined by an average of 18%
during the first half of 1998 (Central Bank of Chile,
1998a, p. 39). The increase in export value in 1997 was
wholly attributable to an increase in the volume of
sales, as shown in table III.2a. As a result, the surplus
that had been registered up to September 1997 gave
way to a deficit that could have exceeded US$ 3
billion by the end of 1998 if it had not been for the
drastic measures that were taken to rein in aggregate
demand. One of the factors contributing to this deficit
was the strong expansion of imports that had been
Table III.2b
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICES OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS, FOB
(Indices: 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
1996 1997 1998a 1996 1997 1998a 1996 1997 1998a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 110.8 131.8 139.1 100.4 94.5 90.2 110.3 139.4 154.3
Argentina 118.5 152.1 160.7 97.7 90.3 86.2 121.3 168.5 186.4
Bolivia 111.8 134.2 144.6 98.5 94.2 89.5 113.5 142.4 161.6
Brazil 106.9 123.1 113.3 108.0 103.6 97.4 99.0 118.8 116.4
Chile 112.6 124.3 124.2 100.3 95.8 92.1 112.3 129.8 134.9
Colombia 99.0 111.5 114.8 96.9 89.6 86.0 102.2 124.5 133.5
Costa Rica 105.4 123.8 147.7 99.7 97.7 92.4 105.7 126.7 159.8
Ecuador 90.7 115.0 128.2 98.6 98.0 93.1 92.0 117.4 137.7
El Salvador 93.8 110.6 129.3 100.4 94.1 90.0 93.4 117.5 143.7
Guatemala 95.0 116.8 140.1 101.8 93.5 88.4 93.3 125.0 158.6
Haiti 96.5 99.2 92.8 102.8 100.7 94.0 93.9 98.5 98.7
Honduras 112.0 131.1 154.7 95.7 88.4 82.5 117.0 148.3 187.5
Mexico 123.5 151.6 172.0 97.9 91.9 89.0 126.1 164.9 193.2
Nicaragua 121.6 158.5 160.7 101.4 98.6 92.5 119.9 160.7 173.7
Panama 97.1 110.3 113.8 98.0 90.5 86.0 99.0 121.9 132.3
Paraguay 97.5 93.8 81.5 99.7 95.2 90.0 97.8 98.5 90.5
Peru 101.6 110.2 107.4 101.3 91.4 86.2 100.3 120.6 124.6
Dominican Republic 111.3 128.4 147.0 103.2 100.1 93.1 107.9 128.3 157.9
Uruguay 115.7 129.3 133.7 101.0 99.6 94.0 114.5 129.8 142.2
Venezuela 82.3 107.2 114.5 97.3 90.9 87.7 84.6 117.9 130.5
Source:ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1998(LC/G.2051-P), Santiago, Chile, 1998.
United Nations publication, Sales No: E.98.II.G.15.
a Preliminary figures.
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occurring until the outbreak of the international crisis,
which then slowly subsided as a consequence of the
internal adjustment measures that were adopted. The
trade situation has been accompanied by a worrisome
current account deficit that may lead to the 5.3% GDP
figure for 1997 being topped by more than one point
(Banco Central de Chile, 1998b, p. 43).
Growing demand in the other Latin American
countries (i.e., those that do not belong to Mercosur)
has not offset the losses experienced by Chilean
products in almost all other markets.58The low prices
of copper and other mining products caused the
relative weight of these goods among total exports to
decline from 48% to 40% on average between 1997
and the first half of 1998 and led to an increase in the
proportion of agricultural and industrial products
(Banco Central de Chile, 1998c, p. 1381). Among
farm exports, fresh fruit and corn rose notably, while
wine, furniture and furniture parts, and some
automotive products (gearboxes and pickup trucks)
showed the most growth among industrial goods
(Banco Central de Chile, 1998a, pp. 33 and 35).
In 1997, Paraguay’s exports were hurt by the
measures that Argentina and Brazil took to curtail
what is known as “shopping tourism” to Paraguay.59
As a result, Paraguayan imports for re-export fell by
almost 27% during the first nine months of 1998 in
comparison with the same period of the preceding
year. Exports, too, were affected by a number of
factors, including the decline in Brazilian demand,
lower cotton prices on the international market and the
effects of El Niño. The combined effect of all this was
a 20% downturn in the country’s agricultural output.
The slump in Brazilian demand is expected to hurt
Uruguay’s exports in 1998 as well, particularly in the
case of textiles. Growth in Uruguayan exports in 1997
was due to the positive performance of forest products,
paper and printed matter, and machinery and electrical
appliances, although sales of meat and other livestock
products, which showed a notable expansion for the
year, continue to be the main component of the
country’s export mix.60 The country’s output of rice
(the main export to Brazil) was 20% lower than in
1997 due to adverse weather conditions, though prices
rebounded considerably. Production of wool, meat,
and hides and skins has experienced problems.
According to figures up to August 1998, however,
transport equipment, dairy products and tobacco all
continued to show strength. As of that date, Uruguayan
exports to Mercosur represented more than 50% of the
total (Banco Central de Uruguay, 1998).
2. Trade policy
(a) Measures affecting imports
Argentina
In 1997, the Government of Argentina
concentrated its efforts on refining the non-tariff
measures used to control imports, on bringing the
measures it employs to regulate imports of textiles and
shoes into compliance with WTO rules, and on
implementing specific aspects of the regulations
established under Mercosur and other trade
agreements. The former measures include: (i) approval
of a pre-shipment inspection programme for imports
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58 According to preliminary data from the Central Bank of Chile, the value of Chilean exports up to October 1998 was down 15% in comparison
to the same period of the preceding year owing to the decline in exports to Asia, Mercosur, the European Union and NAFTA countries (the decreases
were, respectively, 36.4%, 12%, 3.3% and 2.3%. A study by the Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Development and
Reconstruction covering a basket of the 47 principal Chilean export products, which represent 80% of total shipments, indicates an increase of 7%
in volume and a fall of 22.5% in prices (El Mercurio, “Se estabilizan importaciones provenientes de países asiáticos”, 27 November 1998, pp. B1
and B4).
59 To prevent tax evasion in the sale within Argentina and Brazil of products bought in Paraguay by Argentine and Brazilian tourists, these two
countries have tightened up their border checks of goods being brought in from Paraguay.
60 According to preliminary figures from the Central Bank of Uruguay, tourism revenues in 1997 exceeded the value of wool and meat exports.
under which merchandise is to be inspected in the
country of origin,61 and (ii) establishment of a range
of values for imports of various products. With respect
to textiles, clothing and shoes, labeling requirements
were established for imported goods to be marketed
on the domestic market.62Changes were also made in
the specific minimum duties on textiles and shoes.63
Various measures were adopted with a view to
bringing domestic instruments into line with Mercosur
rules: adjustments were made in the Mercosur
Common Nomenclature in line with the changes
introduced by means  of  resolutions  issued  by the
Mercosur Common Market Group aimed at making
the tariff treatment of certain products compatible with
the WTO bound tariff; various iron and steel products
that cannot be provided by local industry were taken
off the list of items subject to the final adjustment
regime for customs union standards; and the total
quotas (with a 100% tar i f f preference) of
intra-Mercosur imports of other products subject to the
same regime were broadened.64 Under an agreement
reached within Mercosur, at the start of 1998 duties on
imports from outside Mercosur were raised by three
percentage points for all the tariff items in the Mercosur
Common Nomenclature until 31 December 1999, and
the statistical tax was reduced from 3% to 0.5%.65
During 1997, the National Foreign Trade
Commission (CNCE)66 received eight new
applications for safeguard measures, and 11 inquiries
were launched to investigate allegations that industrial
concerns had been harmed by dumping and the use of
subsidies. Although the  requests submitted  in any
given year are not necessarily resolved within that time
frame, it should nonetheless be noted that this
represented a decline in relation to 1996.67During the
period 1995-1997, these investigations culminated in
195 decisions; 39 of these cases resulted in the
definitive imposition of anti-dumping duties and in
another 18, provisional duties were imposed; in 11 of
the cases, complaints were withdrawn following the
conclusion of pricing agreements, and in 46 instances
the investigations were closed without imposition of
any additional duties. In 1997, decisions relating to
dumping practices affected a total of US$ 168 million
in imports and those relating to subsidies involved a
total of US$ 19 million.68 Brazil and China were the
countries involved in the greatest number of decisions
adopted and applied in 1997 in connection with
dumping practices.
Brazil
Since 1997, the Brazilian Government has
adopted various administrative measures  to  check
import growth, some of which involve a stricter
regulation of financing (see ECLAC, 1997a, p. 60). In
addition, in December 1997 the Secretariat of Foreign
Trade (SECEX) increased the proportion of products
subject to import licensing with the inclusion of a
variety of agricultural products and white goods (such
as washing machines and refrigerators).69 Then, in
March 1998, new rules to control the value of imports
came into force under which customs officials are
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61 See the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (GATT, 1994).
62 Application of the Merchandise Identification Regime (stamps) to textile products originating in and coming from Brazil had been mandatory,
but this requirement was then suspended. SeeInforme Anual 1997,chapter II, “Política comercial y comercio exterior argentino” on the Website of
the National Foreign Trade Commission (CNCE) [http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cnce].
63 In July 1993, the Argentine Government issued resolution No. 811, imposing specific duties on some 200 tariff items as a response to increased
imports of textile products, which had reached US$ 342 billion in 1992 (Casaburi, 1997, p. 47).
64 High-density polyethylene and tyres.
65 See the Website of the National Foreign Trade Commission (CNCE).
66 CNCE is the agency responsible for investigating unfair international trade practices –dumping and subsidies– and for studying requests for
application of safeguard measures.
67 Nineteen dumping and subsidy investigations were opened in 1996 (see CNCE Website).
68 Though the amount involved may be fairly small relative to total Argentine exports, it represented 51% of the total imports of similar products
(see CNCE Website).
69 The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures is part of the Uruguay Round agreements (GATT, 1994).
authorized to determine whether or  not imported
goods are within a price range that is in keeping with
international prices.70
Under the rules applying to motor vehicles that
were approved in December 1995, the tariff on
automobiles was lowered from 63% to 49% on
1 January 1998.71 Tariffs on products on Mercosur’s
common external tariff list were also reduced.72
In September 1998, the Chamber of Foreign
Trade (CAMEX) adopted three sets of measures to
restrict imports; the regulations needed to put these
measures into effect were later enacted by the relevant
bodies: (i) consumer protection measures were
extended to include imported products, which must
now meet the same quality standards as those required
of domestic products;  (ii)  customs  valuation  rules
were made str icter to prevent the entry of
under-invoiced goods; and (iii) mechanisms for
dealing with unfair trading practices were upgraded in
order to simplify and expedite the procedures involved
in establishing safeguards, countervailing duties and
anti-dumping duties.73As a result of this decision, the
proportion of imported foods and other products
affecting human health that are subject to sanitary
inspection was raised from 20% to 80%.74 In addition,
qualitycertificationbytheNational InstituteofMetrology,
Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO)
will be required for imports of 23 products.75
Brazil also has a flexible tariff-modification
mechanism for some products, most of which are
capital goods not manufactured in the country. The
corresponding list –known as the “ex  tariff” list–
contains  products that the  Department  of Foreign
Trade Operations (DECEX) temporarily removes
from the relevant tariff item; during this period the
import tax on the product can be substantially reduced
and these imports cease to be subject to
“non-automatic” import licensing requirements. If a
product is taken off this list, then the usual taxes come
back into effect and a non-automatic import license is
again required. This instrument is used frequently by
the Brazilian Government.76
Chile
In contrast with the  policies of the countries
belonging to Mercosur, Chile has decided to move
ahead with its unilateral liberalization process. After a
lengthy national debate, a law was passed on
28 October 1998 under which a five-point tariff
reduction is to be phased in over a period of five years,
starting on 1 January 1999. In other words, the 11%
tariff in force since 1991 is to be reduced to 6% by the
year 2003.77 In addition, the law provides that price
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70 See the customs valuation rules in, “Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Customs Tariffs and Trade of
1994” (GATT, 1994).
71 In a meeting held in December 1998 in Rio de Janeiro, the member countries agreed that at the end of 1999 Mercosur would establish a common
import duty of 35% on automobiles produced outside the region and would eliminate tariffs on automobile and automobile parts trade between member
countries (El Mercurio, “Argentina y Brasil establecen arancel común para autos”, p. B9, December 11, 1998).
72 Tariffs were lowered from 35% to 32% for electrical appliances; from 39% to 36% for shoes and slippers; from 31% to 29% for electrical
appliances (white goods); and from 55%  to 45%  for trucks and buses (see the Website of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism
[http://www.mict.gov.br]).
73 Starting in October 1998, anti-dumping procedures have to be initiated within a maximum of 15 days, and temporary measures may be adopted
60 days after the investigation is opened. Pursuant to Inter-ministerial Rule No. 21 as established by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism
and the Ministry of Finance (Diario oficial, 14 October 1998), a working group called the Consultative Committee on the Defense of Trade (CCDC)
was created in order to examine questions related to dumping and subsidy investigations.
74 Rule No. 772 of the Health Monitoring System (SVS) (Diario oficial, 30 October 1998), which approves procedures to be adopted in respect
of imported products and raw materials subject to sanitary controls.
75 Circular No. 40 of the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX) (Diario oficial, 30 October 1998) stipulated that starting on 16 November 1998,
imports of certain products would be subject to non-automatic licensing procedures and to certification of compliance with measurement standards
as defined by the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO).
76 See, for example, DECEX, Communiqué No. 20, 8 July 1997, on the Website of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, Secretariat of
Foreign Trade. [http://www.mict.gov.br/secex/decex/scx120.htm]. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures is part of the Uruguay Round
agreements (GATT, 1994).
bands applying to agricultural products and the tariffs
on motor vehicle parts that enjoy special treatment
under the relevant statute are to be brought into line
with the new tariff rates.
Advocates of across-the-board tariff rates in Chile
have argued that the uniform tariff has been
undermined by trade agreements and by a number of
specific instruments such as agricultural price bands
whose end result is to afford differential protection to
certain sectors of the economy.78 When the
preferences entailed in the various agreements are
added up, the result shows that the average ad valorem
tariff actually  being  applied is  around  7% or  8%
(Valdés, 1998). The proposal submitted on this issue
included special support for the groups that would be
affected the most by the tariff reductions, such as the
farm sector and small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), and made a commitment to establish
safeguard mechanisms and improve existing
anti-dumping instruments.79 The tariff reduction
programme is also premised on the idea of
renegotiations and possible compensatory measures
for countries with which Chile has tariff preference
agreements.80
Since the beginning of 1997, Chile has been using
a WTO-compliant system of customs valuation for its
trade with Canada and Mercosur, but the Government
has decided to take advantage of the additional
five-year period allowed for a revision of its overall
system (WTO, 1997a). In addition, in December 1997
a new law came into effect which modifies the rates
of taxes levied on alcohol depending on the percentage
of alcohol content. In the case of whiskey, for
example, this change will translate into a tax reduction
from 70% to 53% within three years.
Uruguay
WTO reports indicate that tariffs continue to be
Uruguay’s main instrument of trade policy, where
tariff levels and structure are determined by the
schedule for convergence with the Mercosur common
external tariff. In 1998, tariffs for outside countries
varied from 0% to 23%.81 Uruguay’s tariff structure,
as in most of the other countries in the region, is
progressive, inasmuch as the average tariff is higher
on final goods (13.2%) than on semi-manufactured
goods (11.7%) and raw materials (9.2%). This pattern
of protection will remain in force even after
Uruguayan tariffs have finished the process of
converging with the common external tariff. In
addition, effective protection (protection for the value
added in each sector) will be increased thanks to the
implementation of special importation regimes that
permit tax exemptions under, for instance, the Forestry
Act and the Industrial Development Act (WTO,
1998d).
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77 Law 19.589, published in theDiario oficial y on 14 November 1998. The decrease in tax revenues resulting from the reduction will be offset
by taxes on tobacco (starting in 1999), gasoline (starting in 2000), and government stamps and seals, which represent taxes on legal procedures and
are used in credit operations (starting in 2002) and by a portion of the funds freed up by the elimination of other tax instruments, such as simplified
drawbacks and deferred payments of tariffs on capital goods.
78 The tariff differentiation based on these agreements is expressed at the country level as well as the sectoral level and stems from the preferences
granted to such countries and the influence they exert as suppliers of the products concerned. For example, a recent study showed that mining and
manufacturing were the most heavily “protected” sectors in terms of the country’s total trade flows, although agricultural and food products paid a
higher percentage of tariffs in trade with countries with which agreements have been signed (Cámara de Comercio de Santiago, 1998).
79 The safeguards bill was sent to the National Congress by the executive branch on 23 November 1998. This bill supplements Act 18.525 on
anti-distortion mechanisms which is currently being discussed in the Senate. Anti-dumping legislation is in the process of being reviewed for the
purpose of bringing it into line with WTO rules, as indicated in the evaluation of Chile’s performance prepared at the end of 1997 as part of the overall
review of WTO trade policy (WTO, 1997a).
80 In response to the bilateral accord signed between Chile and Canada, the Governments of Chile and of the Mercosur countries agreed to Additional
Protocol No. 35 on Economic Complementarity, under which the preferences applied to various products have been brought into line with the terms
of access that Chile had granted to Canada (LAIA, 1998f).
81 These tariffs include a 3% increase in the common external tariff agreed on by the members of Mercosur that went into effect on 31 December
1997 (see chapter VII).
Minimum export prices are used as a contingency
measure, much like the system of benchmark prices
(eliminated in 1994), which was used to provide
protection from the unfair trade practices of other
countries. Currently, the minimum export price
system covers 117 tariff lines, including sugar, textiles
and clothing. Since the Ouro Preto Protocol came into
force and Uruguay’s commitments in relation to the
Mercosur adjustment regime were defined, minimum
prices can no longer be applied to goods imported from
a Mercosur member country. The setting of these
minimum export prices and their alignment with the
customs union form part of the commitments
undertaken by the Uruguayan Government in 1995.
The Government may, however, maintain this system
of minimum export prices for imports  from third
countries until January 2000 in order to give domestic
enterprises the time they need to retool.82
The Uruguayan Government has passed
WTO-compliant legislation on dumping and
countervailing duties, but did not put any of those
measures into effect in the period from 1992 to 1998.83
Also, although Uruguay signed the safeguards
agreement and made it national law, the issuance of
the corresponding regulations are still pending.
(b)  Export promotion measures
Argentina
During 1997, as one of the specific measures it
adopted to backstop exporters, the Federal
Administrat ion of Publ ic Revenues (AFIP)
established a more flexible regime for rebating VAT
under its advance drawback system. New lines of
credit were also established for exports under a new
loan programme started up by the Banco de Inversion
y Comercio Exterior (BICE) for exporters of
manufactured goods, services and industrial plants or
works designed to serve markets outside the region. In
addition, as part of the programme to ensure
compliance with quality standards, 260 new
enterprises received quality certification from the
National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI) and
the Argentine Accreditation Organization.84 In
addition, requirements concerning the content of
hormonal or anabolic substances in meat exports to the
European Union were established.85
Brazil
With a view to improving the international
competitiveness of Brazilian business, in September
1998 the Government launched the Special
Exportation Programme (PEE), whose goal is to
double the value of exports by 2002.86 Under this
programme, 55 sectors have been identified whose
exports represented 88% of the value of exports in
1997, and quantitative goals have been established for
their export performance. The Special Exportation
Programme is intended to correct the current
f ragmentation of regulatory power and
decision-making authority in relation to export
promotion initiatives, which are divided up among
various agencies according to the area of foreign trade
in question. In order to manage the programme, a core
structure has been created for monitoring and
management functions which brings together
representatives of various public-sector agencies
(represented by 11 managers for designated subject
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82 Decree No. 357/97 of 19 September 1997. For further details, see WTO (1998d).
83 The WTO report, however, notes that Uruguay may not have felt the need to use anti-dumping measures, given the protection provided by the
use of reference and floor prices for exports. Hence, it is to be expected that a reduction in the use of these instruments may lead to an increased
application of anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties. Two anti-dumping investigations were begun in September 1998 (WTO, 1998d).
84 SeeInforme Anual 1997on the Website of the National Foreign Trade Commission (CNCE).
85 Within the context of customs and other foreign trade regulations, operating rules were approved for the EPZs in Corrientes, Chaco and La Rioja
and for the production procedures to be followed in Tierra del Fuego (see CNCE Website). For a critical analysis of export promotion policy in
Argentina, see Cleri (1998).
86 PEE restructures the previous foreign trade programme, which had been launched in January 1997. For a critical analysis of Brazil’s export
promotion programme, see Motta Veiga (1998).
areas) and of the private sector (represented by 55
sector managers). Although this programme is based
on an active policy stance, it is not aimed at “picking
winners”, but rather at creating an effective
mechanism for identifying bottlenecks that affect
exports in the selected sectors. The country’s export
effort will be concentrated in 11 areas: financing, trade
promotion, an export “ culture”,  tax concessions,
public administration, market access, logistics,
investment in export activities,  relationships with
trading companies, quality control and technology.87
Another measure to promote exports was the
creation in March 1997 of the Brazilian Export Credit
Insurance Board, or Seguradora Brasileira de Credito
a Exportaçao (SBCE), a partnership between the
government banking system (the Banco do Brasil),
four private Brazil ian insurance companies
(BRADESCO, BAMERINDUS, Sul  América and
Minas-Brasil) and a French firm, to offer lines of
insurance to cover all of an exporter’s commercial
r isks. This form of f inancial support was
supplemented by a loan programme for exports
created in April of the same year. Authorization was
given for equalization operations to bring national
interest rates into line with international rates (with
equalization up to 100%) for new products (see
ECLAC, 1997a, p. 60).88
In 1998, the Government of Brazil instituted
regulations to cover new lines of financing for
pre-shipment operations in order to supplement the
programme of export incentives (PROEX) funded by
the Treasury and administered by the Banco do Brasil,
which until then had provided  financing  only for
post-shipment operations.89 In Apri l 1997, the
National Monetary Council adopted new rules to help
the export sector carry out interest equalization
operations, up to a ceiling of 85% of the total value of
the operation, using Treasury funds.90 In June, the
Brazilian central  bank authorized exporters to use
PROEX funds for certain types of loans (advances
against exchange contracts).91In September 1997, the
central bank simplified the bureaucratic procedures
applying to exchange contracts for export operations
under US$ 10,000. Finally, on 21 November 1997, the
Export Promotion Agency (APEX) was created in
order to coordinate the relevant policies.92
Chile
Chile’s export promotion initiatives currently
follow three lines  of action. The  first consists in
broadening the scope of the work being done to
analyse the country’s export pattern, which is still
concentrated in terms of both products and
enterprises;93 the second addresses the need to
consolidate the existing export base; and the third is
directed towards developing new businesses. To meet
the new challenges arising in this area, the Export
Promotion Bureau (Prochile) has developed an
institutional modernization strategy under which it
would be converted into a public corporation and the
role of the private sector would be increased
(Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción,
1998, pp. 24 and 25). In response to the Asian crisis,
Prochile has followed a strategy that focuses on
strengthening Chile’s commercial presence in Asia
through the use of instruments designed to deal with
the various conditions that Chilean exporters face in
Asian markets and with all phases of the marketing
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87 “Programa Especial de Exportação: inovações para uma política harmonizada,”B lança comercial, Revista brasileira de comercio exterior
RBCE, No. 144, October/December 1998, pp. 2-4.
88 Provisional Measure MP 1601 of 11 November 1997 (Diario oficial, 25 November 1997) established the Guarantee Fund for the Promotion of
Competitiveness.
89 Provisional Measure MP 1623 of 13 January 1998.
90 Resolution CMN No. 2381 of 25 April 1997.
91 Export insurance programmes and international interest-rate equivalence programmes for exports are permitted by the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (GATT, 1994).
92 Decree No. 2.398 of 21 November 1997 (Diario oficial, 24 November 1997).
93 See also Macario (1998b) and Silva (1998).
process (Office of International Economic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Relations, March 1998).
In addition, various important export promotion
instruments were modified in order to make them
WTO-compliant and to help finance the scheduled
tariff reductions. In accord with a protocol of
understanding supplementary to the Tariff Reduction
Act, a proportion of the funds that will be freed up
when the Government dismantles such export
promotion instruments as simplified drawbacks and
the deferred payment of tariffs on capital goods will
be used to offset the decrease in government revenues
caused by the tariff reduction and to provide support
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
the farm sector, which will be hit the hardest by the
reduction in tariff protection. As for the simplified
drawback, the maximum rate of 10% on exports is to
be gradually reduced between 1999 and 2003, and it
and the present 5% rate are to converge at a level of
3% in the year 2003.
Under its bilateral agreements with Canada and
Peru, the Government of Chile has pledged to refrain
from subsidizing its exports after the year 2002. By the
same token, under its agreement with Mercosur,
products enjoying tariff preferences will not be able to
make use of general drawbacks from the sixth year on.
Uruguay
Support for the export sector is included in the
productivity-enhancing measures contained in the
new investment law,94 which broadens the coverage
of the old industrial development law. At the end of
1997, the Uruguayan Government reformed the
drawback regime so that it would be easier to use and
work function more like the temporary customs
clearance mechanism. At the same time, the
application of the latter mechanism was broadened,
and both instruments were placed under the
administrative authority of the Technological
Laboratory of Uruguay (LATU) (SIC, 1998a).95
These mechanisms must still be harmonized with the
other trade instruments in use within Mercosur,
however.
In August 1997, the Uruguayan Accreditation,
Standardization, Certification, Calibration and
Testing System (SUANCCE) was created. Under the
supervision of the National Committee for
Standardization and Accreditation, SUANCCE will
have the power to issue its own rulings concerning
compliance with quality standards in accordance with
international practices.
(c) Measures applied in importing countries
Chile
On 12 June 1997, pursuant to a complaint brought
by the United States salmon industry, the United States
Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission launched a dumping and subsidy
investigation to examine the practices  of  Chilean
exporters.96The plaintiff accused Chilean exporters of
maintaining a  dumping margin  of 41.78%  over a
“reconstructed value” and claimed that Chilean
salmon producers had received subsidies under 28
different Chilean government programmes.97 Since
the subsidization allegations involved government
programmes and could be extended to include other
export industries as well, the Chilean Government
decided to become a party to the case. It was
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94 Act No. 16.906 of January 1998.
95 Decree No. 431/97. Temporary customs clearance, which allows the importation of merchandise under a regime of exemptions contingent upon
re-exportation within a specified time period, is a system widely used by exporters. In 1997, around 20% of imports of inputs (excluding oil) made
use of this instrument (Vaillant, 1998, p. 50).
96 This investigation concerned the sale of fresh Atlantic salmon, either whole or filleted.
97 Some of the programmes mentioned were technological assistance programmes of the National Fund for Technological and Productive
Development (FONTEC) and the Technological Research Institute (INTEC), the international promotion support services provided by Prochile,
financial programmes of the Production Development Corporation (CORFO), assistance from the Fundación Chile, and chapters XIX and XVIII of
the Central Bank on external debt conversion mechanisms (see “Situación final de la acusación de subsidio y dumping contra la industria del salmón
chileno” on the Website of the Office of International Economic Affairs [http://www.direcon.com/Salmonjul.html].
represented in this matter by the Office of International
Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations, which was responsible for the coordination
of its defense before the United States Commerce
Department and chose to base that defense on an
aggregate approach  rather than on the  figures  for
individual companies. The latter involves analysing
each individual firm’s use of the available subsidies,
whereas, when the former method is used, the
investigation attempts to evaluate the industry as a
whole, which permits the Government to centre its
argument around an overall defense of the country’s
practices.98
Four days after the complaint was lodged, the
International Trade Commission initiated the
preliminary phase of the investigation, whose purpose
is to determine whether there was harm or a threat of
harm to local industry. At the beginning of July, the
Commerce Department formalized the  decision to
begin a dumping and subsidization investigation of the
Chilean salmon industry, but resolved to eliminate
from the investigation nine of the 28 programmes
named in the complaint. Based on information
provided by the Chilean Government, the Commerce
Department arrived at the preliminary conclusion that
there was evidence of dumping and harm to local
industry, and hence decided to open the investigation,
which focused on five companies (whose sales
represented 50% of the total value of the exports in
question).99From January to April 1998, a number of
Commerce Department officials visited Chile to check
the accuracy of the information that had been
provided. In its final decision, issued in June 1998, the
Department of Commerce ruled that Chilean salmon
exports were not receiving countervailing subsidies,
but that dumping was in fact occurring.100On 14 July,
the International Trade Commission, in a two-to-one
ruling, upheld the Commerce Department’s dumping
ruling and imposed a 4.54% tariff on Chilean salmon
coming into the United States market.
C. ANDEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
1. Merchandise trade and the trade balance
In 1997, as in the previous few years,Bolivia posted
a negative balance on its merchandise trade account,
and the growth rate for the value of imports outpaced
the  rate for exports (see table III.1). Agricultural
exports rose 13.6%, bringing their share of total
exports to 14% (the highest level in recent years), with
the main products being soy, cotton, chestnuts and
coffee. Manufacturing exports grew fairly slowly
(1.7%) due to the downturn in tin (-10.4%) and gold
exports (-7.6%). Exports of agro-industrial products
increased by 7%, bringing this subsector’s share to
37.5% of total exports.101 The 1.6% expansion of
exports from the mining and quarrying sector was the
result of the increase in zinc exports (31.8%), which
more than offset the reduction in sales of fuels and
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98 The Office of International Economic Affairs formed a working group of more than 35 individuals from different government agencies and
hired a law firm in the United States. For the details, see the document mentioned in the preceding footnote and Banco Central de Chile (1998d).
99 According to the Office of International Economic Affairs, the information submitted in the case was equivalent in volume to more than
10 telephone books (see the preceding footnote).
100 The Department of Commerce decided to open investigations into 19 of the 28 programmes that were the subject of subsidy complaints. Only
six of the programmes that were investigated were found to be grounds for countervailing measures, but they totalled less than the 2% benefit that is
considered thede minimisthreshold. The other programmes were not found to be grounds for countervailing measures, or no benefit was found to
exist. With respect to the allegations of dumping, margins of between 0.16% and 10.69% were set for the five companies, but under thede minimis
rule, two of them were excused from any payment obligations; three firms had to pay surcharges of between 2.23% and 10.69% and the rest had to
pay a surcharge of 4.57%.
101 The main categories are soy-based food products (animal feed, edible oil), wood products, gold jewellery, wearing apparel and “other”.
natural gas caused by declining international prices
and the rupture of the gas pipeline to Argentina.
The structure of Bolivian imports did not undergo
any major changes, since imports of consumer goods
(21% of the total), intermediate goods (39% of the
total) and capital goods (40% of the total) grew at
similar rates. In the first eight months of 1998, a
growing deficit was registered due to the harmful
effects of the Asian crisis on the price of Bolivia’s
main export products and the persistent growth of
imports.
The value ofColombia’s exports in 1997 climbed
by almost 10%, but the country posted a trade deficit
of close to US$ 2.8 billion nonetheless. During 1998,
Colombia’s exports were affected by the sharp decline
in the prices of some of its main traditional export
products, including oil, coal and coffee. According to
preliminary data from the National Bureau of
Statistics (DANE), the value of exports up to August
1998 had fallen 3.7% compared with the same period
of the previous year, despite the fact that the volume
of shipments increased 13% (see table III.2a).102
Exports of non-traditional products grew 4.3% in the
same period. Imports have been notably stronger than
exports and, as a result, the cumulative trade deficit for
the first six months of 1998 was 50% above the total
cumulative deficit for all of 1997 (see tables III.1 and
III.2b).
Ecuador’s 1997 trade figures featured a small
increase in the value of exports (6%) and a large one
in  imports (27%) (see  table III.1). The  growth in
exports was the consequence of larger volumes of
bananas and shrimp, which also rose in price, while
low oil prices reduced this product’s share in total
export value. The share of the overall of value of
Ecuador’s exports represented by oil, bananas and
shrimp was 30%, 25% and 17%, respectively.
In the first half of 1998, the value of exports fell
steeply as a consequence of low oil prices and
reductions of banana and shrimp exports, the latter on
account of El Niño and the general decline in
commodity prices. Import growth rates remained high
and,  for  the first  time  since  1987, this led to the
build-up of a negative trade balance.
In 1997,Peru’s exports grew 15.5% thanks to the
strength of non-traditional products (textiles, metal
manufactures and machinery, chemicals, and iron and
steel), although traditional exports also grew. Imports
were up by 8.3% over their 1996 level, making for a
reduction of 13% in the trade deficit. Nonetheless, in
the first half of 1998, the trade deficit was almost three
times as high as it had been in the same period in 1997
(US$ 581 million) due to a 27% fall in the value of
exports. The main causes of this reduction were
decreased fishmeal production and falling world
prices for the country’s main export metals (copper,
zinc and gold).
The Venezuelan economy expects growth in 1998
of about 1% (compared to more than 5% in 1997) due
to the weakening of international oil prices.  The
Government ofVenezuelacut oil production by more
than 15% (almost one half million barrels per day) in
an effort to reduce the exportable supply and thus help
to raise world prices for crude. Oil exports account for
80% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and
25% of its GDP. In 1997, exports grew less than 3%,
while imports expanded almost 15%. Thus, between
1996 and 1997, the trade surplus fell from US$ 13.59
billion dollars to US$ 11.4 billion.
In the first half of 1998, non-traditional exports
totalled US$ 2,370 million, for an averaged increase
of 3.2% over the same period of the previous year.
Most of this increase was accounted for by chemicals,
food products, beverages and tobacco, and electrical
equipment. Preliminary projections for 1998 are not
promising, since a reduction of more than 11% in
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102 Between January 1997 and June-July 1998, the prices of Colombia’s main commodity exports underwent significant declines: from US$ 1.444
to US$ 1.273 per pound for coffee; from US$ 23.40 to US$ 12.00 per barrel for oil; from US$ 34.10 to US$ 30.80 per ton for coal; from US$ 2.90
to US$ 1.90 per pound for nickel; and from US$ 354.80 to US$ 292.40 per troy ounce for gold (June 1998). As a result, the terms-of-trade index,
which was 1.00 in 1997, fell to 0.96 in July 1998. (See “Las exportaciones han caído 3.7% este año”,El Tiempo,6 October 1998.)
export value is expected, together with an upswing of
more than 28% in imports, which would lead to an
even larger decrease in the trade surplus by the end of
1998. Be that as it may, Venezuela is likely to be the
only Latin American country registering a
merchandise trade surplus for the year.
2. Trade policy
(a) Measures affecting imports
Bolivia
In 1998, the country’s tariff structure remained
unchanged (5% on capital goods and 10% on all other
goods), except in the case of books, pamphlets and
other printed matter, whose 2% tariff was eliminated
in July of that year. Currently, the Government is in
the process of drafting legislation on WTO-compliant
anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties  and
safeguards.
Colombia
In January 1998,  the Colombian Government
established procedures and criteria for the adoption of
general safeguard measures, transitional safeguards
for products included in the agreement on textiles and
clothing, and special safeguard mechanisms for farm
products consistent with WTO agreements.103
On 16 October 1998, the Foreign Trade Council
restricted imports of polyester fibre from the Republic
of Korea and Thailand because the sharp decline in the
prices of Asian textile products had triggered an
increase in imports and put Colombian textile firms in
a difficult position. Under these restrictions, textile
imports may not exceed the level recorded the year
before. Previously, on 31 July, the Council had
adopted safeguard measures in respect of texturized
polyester yarns or thread from China and the Chinese
Province of Taiwan.104On the same date, a safeguard
measure was also adopted for imports  of smooth
polyester yarn or thread from the Chinese Province of
Taiwan under which a quota of 232.5 tons was set for
a period of 12 months (see ECLAC, 1997a, p. 72).
Limitations on imports have also been placed on
such products as processed poultry meat or poultry
cuts coming from the United States due to the
distortions created in the domestic market by the low
prices of these items.
Ecuador
In March 1998, in an effort to deal with the budget
deficit, the Technical Customs Committee decided to
modify the structure of import duties by means of a
number of provisions that were to remain in effect until
the end of 1998. Accordingly, a 2% tariff came into
effect for imports that had been exempt from duty until
that time; the 5%, 10% and 15% tariff rates were raised
four points and the 20% and 35% rates were increased
five points. These surcharges are not applied to goods
coming from other countries in the Andean
Community or to LAIA countries with which Ecuador
has trade agreements.
At the beginning of 1998, the Unfair Trading
Practices Division was created in  the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, Industrialization and Fishing. This
Division will be responsible for dumping, subsidy and
safeguard investigations based on regulations  that
were to enter into effect in April 1998.
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103 Decree No. 152 of 22 January 1998 (Diario oficial 43221 of 23 January 1998).
104 Import quotas of 800 tons for products of Chinese origin and of 1,532 tons for products from the Chinese province of Taiwan were set for a
period of 12 months.
Peru
On 1 January 1998, the new international
nomenclature, the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS), entered into
force, and the tariff schedule based on the common
tariff nomenclature was approved.105 Peru made
sizeable reductions in its tariff structure in April 1997,
and the Government is assessing the possibility of
continuing to reduce tariffs gradually in order to
improve the competitiveness of the country’s
businesses.106 Peru, unl ike the other Andean
countries, does not use price bands for sensitive
products but instead levies specific duties on a group
of 20 tariff items (see ECLAC 1997a, p. 78).107The
previous year’s list of prohibited imports remains in
force.108
The rules on safeguards applicable to third
countries are currently under discussion. The Peruvian
Government advocates the adoption of national
regulations rather than those of the Andean
Community, although it accepts  the  idea that  the
procedure for the assessment of harm or damage
should be common to all the countries in the
Community. Peru has provisionally applied
anti-dumping measures to shoe imports from
China,109 to imports of calcium carbide from
Argentina110and Brazil,111and to imports of woven
labels from Chile, among others. In late December
1997, an investigation was launched on bus imports
from Brazil in view of the possibility that they were
subsidized under Brazil’s export incentives programme.
Venezuela
The Venezuelan tariff structure is governed by
that of the Andean Community’s common external
tariff, which has four steps: 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%.
Some products are dealt with outside this structure,
such as motor vehicles, which are subject to a 35%
tariff, and those agricultural products for which
price bands are used. The latter include some
13 agricultural products and substitutes (such as milk,
corn, pork, poultry, soy and oilseeds).
In April 1998, the Venezuelan Government
imposed a 15% surtax on certain (non-staple) products
from countries with which Venezuela does not have
bilateral agreements.112This increase, which applies
to selected goods carrying tariffs of between 15% and
20%, was scheduled to remain in place until the end
of 1998. On the same date, the rate for customs service
fee was also raised from 1% to 2% of the value of the
merchandise.113 Subsequently (in June) further
modif icat ions in the tar i f f structure were
introduced.114
In September 1997, the customs service began to
apply minimum reference prices to the textile sector
in order to check the increase of textile imports and
help the domestic textile industry to compete with
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105 Supreme Decree No. 119-97-EF.
106 A 12% tariff for industrial equipment, machinery and inputs, and 20% for motor vehicles, electrical appliances, liquor, cigarettes and luxury
articles.
107 In August 1998, the 5% specific duty on wheat imports (Supreme Decree No. 083-98-EF) was lifted.
108 Used clothing, used tires, pesticides, arms and live cattle and cattle products coming from countries affected by BSE, or “mad cow” disease
(France, Ireland, Portugal, United Kingdom and Switzerland).
109 Resolution No. 004-97-INDECOPI/CDS of 6 March 1997.
110 Resolution No. 007-97-INDECOPI/CDS of 7 May 1997.
111 Resolution No. 001-98-INDECOPI/CDS of 24 February 1998.
112 (Decree 2484, 16 April 1998). The measure covers, among other things, imports of alcoholic beverages, beauty products, seafood, ornamental
flowers, candy, electronic calculators, toys, vacuum cleaners and blenders.
113 Decree 2483 of 16 April 1998.
114 Tariffs on hydraulic brake fluid and certain plasticizers were reduced from 15% to 10%, while tariffs were raised for 36 headings, including
aluminium oxides and waxed paper (from 5% to 10%), railroad equipment (not rolling stock), cement-mixing trucks and fire engines, bumpers,
instrument panels and bicycle tyres (from 5% to 15%), and paintings and sculptures (from 5% to 20%) (Veneconomía Semanal,vol. 16, No. 28,
10 June 1998).
imported products.115 Venezuela does not have
legislation covering safeguards, subsidies, dumping or
countervailing duties, but a bill on safeguard measures
drafted by the Anti-dumping and Subsidy
Commission is currently in the pipeline.116
(b)  Export promotion measures
Bolivia
Pursuant to the Executive Branch Organization
Act, in September 1997 the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Investment was created. This ministry’s duties
include developing foreign trade regulations and
policies for the promotion of Bolivian exports and
helping them to become more competitive in foreign
markets. In February 1998, the Bolivian Promotion
Centre was founded to backstop private firms  in
foreign markets, identify export opportunities, provide
private firms with technical assistance and promote
technology transfer. The Government is also
considering new export legislation that would provide
more impetus for investment in capital goods used in
the production of exportables and would permit the
creation of an appropriate institutional framework for
the promotion of exports.
At present, the General Export Regime is defined
by Act 1489 of 1992, which establishes, among other
things, tax neutrality for exports. Under these
provisions, domestic taxes can be rebated using the tax
credit-debit system and drawbacks can be issued on
import duties paid on raw materials and inputs
incorporated  into export  goods; the  corresponding
percentages are set annually and vary from 1% to 4%
according to the cost structure of the industry
concerned. In addition to the General Regime, there
are two special regimes: the Temporary Clearance for
Export (RITEX) regime and the Export Processing
Zone (EPZ) regime. In 1997, Executive Decree 24480
introduced operational improvements designed to
make RITEX more efficient by authorizing firms to
clear raw materials and intermediate goods through
customs without paying import duties or domestic
taxes for a period of up to 120 days, within which time
the merchandise must be produced and exported.
The regulations required to govern the operational
aspects  of  the  country’s  EPZs  were  also  enacted.
These operation of these zones is based on the
principle of customs and tax segregation, with the idea
being  that investment can be increased under this
regime.
Colombia
Colombian trade policy, as indicated in the
document approved by the Foreign Trade Council of
the Ministry of Foreign Trade entitled “Política de
Comercio Exterior”, seeks to internationalize the
Colombian economy over the long term. To this end,
the Colombian Government  has adopted a  policy
position supporting open regionalism, without
prejudice to its Andean Community commitments. In
pursuit  of  its  ultimate objective,  Colombian  trade
policy not only deals with export of goods but also
devotes special attention to services exports. In
addition, it is thought that in order to increase
productivity it will be necessary for the Government to
address related matters, such as infrastructure, research
and the accumulation of human capital. A particularly
important role is played in this respect by foreign direct
investment and international technical cooperation as
well (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1997).
With this same objective in mind, the Government
decided to use a gradual approach in dismantling the
tax reimbursement certificate (CRT) system and to
create a strategy to improve business productivity and
competitiveness.
The newly elected Administration in Colombia
has reaffirmed its commitment to raising the
competitiveness of the export sector through an
efficient channeling of funding for infrastructure,
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116 Anti-dumping and Subsidy Commission, No. 066-98, 16 February 1998.
education and sectoral development  policies. The
objective is to boost exports from the current level of
US$ 11.5 billion to US$ 25 billion by the year 2002.117
To this end, on 15 October 1998 the Government
announced it was taking steps to streamline its customs
procedures, which currently involve eight steps and
take an average of 20 days but are to be reduced to a
single, shorter stage.118
Ecuador
In June 1997, the Foreign Trade and Investment
Act was promulgated. Under this law, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, Industrialization and Fishing is
assigned the tasks of promoting foreign trade and
investment, and advancing the process of regional
integration. This move was intended to put an end to
the overlapping and excessive dispersion of
administrative functions in the areas of foreign trade
and investment, which had been spread over various
government agencies. The law also provided for the
creation of the Council on Foreign Trade and
Investment (COMEXI), whose main job is to design
and coordinate foreign trade policy. This body, headed
by the President of the Republic or his representative,
is made up of five ministers and the presidents of the
five national federations  of the country’s  various
chambers of commerce. In addition, the Ecuadorian
External Promotion System was created. This system
is formed by the Export and Investment Corporation
(CORPEI) and its foreign network, the Trade Service,
which is staffed by diplomatic officials serving
abroad. CORPEI is to replace trade promotion
mechanisms with more eff ic ient –and
WTO-compliant– instruments  (see  ECLAC,  1996,
p. 78).119
Peru
Peru’s Export Promotion Commission (Prompex)
was created in April  1996 and is  an  independent
association in which private firms may participate. Its
functions include promoting and publicizing the
country’s export products, taking measures to
diversify and consolidate markets, helping small and
medium-sized enterprises to develop their export
capacity and promoting the creation of export
companies (see ECLAC, 1997a, p. 80).
In September 1997, a document was approved
that sets out the operational rules for the country’s
Export, Processing, Industry, Marketing and Services
Centres (CETICOs),120 and in May 1998 a law was
passed authorizing the creation of a new CETICO in
Loreto.121 The vehicle repair section has been
expanded at both the Tacna and Ilo CETICOs.
Venezuela
The export promotion instruments upon which the
Venezuelan Government relies the most are
temporary customs clearances, drawbacks, tax rebates
and  the  special regimes applying  to the  country’s
EPZs.122 In 1997, a new trade bank, the Banco de
Comercio Exterior (Bancoex), entered into operation
and began offering  financing for export firms.  In
addition, the Ministry of Development and the Foreign
Trade Institute were merged to form the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce.
(c) Measures applied in importing countries
Colombia
A number of the measures applied by importing
countries were favourable to Colombian exports. One
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117 See “Exportar más, una obligación”,El Tiempo, 13 October 1998.
118 For a review of Colombia’s export promotion policy, see Ochoa (1998).
119 Ecuador promotes exports by means of drawbacks, EPZs, amaquilaregime, temporary importation procedures and international trade fairs. Of
the five EPZs that have been approved, only one is in operation.
120 Supreme Decree No. 112-97-EF.
121 A CETICO was created in Loreto by virtue of Act No. 26.953 of 22 May 1998.
122 The Government of Venezuela does not consider the latter to be an export promotion instrument.
of the main such measures was the re-certification of
the country by the United States based on its efforts to
combat drug trafficking.123A significant development
in relation to the use of export barriers was the United
States’ decision to ban shrimp imports, a measure that
prompted a number of countries to have recourse to
WTO dispute settlement procedures (see chapter IX).
On 28 April 1997, Colombia submitted a request for
consultations with WTO  concerning the safeguard
measure taken by the United States against imports of
Colombian brooms. This request is still pending.124
The European Commission is studying the
possibility of extending the Generalized System of
Preferences for the Andean countries for a period of
several years. In October 1998, new quotas for banana
exports from Latin American countries to the
European Union’s markets were set. According to the
proposal submitted by the banana industry’s
management committee, Colombia will provide
23.03% of total European banana imports from Latin
America.
D. MEXICO
1. Merchandise trade and the trade balance
Mexico’s strategy of maintaining close trade links
with the United States is reflected in a number of
special features in relation to its trading patterns that
distinguish it from the rest of Latin America and the
Caribbean. In the first place, Mexican exports
represented more than 38% of the region’s total
exports in 1997. In addition, according to WTO, in
1996 Mexico was one of the world’s 10 largest
exporters of automotive products. Nonetheless, the
country’s cumulative 1995 trade balance of more than
US$ 7 billion fell to slightly over US$ 6.5 billion in
1996 and to only US$ 623 million in 1997, although
it should also be noted that Ecuador, Mexico and
Venezuela were the only countries in Latin America
to post a trade surplus that year.
In July 1997, Mexico’s monthly trade account
began to show a systematic and increasingly large
deficit for the first time since January 1995. In the first
nine months of 1998, the cumulative trade deficit on
the merchandise trade account was over US$ 5 billion,
with negative monthly balances averaging over
US$ 750 million in the third quarter.
In 1997, the total value of export goods (including
maquila products) rose 15%. The value ofmaquila
exports rose 22%, while the non-maquilasector saw a
10% increase; these trends were in sharp contrast to
those registered in 1996, when the non-maquilasector
had posted a larger increase than themaquilasector
had.Maquila imports climbed 20%, as against 25%
for the non-maquilasector. Imports of capital goods
were up 38%, but those of consumer goods increased
by 40%.
Exports to the United States have climbed sharply,
particularly  from 1994  to  1996;  their  growth rate
slackened in 1997 and 1998, but was still above the
average rate for exports as a whole. The share of the
United States in Mexico’s trade flows has held steady
at around 85% of exports and 75% of imports.
Moreover, since 1995 Mexico has consistently run a
surplus with the United States, although the balance
on this account showed a 27% decline in the first nine
months of 1998.
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123 The new Colombian Administration reported that it will request an extension of the Trade Preferences Regime for the Andean Countries (ATPA),
which benefits Andean countries working to combat the drug traffic. It also indicated that it will ask that Colombia be included in the initiative to
extend the preferences granted under NAFTA to the countries of the Caribbean Basin.
124 See the WTO Website [http://www.wto.org].
Trade with LAIA and Central American countries
is also favourable to Mexico. It has been building up
trade deficits with all the European countries,
however, as well as with the Asian countries
(including China and Japan). The value of Mexico’s
exports, measured in current dollars, to the European
Union diminished between 1992 and 1994 and then
leveled off at around US$ 3.5 billion in 1995 and 1996,
after which it rose slightly, to just under US$ 4 billion,
in 1997.125 Imports remained high,  however, at
between US$ 6.2 billion and almost US$ 10 billion
during those years. The country’s largest deficits were
with China, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Republic of
Korea.
In the nine months of 1998, despite the problems
faced by the Asian countries, Mexico ran much larger
deficits than it had during the same period of the
previous year, and its deficit with the European Union
rose by 45%.
2. Trade policy
(a) Measures affecting imports
According to information from the Ministry of
Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI),
the tariff structure for Mexican imports includes 75
headings subject to controls and 11,266 headings that
have  been deregulated, which represent 4.8% and
95.2% of the value of total imports, respectively.126
The simple average of tariff rates is approximately
11% for capital and intermediate goods, and there is
little dispersion for these categories (between 5.5%
and 6.6%). More protection is provided for consumer
goods, with a simple average rate of 24.9% and a tariff
spread of 11.6%. Between 1990 and May 1998, the
number  of  deregulated  items  rose  from 11,019 to
11,266, and the share of such imports grew from
86.4% to 95.2% (SECOFI, 1998, p. 119).
In 1997 a total of seven investigations into
allegations of unfair trading practices (dumping and
subsidization) were initiated at the international level,
and 55 decisions were issued; this was a significant
reduction in comparison to 1993, 1994 and 1995,
when there was an average  of  132 decisions per
year.127Of the total number of investigations carried
out between 1987 and 1997, 91% concerned
allegations of dumping, 8.5% related to subsidies, and
only one investigation (0.5%) dealt with safeguards
(SECOFI, 1998,  table  A.2, p.  66).128 Of  the  188
investigations conducted in the last 10 years, 82 led to
the imposition of a countervailing duty and 100 did not
(53% of the dumping investigations). Of the 18
subsidy investigations that were opened, eight resulted
in the imposition of countervailing duties.129
Thus, up to 31 December 1997, countervailing
duties were imposed in 90 cases; in 48 of  these
instances, the extra duty was in excess of 50% and in
19 it was 200% or more (SECOFI, 1998, figure A.4,
p. 69).130 During the  last 10 years, the countries
requesting the greatest number of investigations were
the United States (58), China (37), Brazil (22) and
Venezuela (10), whereas upon which countervailing
duties were imposed most frequently, in proportional
terms, were China (in 89% of the investigations
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125 As a result, Mexico’s exports to the European Union increased at an average annual rate of 2.5% between 1991 and 1997, while its total exports
rose at a rate of 18% (data from the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI).
126 There are also 33 controlled headings and 5,267 headings not subject to export tariffs. The former represent 0.6% of the total value of exports
(SECOFI, 1998, p. 119).
127 In 1993 a total of 83 investigations were initiated (SECOFI, 1998, table A.1, p. 65).
128 In those 10 years, 82% of the investigations dealt with intermediate goods (mainly basic metals, chemicals, petroleum products and rubber and
plastic products) (SECOFI, 1998, tables A.8 and A.9, pp. 72-74).
129 However, in 147 of the 206 investigations into allegations of unfair trading practices, countervailing duties were imposed in at least one phase
of the inquiry (SECOFI, 1998, table A.5, p. 69).
130 In addition, in the course of the initial anti-dumping inquiry, provisional duties were imposed in four instances (SECOFI, 1998, table A.6, p. 69).
dealing with its products), Venezuela (in 70% of the
cases) and Brazil (59%).131 Only 38% of the
investigations conducted in respect of United States
products resulted in the imposition of countervailing
duties (SECOFI, 1998, table A.7 and figure A.5, pp.
70 and 71).
In Mexico, investigations of unfair international
trading practices  are  handled by the  International
Trade Practices Unit (UPCI), which recommends that
the Minister of Commerce and Industr ia l
Development impose countervailing duties when it is
has been demonstrated that the dumping or
subsidization (or both) of imports of a product harm
or threaten to harm domestic production. The Unit also
provides technical assistance to the Minister in
determining whether an area of the country’s
production activity faces harm or threat of harm
because of a substantial increase in imports, and in that
event proposes the application of safeguard
measures.132
(b)  Export promotion measures
The Mexican Government has moved forward in
its efforts to promote exports through various
innovative programmes. The Joint Export Promotion
Commission (Compex) is made up of both public- and
private-sector representatives is active in such areas as
the coordination of efforts to streamline administrative
procedures and the mitigation of technical obstacles
hampering the relationship between the Government
and the private sector.133
Between September 1996 and June 1997, 87.5%
of the country’s manufacturing exports (around US$
64 billion) were made by firms benefiting from export
promotion programmes. During this period, 104,361
certificates of origin were issued for products having
a total value of more than US$ 8 billion. These
certificates facilitate exports by taking advantage of
the tax exemptions or reductions provided for in the
various preferential schemes and agreements
negotiated with other countries.134 In addition,
US$ 31 billion in exports were made under
programmes allowing temporary customs clearance
for inputs used  in  the production of  export  items
(known as “Pitex programmes”); 6,135 companies
now benefit from these programmes.135
In April 1997, SECOFI published a number of
decrees designed to carry forward the deregulation and
administrative streamlining process and to backstop
export firms. One of these decrees provided for the
establishment of foreign trade enterprises; its aim is to
provide incentives for the provision of comprehensive
services to assist in the development of exportable
supply (e.g., promotion, transportation logistics and
marketing) in order to bring more firms, especially
smaller ones, into the export sector. Another of these
decrees, which established a series of programmes
allowing for temporary customs clearance for items to
be  used in  connection with comprehensive  export
services (Pitex-Services), allows VAT-and duty-free
importation of machinery, equipment and other
devices used in export-related services, such as
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131 In November 1998, the Governments of Mexico and the People’s Republic of China agreed to establish an institutional cooperation and
consultation mechanism to combat the under-invoicing that had been detected in bilateral trade flows. The agreement allows SECOFI to examine a
series of anti-dumping measures taken against imports of machinery and appliances, tools and organic chemicals coming from China. As a result of
the review, countervailing duties on 624 tariff items were eliminated, although 1,360 tariff items being imported from China will continue to be
subject to such duties; these items include such products as textiles, clothing, shoes and toys (see “México y China acuerdan reforzar el combate a
la subfacturación y a la elusión de medidas antidumping” on the SECOFI Website [http://www.secofi.gob.mx/comsocial/645.html]).
132 See the UPCI Website using the link from the SECOFI Web page [http://www.secofi.gob.mx].
133 See the SECOFI Website [http://www.secofi.gob.mx/compexl.htm]. For an examination of the main programmes and instruments for the
promotion of Mexico’s non-oil exports, see Máttar (1998).
134 During 1997, maquila enterprises exported more than US$ 40 billion and directly created more than a million jobs (see
SECOFI/Publicaciones/Actividades 1996-1997 on the SECOFI Website [http://www.secofi.gob.mx/lab97-14.html]).
135 See “Reformas de programas PITEX y Maquila para adecuarlos al Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte” on the SECOFI Website
[http://www.secofi.gob.mx/comsocial/641.html].
loading, unloading, warehousing, exploration, design,
containers, packaging and process engineering.136
In November 1998, the official government
gazette published a listing of the changes to be made
in the Development Programme for Export-Oriented
Maquila Industries of 1997-1998 and in the
above-mentioned Pitex programmes. These reforms,
which will go into effect in 2001, are needed in order
to make these programmes NAFTA-and
WTO-compliant. The reforms do not affect the right
to import inputs on a temporary basis without payment
of duties or VAT, but 60 days after exportation the
exporters must pay duty on the inputs coming from
countries with  which Mexico does not have trade
treaties. The mechanism for the temporary transfer of
merchandise imported duty free remains in place, and
the regulation exempting temporary machinery
imports from the VAT will remain in place
indefinitely,  although the  same duty as  applies  to
non-temporary imports will have to be paid at the time
of entry.137
(c) Measures applied in importing countries
As of the end of 1997, anti-dumping duty orders
had been applied to Mexican products in 15 cases:
seven by the United States, two by Australia, two by
the European Union and one each by Canada,
Guatemala, India and Peru (SECOFI, 1998, table
A.20, p. 91).
E.  THE COUNTRIES OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
COMMON MARKET (CACM) AND PANAMA
1. Merchandise trade and the trade balance
In 1997, in line with the trend of the last few years,
Costa Rica posted a trade deficit equivalent to 7% of
GDP, as compared with 4% for the previous year.
Exports grew 9%, thanks to the momentum provided
by the EPZ regime. Favourable changes were
observed in the prices of coffee and non-traditional
export products, in particular melons (26%), shrimp
and pineapple (46%), yucca (36%) and fish. Indeed,
fishery exports (dried, fresh and frozen fish and
shrimp) were up by 65%.138Imports increased 13%,
largely due to the general growth of the economy. The
strongest increases in imports were in capital goods
(23.7%), raw materials (18%) and construction
materials (13.5%). Raw materials represented the
greatest share of total imports (44%), partly because
of the production sector’s dependence on imported
inputs. After raw materials, the next-largest share of
total imports corresponded to consumer goods (27%).
Capital goods represented 20% of total imports.
This category’s share of imports is in part determined
by long-term investment decisions and projects
involving technological change. The arrival of Intel
(Integrated Electronics), the microchip maker, in
Costa Rica in 1997, for example, will have a decisive
impact on the performance of such imports.
In 1997, El Salvador’s trade deficit was US$ 1,323
million, representing a decline of US$ 111 million
from the previous year, although the deficit is believed
to have increased in 1998. The positive performance
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137 Under the PITEX programmes,maquilaenterprises will be allowed to import all inputs and machinery necessary to produce products for export
to Canada or the United States from any part of the world duty-free until 2001 (see “Reformas a programas PITEX y Maquila para adecuarlos al
Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte” on the SECOFI Website [http://www.secofi.gob. mx/comsocial/641.html]).
138 According to an ECLAC study (1998a, p. 193), the growth of Costa Rica’s exports was primarily attributable to the upswing in international
prices (12%), since volume expanded by only 5%.
of exports in 1997 is attributable to strong coffee and
sugar prices, though the volume of exports also
increased. In addition, favourable trends were seen in
the exports of other products, such as shrimp (12%)
andmaquilaproducts (21%). As a result, traditional
exports (coffee, sugar, shrimp) represented 25% of
total exports in 1997, with  non-traditional exports
representing 31% andmaquilaexports 44%.
The trend in Salvadoran imports is due to
(i) increasing trade liberalization, in accord with the
Central American timetable for tariff reductions;
(ii) the recovery of the manufacturing industry,
transport and construction; and (iii) the appreciation
of the exchange rate. Imports of consumer goods were
notable in 1997 and accounted for 25% of the total,
while intermediate goods constituted 35% and capital
goods andmaquilaproducts represented 20% each.
Guatemala’s 1997 trade def ic i t was
approximately 7.6% of GDP. This figure, which was
a two-point rise from 1996, was accounted for by the
fact that exports rose less than imports (15% versus
22%). The increase in traditional  exports, mostly
coffee (30%) and sugar (20%), was due as much to the
increase in volume as to international prices; oil
exports increased 60% despite low prices on world
markets owing to the output from new fields. The
increase in imports was attributable to increased
economic activity, the liberalization of the economy
and, in general, the growth model, which has
established a link between export of goods, import of
inputs and the appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The greatest import strength was seen in construction
materials (24.1%) and in raw materials and
intermediate products (24%). During the first half of
1998, exports increased 15% and imports 23%.
In contrast with the results for other countries,
Honduras’s trade deficit shrank from 2.9% to 2.2% of
GDP from 1996 to 1997 thanks chiefly to the notable
growth of the economy. The rise in coffee prices and
the decline in fuel prices also were positive influences.
The upswing in exports came from increased foreign
sales of shrimp, melon and other products, which more
than offset  the 24% drop in the  value of  banana
exports. The heading “other products,” which includes
manufactures and farm products (soap, textiles, cigars,
cigarettes, palm oil, pineapples, melons and
vegetables),  represented 43% of  total exports and
expanded 22%.
The moderate rise in the value of imports was the
result of the purchase of a smaller volume of fuels and
lubricants,  which also fell in price, and increased
imports of machinery, electrical equipment and
devices, food products and transport equipment.
Nicaragua’s 1997 trade deficit stemmed from a
decline in the pace of export growth, mainly because
of the performance of non-traditional products. On the
other hand, imports registered a  40% rise  due to
increased purchases of intermediate goods (36%)
(mostly industrial inputs) and capital goods (35%).
Imports of consumer goods were not as strong as the
previous year, and purchases of fuels and lubricants
were down (-9%).
In the first half of 1998, exports fell 16% as
compared with the first half of 1997, mostly due to the
effects of El Niño and weaker international prices for
some products, such as beef. There were hopes that the
situation would improve in the second half of 1998,
but the catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Mitch
in agricultural areas heavily affected the economies of
Honduras and Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, those
of El Salvador and Guatemala.
The upturn in Panama’s exports in 1997 was due
principally to the higher sales figures registered by the
Colón free zone (14%) and increased exports of
fishery products (41%) and agricultural produce (fruit,
sugar, melons, watermelons), except in the case of
bananas, which declined. The higher value of imports
was due to increased quantity, since prices fell.
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2. Trade policy
(a) Measures affecting imports
Costa Rica
At the end of 1996, Costa Rica suspended the
tariff reduction programme to which it had agreed with
CACM, and in mid-1997, the subregion’s Deputy
Ministers of Economic Affairs decided to postpone
those reductions for another five years  (ECLAC,
1997a, p. 83). In August 1997, the Government of
Costa Rica set up a timetable for tariff reductions in
accordance with this last decision, with a floor of 0%
and a ceiling of 15%.139 This tariff structure should
remain in effect until the year 2000, except for farm
products, whose tariffs are to be rolled back in 2005.
In 1998, the simple average tariff was 8%, compared
with almost 10% in 1997.140 Table III.3 shows the
tariff reduction schedules for Costa Rica and El
Salvador, updated to August 1998.
Up to July 1998, Costa Rica had submitted 104
safeguard clauses with respect to the CACM common
external tariff for item ranging from meat and dairy
products to laser disks.141
El Salvador
El Salvador’s tariffs will be brought progressively
closer to their target levels, which they are to reach in
the year 2000, according to the CACM tariff reduction
schedule. However, textiles, apparel and footwear are
exempted for the time being and will not be
incorporated into the rollback programme until 2005
in the case of both El Salvador and Guatemala (see
table III.3).142
As of July 1998, El Salvador had applied 147
safeguard clauses to the CACM common external
tariff which were to be eliminated by the start of
1999.143 From January 1997 to June 1998, no new
quantitative controls or related measures were applied
to imports, nor were other countervailing measures
taken. The 10% countervailing duty imposed by El
Salvador on Costa Rican milk remained in force.
Guatemala
The tariff reduction schedule agreed upon by the
Central American presidents on 20 November 1996
was not changed during the period from January 1996
to June 1998 (see ECLAC, 1997a, table IV.17, p. 91).
In October 1998, Guatemala had a tariff of 0% on
capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods
not produced in the subregion. The country’s import
duties will reach their target levels in the year 2000,
except in the cases of textiles, apparel and footwear,
which, as mentioned above, will be incorporated into
the tariff reduction programme in 2005.144
Guatemala imposesde facto import quotas on
seven products in its trade with countries outside the
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139 Gaceta oficial, No. 161, Executive Decree No. 26.248-MEIC.
140 In addition to duties, there are four other taxes on imports (see ECLAC, 1997a, p. 84).
141 Safeguard clauses are an exception to the Central American common external tariff. In other words, they are tariffs that exceed the ceiling rate
of the common external tariff. These clauses are applied individually by Central American countries and may deal both with tariff rates and the types
of products on which they are to be imposed. In Costa Rica, the products subject to these clauses were: meat and edible by-products, dairy products,
fresh or chilled potatoes, onions and shallots, frozen potatoes, corn, wheat flour, palm oil, corn starch, processed and prepared meats, sugar and
molasses, processed potatoes, ice cream, tobacco, salt, coarse woven goods, corduroy, sacks, pumps, air conditioners, electric motors and generat,
converters, electric batteries, laser disks, electrical resistors, relays, motor vehicles, and other instruments and devices.
142 Resolution No. 11-97 of the Ministerial Council on Economic Integration, 11 December 1997.
143 These safeguards apply to the following products: ducks, dairy products, yellow and white corn, rice, sorghum, corn starch, almond oil, vegetable
oil products, sugar, refined salt, fertilizers, tensoactive substances, rosin oils and substances, plastic films, articles for use in transport orp cking and
plastic plugs, wood, thread, fabrics and wearing apparel, iron or steel sheets, iron or steel structural shapes, microphones, earphones, amplifiers, and
recording or reproduction equipment.
144 Resolution No. 11-97 of the Ministerial Council on Economic Integration, 11 December 1997.
zone.145The procedures involved in the imposition of
countervailing and anti-dumping measures  are set
forth in the Central American Regulations on Unfair
Trading Practices, which went into effect for
Guatemala on 3 July 1996. Beginning 31 January
1997, an anti-dumping duty of 89.54% has to be paid
on imports of Portland cement from Mexico. The case
was submitted to the WTO for a ruling, and the panel’s
decision went against Guatemala, but in October 1998
Guatemala decided to exercise its right to appeal.146
Honduras
The tariff reduction schedule for Honduras has not
been changed significantly (see ECLAC, 1997a, table
IV.19, p. 95). Honduras had, up to July 1998, applied
25 safeguard clauses to the common external tariff (to
eight digits).147
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s tariff reduction schedule forms part
of its Fair Trade and Taxation Act (in force since
1  July 1997),  which redefines the  country’s tariff
policy, setting a ceiling of 10% as of 1 July 1999 for
final consumer products and a floor of 0% for raw
materials, intermediate goods and capital goods not
produced in Central America. Under this statute the
temporary protective tariff was combined with the
stamp tax and became subject to a tariff reduction
schedule that was to lower the rate to 0% by 1 January
1999, with the exception of items designated as State
Table III.3
COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR: NATIONAL TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULE, 1997-2000 a
(Percentages)
ID b 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000
base 1997 1 January 1 July 1 January 1 July 1 January
Type of goods
Costa El Costa El Costa El Costa El Costa El Costa
Rica Salvador Rica Salvador Rica Salvador Rica Salvador Rica Salvador Rica
Capital goods 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Raw materials 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intermediate goods
with ID b of 10% 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5
Intermediate goods
with DI b of 15% 15 14 14 13 13 12 12 11 11 10 10
Final goods
with ID b of 20% 20 19 19 18 18 17 17 16 16 15 15
Source: Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), August 1998.
a Updated to August 1997.
b ID: import duty.
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145 At the chapter level, the safeguard clauses deal with poultry (chapter 02), milk and cream (chapter 04), plants (chapter 06), apples (chapter 08),
corn (chapter 10), rice (chapter 10), wheat flour (chapter 11), corn starch (chapter 11), beverage components (chapter 21), peat (chapter 27), heavy
oils (chapter 27), natural polishes (chapter 27), processed beverage ingredients (chapter 33), paper (chapter 48), textile remnants (chapter 63) and
automotive chassis (chapter 87).
146 See the WTO Website [http://www.wto.org].
147 These clauses cover poultry; milk; cheese; potato flakes; plant oils; processed meat, blood or by-products; orange juice; manufactured wood
products; used footwear; and unalloyed iron or steel wire.
goods, which would be subject to reduction by 2001
at the latest, and intermediate and capital goods not
produced in Central America, which would be reduced
at a later stage (see ECLAC, 1997a, pp. 98 and 99).148
There are 24 safeguard clauses that have been
applied to the CACM common external tariff
(corresponding to subheadings) that were to be
eliminated at the beginning of 1999.149
Panama
With Panama’s entry into WTO, the Government
embarked upon a unilateral tariff reduction
programme which also involved narrowing the tariff
spread. Under this programme a ceiling rate of 15%
was set, with some exceptions. The tariff structure,
which includes 8,517 items, had moved from an
average rate of 12.84% in September 1997 to one of
9.05% by August 1998. The use of reference prices
was also eliminated, and preferential treatment
consisting in the application of a 3% tariff on inputs
was extended to all importers.
(b)  Export promotion measures
Costa Rica
In August 1997, the Government of Costa Rica
signed a regulatory instrument covering customs duty
refinements and drawbacks, under which goods may
be imported without paying any duty or tax on the
condition that the merchandise be re-exported after
processing.150The regime also provides for re-exports
to the local market, in which  case  the applicable
portion of the relevant taxes are to be paid, as
determined by the percentage sold on the local market,
upon entry of the product. The drawback regime, for
its part, provides for the refund of taxes and duties paid
to the Government on imports of inputs, containers or
packaging that are subsequently incorporated  into
export products, provided that the export transaction
occurs within 12 months of the date on which the
merchandise was imported.
Subsequently, in September 1998, the Legislative
Assembly approved a series of amendments to the
EPZ law (Act No. 7830), including eligibility
requirements that limit the regime to new projects
involving start-up investments of at least US$ 150,000
in assets and a provision excluding firms devoted to
the provision of professional services. In addition, the
establishment of enterprises outside of the EPZs is
regulated, and the allowable percentage for clearance
into the country is reduced from 40% to 25%.
El Salvador
El Salvador’s Export Reactivation Act provides a
ser ies of tax exempt ions for exporters of
non-traditional products, including an exemption from
income tax and a system of drawbacks.151In addition,
special lines of credit are earmarked for enterprises
that export more than 50% of their production,
provided that these exports are either non-traditional
products or services rendered outside of Central
America.
In 1998, the Legislature passed a new EPZ law
applying to export activities targeting markets inside
or outside the Central American area.152 The
Government of El Salvador is currently studying the
observations submitted by production sectors that
could be hurt by the law’s implementation, since it
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148 The schedule for the reduction of the temporary protective tariff (ATP) is as follows: as of 1 January 1997, 10%; as of 1 January 1998, 5%; as
of 1 July 1998, 5%; as of 1 January 1999, 0%. Under the Fair Trade and Taxation Act, the government stamp tax (ITF), which had been classified
as an additional duty to be paid on all goods being cleared through customs, regardless of their origin or the applicable tariff item, was incorporated
into the new ATP.
149 The safeguard clauses apply to the following products: poultry, unroasted coffee, corn meal, sugar, crackersand cookies, non-alcoholic beverages,
beer, tobacco and air conditioners.
150 For a review of export promotion programmes in Costa Rica, see Monge (1998).
151 Non-traditional exports are defined as those other than coffee, sugar and cotton.
152 Export Processing Zone and Marketing Act, Decree No. 405.
permits the sale inside the country of goods produced
in the EPZs as a means of making the EPZ regime
more attractive to foreign investors. In September
1998, the Government submitted an investment bill to
Congress that is intended to promote foreign
investment by affording equal treatment for domestic
and foreign investment.
Guatemala
Guatemala is being called upon to bring its export
regime into compliance with WTO rules, specifically
in regard to personal income tax exemptions, since this
type of exemption is allowed only in the relatively less
developed countries and, according to WTO,
Guatemala ceased to belong to that category as of the
middle of 1998.
Though there are no preferential financing
mechanisms for exports, the Trade Association of
Exporters of Non-Tradi t ional Products
(AGEXPRONT) has developed a project that would
use public funds to finance SMEs that export
non-tradi t ional agr icul tural , crafts and
hydrobiological products, furniture and forest
products, manufactures, and clothing and textiles.
In an effort to attract foreign and national
investment projects that would create jobs, in late 1997
the Ministry of Economic Affairs launched an
investment promotion programme (PROGUAT)
whose aim is to broaden and strengthen the production
base and export structure in fields where there are
possibilities for technology transfer and the
incorporation of greater value added.
Honduras
As a result of the passage of a bill designed to
stimulate production and competitiveness and to
support human development, the Honduran
Government rescinded duties on exports of shrimp,
lobster and other mollusks and crustaceans that had
been established in November 1987, duties applying
to exports of beef and pork on the hoof, poultry and
other animals that dated back to December 1979, and
duties on sugar cane and sugar beets that had been
enacted in December 1979.153In addition, under this
law the tax on banana exports  is to  be gradually
reduced starting in 1998, and financial support is to be
provided for independent producers, thus giving them
an extra incentive in addition to a minimum sales
price.154
This law also extends the benefits of the EPZ
regime to the country’s entire territory. In terms of the
taxes involved, these benefits include: (i) exemptions
from income tax for an indefinite period for the
administrative body and its users; (ii) exemptions from
tariffs and other import fees for all merchandise
brought into  the EPZs;  and (iii)  exemptions  from
export, sales and production taxes within the EPZs,
from municipal taxes on real estate and businesses,
and from taxes on net assets.
Nicaragua
Article 23 of the Fair Trade and Taxation Act (Act
No. 257 of July 1997) prohibits the application to
exports or imports of any non-tariff restriction other
than phytosanitary regulations, rules designed to
protect public health and safety, environmental
measures, measures taken in response to a national
emergency, and WTO-compliant safeguards and
reciprocity measures. Temporary import regimes
covering all exports not destined for the Central
American area and the drawback regime are defined
by article 25 of the same law.155 Exceptions to the
drawback provisions apply to enterprises holding
valid export contracts which receive incentives
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153 Decree No. 131-98 of 20 May 1998.
154 The tax is to be reduced from US$ 0.18 to US$ 0.04 per crate between 1998 and 2000. The financial support is equivalent to US$ 0.50 per crate
for the first three years and to US$ 0.30 for another three years.
155 Article 25 says: “There shall be a tax rebate rate in order to compensate exporters for the payment of import taxes and for other anti-export
biases, starting 1 January 1998, of 1.5% of the f.o.b. value for all goods exported, including sales of raw materials, intermediate goods andcapital
goods to EPZ enterprises”.
provided for in the special regime for the promotion
of  exports and  to exports of enterprises operating
under the EPZ regime.
In February 1998, the implementing regulations
governing the automation of customs clearance for
imports and exports and other customs regimes went
into effect, and in November of that year the
corresponding law was enacted. Both the law and the
corresponding regulations are intended to simplify and
streamline customs procedures. At present a bill is
being drafted concerning a temporary clearance
regime for exports that may replace the export
promotion act of 1991 entirely.
Panama
Act No. 23 of 11 January  1996  modified the
export tax on bananas and provides for its complete
elimination in 1999.
The Government of Panama has made an effort to
promote foreign investment in the country and to open
up reliable foreign markets for the country’s
production and commercial sectors. To this end, it
conducted a study on existing inter-agency
organizational patterns as they relate to the
implementation of national foreign trade policy. The
findings of that study underscore the need to
restructure the Ministry of Commerce and Industry so
that it would be capable of dealing with all commercial
and industrial matters at the national and international
levels, thus merging into one entity the various foreign
trade functions that are currently scattered among a
number of different institutions.
Under Act No. 53 of 1998, the Government of
Panama has sought to integrate the institutional
structure of foreign trade activity by assigning duties
relating to foreign trade to the Ministry of Commerce
and  Industry  and  creating  two  vice-ministries: the
Vice-Ministry of Domestic Commerce and Industry
and the Vice-Ministry of Foreign Trade. The
objectives of these measures are to consolidate
initiatives aimed at attracting foreign investment and
to promote the country’s exportable supply and the
cause of trade liberalization.156 The law assigns the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry new duties,
including the design, coordination and execution of
national foreign trade strategy, the representation of
the Government in international forums and agencies
concerned with international trade, and the task of
serving as a liaison for such organizations.
(c) Measures applied in importing countries
Costa Rica
During the reference period –between July 1997
and July 1998– no anti-dumping or countervailing
measures were taken against Costa Rican products.
An anti-dumping investigation of a Costa Rican
producer of steel rods has been opened, however, by
Nicaragua. The 10% countervailing duty that El
Salvador has imposed on Costa Rican milk continues
in effect.
Guatemala
Exports of Guatemalan, Chilean  and Mexican
raspberries to the United States have been the object
of allegations concerning health-related problems. In
1997, Guatemala was the second largest supplier of
this product to the United States. As a condition for
resuming its exports of raspberries to the United
States, the latter has stipulated that Guatemala must
implement a pilot plan for the maintenance of quality
standards, health inspections and monitoring of
production and processing facilities.
Honduras
During 1998 the  United  States imposed  trade
sanctions on Honduras under which it suspended some
of the benefits of the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
in reaction to Honduras’ failure to protect intellectual
Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy 77
156 Published in theGaceta oficial, No. 23.593 of 24 July 1998.
property rights and royalties of United States firms in
relation to various television programmes. The
sanction, which took effect on 20 April 1998,
consisted of the suspension of US$ 5 million worth of
benefits pertaining to exports of cucumbers,
watermelons and tobacco products. In addition,
Nicaragua lodged a safeguard complaint against
non-chocolate candy produced by Honduras in which
it argued that harm was being caused to local
industries.
Panama
On 28 November 1996, the United States applied
a safeguard surtax on straw broom exports from
Panama which is to remain in effect for at least three
years. Panama had been assigned a duty-free quota of
41,000 dozen brooms as part of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Exports above that amount are subject to a
specific duty of US$ 0.32 per broom.
F. THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
1. Trade in goods and services and the trade balance
Caribbean exports are concentrated in a few products,
with some of the most prominent ones being
petroleum and petroleum products (Trinidad and
Tobago), bananas (the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS),  especially Saint Lucia,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines,  and  Dominica),  aluminium (Jamaica),
bauxite (Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname) and sugar
(Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago). This concentration
makes these economies more vulnerable to the effects
of changes in the international situation and natural
disasters. Manufacturing exports are limited to the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). EPZ (maquila)
exports are the only products directed towards the
United States and European markets, to which they
have preferential access thanks to agreements such as
the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Lomé
Convention. The bulk of the islands’ service exports
are accounted for by tourism, and exports of (offshore)
financial services are based mostly in Aruba,
Bahamas and some of the OECS countries.
The trade deficits registered by most of the
Caribbean countries  in 1997 were a reflection of
weakness in the export sector as well as the strength
of imports. Earnings from banana exports fell 15% for
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.157 Sugar exports
fell 7% (Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago), but the
value of the Dominican Republic’s sugar exports rose
21%.158Foreign sales of Jamaican bauxite fell slightly
(6.4%), with a reduction in volume as well (from
3,918,000 to 3,641,000 tons), but this was offset by the
increase in aluminium exports from 607 million to 653
million dollars, which was accompanied by an
increase in export volume from 3,253,000 tons to
3,414,000 (ECLAC, 1998g, p. 49).
Tourism revenues rose 7% for the region as a
whole, but  the increase in  trade  registered  on the
services account was not large enough to offset the
merchandise trade deficit. A sharp upswing in the
number of tourists was seen in Cuba (17.5%), Trinidad
and Tobago (22%) and Saint Vincent and the
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157 According to data compiled by ECLAC subregional headquarters for the Caribbean, the value of Saint Lucia’s banana exports fell from
US$ 47 million to US$ 28 million between 1996 and 1997 due in particular to a decline in volume from 105,000 to 71,000 tons; in Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, banana exports fell from US$19 million to US$14 million, also as a result of a decrease in volume (ECLAC, 1998g, p. 49).
158 The value of Guyana’s sugar exports fell from US$ 151 million to US$ 133 million between 1996 and 1997, with export volume dropping from
280,000 to 275,000 tons; sugar exports from Trinidad and Tobago slipped from US$ 44 million to US$ 38 million, with a reduction from 72,000 tons
to 70,000 tons during the same period (ECLAC, 1998g, p. 49).
Grenadines (12.5%). Just the opposite occurred,
however, in the cases of Montserrat, Guyana, Belize
and the Bahamas, although the Bahamas still receives
more visitors than any other island (ECLAC, 1998g,
p. 41).
Cuba’s trade balance for goods and services
deteriorated considerably in 1997, mainly because of
higher imports and the poor performance of sugar and
nickel exports. In the case of sugar, there were
reductions in both the volume shipped (-17%) and in
prices, while in the case of nickel, the volume rose but
prices  fell.  On average,  the unit  value of exports
dropped 2.3%,  and that of imports 0.8% (mostly
because of lower oil and food prices). Growing
revenues from tourism and significant foreign
investments in the country succeeded in containing the
overall deficit, however (ECLAC, 1998g, p. 43).159
Exports of goods from the Dominican Republic
rose 14.5% in 1997 and imports rose 15%. Due to an
increase of 18% in the trade surplus in services, among
which tourism and remittances from abroad figure
prominently,  the country’s current  account  deficit
shrank 6%. In Haiti there was a notable reduction in
the trade deficit, with exports climbing by 31%, while
imports rose a mere 3%. However, since remittances
from abroad diminished and transport, freight and
other service expenditures rose, the current account
deficit increased once again (ECLAC, 1998g, pp. 44
and 45).
2. Trade policy
(a) Measures affecting imports
A comparison of the trade policies of the
Caribbean countries is facilitated by the fact that most
of them belong to CARICOM,  since this largely
determines both the current content and future course
of their trade policies.160 Furthermore, all the
Caribbean countries except the Bahamas are members
of WTO and have therefore consolidated their tariffs
at 50% and 70% for manufactures and at 100% for
agricultural products.161
In general, the Caribbean countries make ample
use of tariff and non-tariff measures. As will be
discussed further below, phase four of the CARICOM
common external tariff reduction programme was to
enter into effect in 1998 for all the countries except
Belize, which has until the year 2000.162This phase
calls for tariffs to be brought down to a range of
between 0% and 20%, except in the case of
agricultural products, which are to carry a tariff rate of
40%. Barbados and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
had already completed this phase earlier, and most of
the other countries expected to complete it in 1998 (see
chapter VII). The Caribbean countries are particularly
sensit ive to the negative impact that trade
liberalization can have on jobs and tax revenues, since
it may raise their already high levels of unemployment
further and depress fiscal receipts.163
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159 Recent structural reforms have promoted the decentralization of foreign trade, and by 1997 close to 300 enterprises were authorized to engage
in import and export activity (ECLAC, 1998b, p. 191).
160 In July 1997, Haiti became the fifteenth member of CARICOM, but the procedures to be used in order to assist the country in bringing its trade
policy into line with the community regime are still under study. Tariffs on goods from the CACM itself were eliminated except for a few products
in each country.
161 Haiti signed GATT in 1950, Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, Jamaica in 1963 and Suriname in 1978; most of the other countries have signed in
the last 15 years.
162 Article 56 of the annex to the CARICOM treaty concerning the common market allows the least developed countries to suspend the application
of CARICOM tariff provisions regarding imports from more developed countries with a view to promoting local industry.
163 As indicated in earlier studies, import duties are still an important source of revenue for the Governments of the Caribbean countries (see ECLAC,
1997a, pp. 125-130).
In almost all the countries, tariffs are ad valorem
and levied on a c.i.f. basis. Guyana, however, applies
specific duties based on weight, quantity, volume, or
a combination of these factors, while the Bahamas
uses excise taxes for cigarettes and other products.
Import licenses are required for many products.
In  some countries (such as Antigua and Barbuda,
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Trinidad and Tobago) import licenses are required
only for products  coming from outside countries,
while in others (such as Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica
and Suriname), licenses are required for imports from
CARICOM countries as well. Only a few countries
–Barbados, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines,  Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago–
apply import quotas, in most cases to certain
agricultural products.
The countries of the subregion also levy stamp
taxes and import surcharges of between 3% and 90%
as a means of increasing their fiscal revenues.
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
have stamp taxes. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago
apply import surcharges.
(b)  Export promotion measures164
Some of the Caribbean countries are making an
effort to increase the coherency of the incentives they
offer to the private sector in order to diversify their
exports. One such country is Suriname, and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
World Bank are providing support for this initiative.
The Government of the Netherlands is also
cooperating with the Government of Suriname in a
project aimed at creating a local quality control
institute. Other donors, such as the Government of
Belgium and a European development fund, are
collaborating to set up a training centre for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the
National Development Bank is being restructured with
assistance from the European Investment Bank so that
it will be better able to serve the needs of SMEs.
Trinidad and Tobago has implemented a
performance-based programme of tax and fiscal
incentives for exporters that are moving into markets
outside the CARICOM area. The country’s strong and
innovative banking system provides a variety of lines
of credit for exports, including financing for
pre-shipment and post-shipment activities (Gordon,
1998, pp. 11-15). Barbados, which has one of the most
successfully managed economies in CARICOM, also
provides tax and fiscal incentives for exports outside
of the CARICOM area. The most important
institutions in this respect are the Central Bank of
Barbados, the Small Business Association and the
Export Incentives and Support Program.
The  member countries  of the  Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda,
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) are in
need of support for their efforts to promote the
development of SMEs and to gain readier access to
secure sources of financing. In Saint Lucia, the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry has created a
Small Business Development Unit in order to help
small businesses prepare to operate in a more open
economy.
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Chapter IV
EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Introduction
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are
at a turning point with regard to export promotion
policies. This is due, first of all, to the priority which
until recently was accorded to macroeconomic and
trade policy reform, and to the belief that the new
policies, by reducing the anti-export bias and making
it possible to achieve correct macroeconomic prices,
would therefore be sufficient to stimulate exports.
Although exports effectively increased due to the new
policies and declining demand in domestic markets,
the reforms were not sufficient to eliminate the
anti-export bias. Currently, as a result of exchange rate
appreciation and the recovery of domestic demand in
several countries of the region, many Governments are
searching for the best way of promoting the sustained
growth of non-traditional exports. In addition,
negotiations towards the creation of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) have underlined the
need for reformulating export promotion policies in
most of the countries of the region.
At the same time, due to the globalization of world
trade and its repercussions on the increasingly
competitive situation which companies must face in
both internal and external markets, the Governments
and private sectors of the region have become more
aware of the need for trade promotion systems
designed to help companies face the challenges of the
coming years.
The commitments undertaken by the countries of
the region in the framework of the Uruguay Round
have also pointed to the need for a new generation of
export promotion policies. The new rules of
multilateral trade, which provide developing countries
with greater access to trading opportunities and an
equitable system for settling disputes, have also had a
major influence on the subsidizing of  exports of
non-agricultural products (see chapter VIII).
However,  the  need for new export promotion
policies is far from being the same throughout the
region. Some countries require major reforms in this
area, while others, whose policies are already well
advanced, only require minor changes to make them
more efficient and compatible with the Uruguay
Round agreements. In some Caribbean and Central
American countries, for example, significant changes
will have to be made –and in some cases are currently
being made– in export promotion policy, whereas in
countries such as Chile only minor changes are
necessary, although they are bound to have a
substantial impact on the exports of smaller
companies. In Mexico, on the other hand, the current
export promotion system is already highly efficient
and fully compatible with the standards of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
This chapter contains a wide range of
recommendations on the subject, which must be
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adapted to the specific  needs of each  country,  in
accordance with policy priorities. The first section lists
the  main reason  for  creating  an export promotion
policy. The second section presents several measures
for reducing the anti-export bias, and the third
describes a number of export promotion policies.
A. REASONS FOR AN EXPORT PROMOTION POLICY
The first aim of an export promotion policy is to
overcome the anti-export bias. Although it has been
on the wane over recent years in the countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean, the bias still persists to
one degree or the other, mainly in the form of import
duties; it has also been reinforced by non-tariff duty
barriers and by other obstacles commonly faced by
exporters. Also, the absence of policies which
stimulate competition in the domestic market often
makes it more profitable for a company to sell its
products at home rather than abroad.
Second, companies which are pioneers in
exporting new products or to new markets generate
positive externalities which benefit other domestic
companies.  When pioneer companies export,  they
incur higher costs than those which follow them, both
because of the greater risk of failure and because they
are often forced to test their products in several
markets before meeting with success. This means that
the companies which simply follow in the footsteps of
the pioneer companies benefit from the positive
externalities they  generate and prevent them  from
reaping the full reward of their initiative. This means
that  private  investment  in  pioneer exports will  be
sub-optimal unless a policy is created to stimulate
these initial ventures.
Third, export activity leads to greater economies
of scale, and this has become an increasingly
important factor in the theoretical models of
international trade developed over recent years.
Although traditional theoretical  models (based on
assumptions such as perfect competition, constant
returns to scale, perfect information and homogeneous
products) can still be used to explain a large portion of
world trade flows, they are less efficient with regard
to some of the situations which are being created by
the current growth of trade between countries having
similar comparative advantages (Ethier, 1979; Brander
and Spencer, 1985; Krugman, 1990, among others).
Ocampo (1993) maintains that the models of the
new trade theory are of interest to developing
countries, because they support the prediction that a
liberalizing trade between  developing nations will
enable them to benefit simultaneously from traditional
economies of scale and from economies of growth and
specializaton. In fact, one of the causes of the sharp
increase in trade –especially in non-traditional
products– over recent years is the fuller use of
economies of scale, and this has led to the creation of
a wide range of trade agreements between the countries
of the region (Devlin and Ffrench-Davis, 1998).
This is another reason to develop an export
promotion policy, since these models stress the
importance of external markets for developing
countries, most of which have relatively small internal
markets.165 In other words, in industries where
economies of scale are potentially significant,
exporting companies should be given temporary
assistance, since they can create major economies of
scale by selling their products abroad.
Fourth, exporting offers companies excellent
opportunities for  acquiring experience, because it
enables them to learn faster than if they confined
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165 One of the policy recommendations which emerge from these new models for industrialized countries is known as the “strategic trade policy”,
in which protectionist barriers are lifted at certain times for certain sectors, in order to allow national companies to achieve economies of scale and
thus increase their productivity. The recommendation, modeled on industrial and trade policies which have been applied in recent decades in Japan,
has been the subject of heated debate, particularly in the United States.
themselves to the domestic market.166 Foreign
markets subject exporting companies to intense
competition and make greater demands on them than
domestic markets, while giving them the chance to
enlarge their knowledge of the standards applied in
countries other than their own.
This was demonstrated in a survey carried out by
ECLAC in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, on
companies which export manufactured products. It
showed that the companies had undergone an important
learning process, because exporting forced them to alter
their production, organization and distribution methods
in order to adapt to the best international practices
(Macario, 1998a). In other words, exporting enables
companies to learn about international standards and
what they must do to comply with them, thus
improving their productivity. Therefore, one of the
most effective ways of increasing productivity is
to support exporting companies, since they learn
more quickly when they venture into foreign
markets.
In conclusion, the main reasons for creating an
export promotion policy are to eliminate the
anti-export bias, to support for pioneer companies
exporting new products or exporting to new markets,
and to enable exporting companies to benefit from
economies of scale and increase their learning
opportunities.
B. POLICIES TO REDUCE THE ANTI-EXPORT BIAS
The anti-export bias is best countered by lowering
import tariffs, which should be based not only on
previous rates but on the current tariff levels of other
economies. Second, non-tariff barriers and other
obstacles to export –which still persist in most of the
countries of the region– should be reduced to a
minimum. However, since this problem is of a more
general order than the specific field of export
promotion, it will not be analysed here in detail.
Another general recommendation is to simplify
export procedures. The first thing to be done,
especially in countries which have just  begun to
reform their export promotion system, is to examine
meticulously all the administrative steps required for
exporting, in order to weed out the unnecessary
procedures, thus retaining only those which are truly
necessary, and make them simple and efficient. These
improvements are not costly, but they require firm
political determination, since there may be attempts to
defend entrenched bureaucratic prerogatives.
The second measure is to concentrate all
administrative procedures in a single location
exclusively devoted to exports. This does not mean
that all the trade, treasury and customs departments
must be merged into a single administrative unit, but
rather that the offices of all these agencies should be
centralized in a single place, so that the necessary
procedures can be carried out at once, without forcing
the exporter to endure time-consuming bureaucratic
procedures. Also, communication between the various
government bodies is improved when  the various
offices which serve the exporter are located in the
same place, and this reduces the amount of red tape
and the need for making double and triple copies of
each document.
Simplification of procedures means that the
necessary steps should be as simple as possible; the
necessary information should be easily accessible and
transparent; the procedures should be swift; and
whenever possible, approval  should be automatic
rather than discretionary. As we have said, all
paperwork should be handled in a single place, and
once the necessary improvements in procedures have
been made, no further modifications should be made
to the main instruments, so as to keep information
costs to a minimum.
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166 Krugman (1987) presents a model which stresses the importance of the learning curve in a country’s productive specialization.
Other means  of reducing the anti-export bias
which fall more directly within the purview of the
agencies involved in export promotion are those that
provide exporters with access to inputs of competitive
price and quality. Although these are not export
promotion tools per se, they have that effect, because
they eliminate some of the sources of the anti-export
bias. Among the key tools for facilitating access are
drawback systems and the suspension of import duties
for exporters.
Access to competitive inputs is facilitated first and
foremost by means of a drawback system,  which
enables the exporter to recover the import duties paid
for imported inputs.  This is  not,  as  is  sometimes
claimed, an export promotion too per se, although it
must operate as an authentic import duty refund rather
than as an export subsidy (see chapter VIII). It is
simply a mechanism for protecting the exporter from
paying double import duties, in the country of origin
and in the country of destination, meanwhile reducing
the anti-export bias.
However, this mechanism should function swiftly
and simply, with a minimum of red tape. The exporter
should be clearly informed of the conditions which he
must satisfy in order to benefit from it; the money
allocated to the refund should, if possible, not be used
to solve short-term problems of a fiscal nature, as has
often occurred in the region. Lastly, as is currently
being done in Mexico, mechanisms should be created
for refunding import duties and other taxes levied on
indirect exporters (companies that sell inputs to the
direct exporters). Such mechanisms are essential for
building backward linkages and increasing the
beneficial effect of exports on the national economy
as a whole.
Furthermore, in order to encourage  a greater
number of companies to become involved in exporting
on a permanent rather than an occasional basis, there
should be a system for temporarily exempting
companies from the  payment of import  duties on
inputs necessary for the production of export products.
This is especial ly important for smal l and
medium-sized companies, which usually have limited
working capital. The temporary suspension of import
duties has especially important advantages over the
drawback system in countries with high rates of
inflation and unpredictable exchange rates. It has been
observed that a large part of the export success of the
countries of South-East Asia (Rhee, 1985) and Mexico
has been due to the temporary suspension of import
duties.167
However, this type of system can only be effective
if the Government is able to strictly control any abuses
(for example, by companies which benefit from the
exemption to import inputs for the production of goods
for  the  local market).  Furthermore, access  to  this
instrument should be as automatic as possible, with a
minimum of individual discretion in granting it.
Companies which export regularly should be able to
perform the necessary procedures easily. As has been
seen in Mexico, where drawback formalities have
been reduced compared with other countries, this
encourages many more companies to take advantage
of the related benefits.
The net result is that the anti-export bias in the
countries of the region can be significantly reduced by
simplifying the procedures required of exporters, and
by setting up efficient  drawback and import  duty
suspension systems for direct and indirect exporters.
However, countries wishing to make a greater
effort to promote exports should consider two types of
policies. The first are productive development
policies, which have the  effect of increasing firm
productivity and export supply. Over the long term,
these are the factors that are most important in creating
permanent export capacity. The effectiveness of such
policies is indicated by Chile’s decision to give them
priority in the framework of its new competitiveness
policies (Macario, 1998b). The application of the new
WTO rules regulating export subsidies, whether they
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167 The temporary suspension of import duties is compatible with WTO standards, since it does not constitute an export subsidy, but only a tax
exemption, the purpose of which is to avoid double taxation.
are appealable or not, will  also contribute to the
growing importance of development  policies (see
chapter VIII). However, these policies will not be dealt
with here because they do not belong to the specific
area of promotion policies.168 The second type of
policies are those specifically designed to promote
exports: they are described below.
C. EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES
The support programmes in the areas analysed in this
section can be administered directly by the public
sector, or, as is done in several countries of the region,
by business associat ions or pr ivate sector
organizations contracted through public bidding to
manage funds for this purpose. However, regardless
of the type of institutional arrangement which is
chosen (in accordance with the institutional capacity
of the government agencies, the business associations
or the private sector) the exporters must receive
support in the areas which are described below.
1. Information
Companies  must  obtain the  necessary information
before venturing into a foreign market. The exporting
company must first obtain information on the export
procedures and export promotion benefits in its home
country. Next, it will need information on the potential
foreign markets, on tariff and non-tariff barriers in the
target countries, on the standards with which products
must comply to be sold on the foreign markets, on
prices, export contacts, distribution channels,
legislation in the target country, terms of payment, and
so forth. This information must be constantly updated
to allow for changes in the parameters, particularly as
the result of the many trade agreements being
concluded in the region and other parts of the world.
The countries of the region where easy access has
been provided to  updated  information  on  external
markets are also those where the number of exporting
companies has most sharply increased. The
Government of Mexico, through its Ministry of
Commerce and Industrial Development  (SECOFI)
and the Banco de Comercio Exter ior
(BANCOMEXT), and the Government of Chile,
through its Export Promotion Office (PROCHILE)
and the Association of Exporters of Manufactures
(ASEXMA), have given dissemination of information
top priority in their export promotion policies. But in
other countries of the region it is almost impossible to
obtain information on external markets, either from
government agencies or business associations. In these
countries, the companies must rely on their own efforts
to obtain the information they need in order to begin
exporting (see chapter VIII).
2. Support for participation in trade fairs
Participation in trade fairs is useful for companies that
wish to export because it enables them to exhibit their
products and find customers. They are also useful for
companies that do not exhibit products, because they
provide an excellent opportunity to make contacts,
obtain information on the current trends in the
international markets and learn of the latest
developments in manufacturing techniques.
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168 For more details on productive development policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, see Peres (1997) and Ramos (1997).
Government  support  for participation  in trade
fairs has been widely used in the region to promote
exports. Nevertheless, experience has shown that this
approach does not always provide positive results, due
to the lack of speci f ic information on the
characteristics of the fairs themselves. For example,
many footwear trade fairs are held throughout the
world. Some of these specialized in large-scale
production deals with United States department store
chains, which means that they are of little value for
companies with low production outputs. This is why
government financial aid should be carefully targeted,
so that the right companies and products go to the right
fairs, thus saving government  funds and business
managers’ time.
One way of avoiding this risk and making better
use of government  money is to  organize  fairs by
sectors in the home country, in order to present a full
range of national products to international buyers. This
approach –which has been used in Colombia, among
other countries– has yielded excellent results for the
participants,  as it has enabled a large number of
companies to get started in exporting.
Giving greater support to companies organized by
sectors has also proven to be highly effective because,
apart from the other benefits of participating in fairs,
it encourages interaction and collaboration between
the company managers who travel together.  One
example of this  are  the committees of  companies
organized in Chile by PROCHILE and various
business associations, as well as the so-called export
units which have been created in Colombia.
Furthermore, the business trips can also provide an
opportunity for visits to factories of special
technological and organizational interest to the
company managers (Ramos, 1997).
3. Export financing and insurance
Adequate financing support for exports is a key
component of any export promotion policy. In order
to obtain orders from foreign companies, it is
extremely important to be able to offer the potential
buyers financial terms comparable to those offered by
firms in other countries. In fact, one of the reasons for
which the companies in the region sometimes are not
awarded contracts is that they are unable to provide
financing to the importers. Although in some countries
of the region, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Mexico exporting companies receive financial
support, either public or private, in most of the other
countries financing agencies, where they exist, have
practically no impact on exports.
This situation is even more serious in those
countries in which most companies are not even able
to obtain long-term loans for their domestic sales,
owing to insufficiently developed local capital
markets. Clearly, companies which have trouble
obtaining credit to finance their domestic business will
find it even harder to obtain loans for export, since it
would be impossible to attach the property of the buyer
in case of non-payment.
It should be made clear that such support does not
mean that the loans should be subsidized, since this
would run counter to WTO rules and would constitute
an improper allocation of public resources. However,
exporters must have access to loans for purposes of
operating capital and customer credit at rates which
are internationally competitive. The main problem is
not the rates in themselves –as long as they are
reasonable– but how to ensure the region’s exporters
access to export credit. This applies especially to small
and medium-sized companies, since the large
companies have less difficulty in obtaining credit, both
at home and abroad. These loans can be granted using
several methods, for example, financing through a
major government bank specialized in this area of
activity, such as BANCOMEXT, or the allocation of
funds to a privately-owned bank, which deals directly
with the exporters, as occurs in Chile.
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Furthermore, there must be mechanisms for the
insurance of exports, against both political and
commercial risks. The cost implicit in the acquisition
of the information necessary for insuring exports can
be partially covered thanks to the increasing
cooperation among the region’s export insurance
agencies.
4. Specific export promotion programmes
When a Government decides to increase its support for
exports, it can choose from several options, which will
be described below. However, it should be understood
that even the most effective specific programme
cannot make up for the failure to apply the policies
described earlier. Therefore, the following proposals
should be considered supplemental options, to be used
after the basic requisites have been met.
The first option consists of a number of measures
which have the effect of further simplifying export
procedures. One example of this is the Cooperation
Programme with Heavily Exporting Firms (ALTEX),
which is designed to simplify administrative
procedures for Mexican companies which export large
volumes or a considerable portion of their total output.
Another similar option is to establish a
programme which advises small and medium-sized
companies on the administrative procedures which
they must comply with in order to export their first
shipments. This can prove especially useful in
countries which will have to replace export subsidies
with drawback of import duties in order to comply
with WTO standards. It is highly likely that small and
medium-sized firms will have more difficulty than
large ones in learning to present the  information
required for the approval of the drawback.
There is a new line of activities more directly
within the sphere of export promotion agencies which
is gaining increasing importance, and consists  in
helping exporting firms to establish a permanent
presence outside the country. This method can take
various forms. Colombian companies, for example,
can obtain assistance from the network of offices the
Export Promotion Office (PROEXPORT) has set up
outside the country; Mexican companies are similarly
assisted by BANCOMEXT. Another method is that of
PROCHILE, which offers credit and technical support
to help business associations, organized by sector, set
up offices outside the country.
Moreover, although the new rules which govern
international trade under WTO (which will be
analysed in chapter VIII) restrict most export
subsidies, it is still possible to establish export
promotion programmes. In fact, horizontal subsidies
aimed at providing assistance of a pre-competitive
type or to regions which are disadvantaged by
comparison with the national average, are –like
subsidies which encourage the use of technologies
which protect the environment– not appealable.
Furthermore, it is still possible,  under  thed
minimis clause, to carry out some specifically
export-oriented projects. This  clause calls for the
termination of countervailing duty investigations
against a developing country that is a member of WTO
when the subsidy for the export of the product is not
greater than 2% of its unit value. The same applies
when the volume of the subsidized imports represents
less than 4% of the total imports of the product in the
importing country, unless imports of the product from
developing countries collectively represent over 9%
of the importing country’s total imports of the product
(GATT, 1994; Tussie, 1997).
This provides sufficient leeway for the use of
mechanisms which, at low cost, support pioneer
exports (of new products or to new markets). It is also
possible to set up small projects in productive
branches which are felt to have export potential, in
order to create enterprises which have a demonstration
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effect for new export products, as in the case of the
Chile Foundation, which promoted salmon exports in
the 1980s.
Before proceeding to execute any of these
programmes, it is important to ensure that they are in
line with the following parameters, namely, that the
support is:
(i) Moderate, in order to attract companies which
are willing to share the cost of the project because they
believe they have good chances of succeeding, rather
than companies which simply want to take advantage
of the subsidy;
(ii) Focused on exports to new markets or of new
products, creating incentives for companies to take a
qualitative leap forward in their export activity;
(iii) Temporary, for a relatively short period –for
example, three years– pre-set in advance, so that the
support is only for the initial activity and does not risk
becoming a permanent subsidy without which the
company is unable to survive or continue exporting;
(iv) Evaluated by independent bodies, so that it
can be modified, if necessary, or abandoned if it is not
producing results;
(v)  Allocated and administered  jointly by the
State and the private sector (for example, by
associations of exporters), or exclusively by private
entities selected by public bidding;
(vi) Strictly compatible with WTO standards.
In conclusion, there is an urgent need to reduce
the anti-export bias and create a free trade system for
domestic companies, both of which are priority
objectives for countries that wish to promote exports.
None of the aforementioned programmes can
completely eliminate the anti-export bias caused by
levying import duties that are high by comparison with
the average in the major markets, or by imposing other
obstacles, such as non-tariff barriers, export
restrictions, constraints on competition in the domestic
market and overvalued exchange rates.
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Chapter V
THE STRUCTURE OF LATIN AMERICAN IMPORTS IN THE 1990s
In the 1990s, the foreign trade of Latin America has
been characterized by considerably greater growth in
imports than in exports, which has translated into a
continuous build-up of trade and current account
deficits. Between 1990 and 1995, the region’s exports
grew in volume at an average annual rate of less than
8%, while imports grew at an annual rate of nearly
13% (ECLAC, 1998a, table I.1, pp. 42 and 43). Of the
16 Latin American countries studied here, only
Ecuador and Venezuela have consistently had trade
surpluses throughout the last eight years (see tables
V.1 and V.2).
In the 1980s, in the midst of the international
liquidity crisis, the countries of the region reduced
their imports sharply as they strove to maintain a
positive trade balance and cope with their external debt
commitments. This recessive adjustment thus put a
brake on imports, and its effect was reinforced by
exchange rate devaluat ions and tar i f f and
administrative controls.169In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the severe restrictions on imports were lifted,
but the effect of this was not immediately reflected in
the trade balance because of the recessionary
macroeconomic situation that still prevailed in many
countries (see table V.1).170
Imports have played a considerable part in the
industrial restructuring of Latin America, as the region
has been using imported inputs and capital goods in
the technological modernization of its industrial base.
This has been shown in various studies, in which it can
be seen that the opening up of trade and the new regime
of incentives and regulations associated with it have
triggered a far-reaching process of industrial
restructuring. Conspicuous features of this process
have included changes in the productive specialization
of the countries and a greater use of imported inputs
in local production. Another feature has been a series
of major changes in the equity  structure of many
industrial sectors in which local firms  have been
unable to compete with similar imported products.
For example, according to a recent analysis, Latin
American manufacturing has been shifting its
emphasis towards the food sector and industrial
commodities and away from metal manufactures and
machinery, capital goods  and consumer durables.
Hence, as shown by this analysis, industry has ceased
to exhibit the high degree of vertical integration that it
did in previous decades because, given the lower cost
of importing parts, components and partially
assembled inputs, that kind of structure is no longer
profitable. In other words, many firms have
significantly increased the ratio of imported elements
they use in the production of consumer or capital
goods by substituting equivalent imports for the parts
and components that used to be produced in the
country, either by the same firm or by other local
enterprises. At the same time, in Argentina, Chile and
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169 Between 1980 and 1985, real GDP grew on average by 0.6% a year and exports by 5.5%, while imports fell to an average annual rate of 5.9%.
Between 1985 and 1990, GDP grew on average by 1.9% a year, exports by 5.1% and imports by 6.4% (ECLAC, 1998a, pp. 42 and 43).
170 In the early 1990s, the countries of Latin America completed or intensified their trade liberalization process by sharply reducing both tariffs and
the dispersion of effective levels of protection (ECLAC, 1998a, table V.1, p. 151).
Mexico a sharp decrease in local production has been
observed in areas involving more value added,
in-house engineering and technological development
(Benavente et al., 1996).
Trade liberalization, the relative decline in the
prices of imported products and the growth of the
Latin American economies in the 1990s have
prompted an upswing in imports of consumer and
capital goods. By permitting the countries to renew
their stock of capital goods, this trend has posed new
challenges and opened up new opportunities for the
region’s producers and exporters. While it is true that
some sectors and firms in Latin America have
succeeded in meeting these  challenges  and taking
advantage of these opportunities, the fact remains that
the increased use of imported inputs makes it harder
to adjust the countries’ current account deficits
without harming production and exports.
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the trends
to be observed between 1990 and 1997 in the imports
of the 16 countries of Latin America for which systematic
information is available. The changes in the trade
profiles of these countries will then be examined using
the methodology developed by Guerrieri (1994).
Table V.1
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS IN THE TRADE BALANCE, BY COUNTRIES
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Millions of dollars)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 924.9 270.7 -8 773.4 18 375.5 10 026.2 4 567.0 -418.0 -9 103.4 -14 346.5 -18 358.4
Argentina 299.1 84.6 -2 520.1 8 274.9 -2 628.7 -3 658.5 -5 777.8 840.9 48.1 -4 086.3
Brazil 499.1 -105.9 -4 816.8 8 939.7 13 617.5 11 391.1 7 849.7 -7 590.3 -9 568.3 -12 596.3
Chile 83.7 303.5 -539.2 1 269.8 190.9 -1 473.2 -89.3 627.1 -1 830.8 -1 814.7
Paraguay 2.4 -11.2 -304.5 -389.9 -763.9 -962.8 -1 607.8 -2 216.6 -2 064.4 ...
Uruguay 40.8 -0.4 -592.9 281.2 -389.7 -729.6 -792.8 -764.6 -931.1 -1 002.1
Andean
Community 1 460.8 1 847.2 9 245.3 14 430.4 1 188.2 259.1 3 680.8 1 439.6 9 145.9 15 224.5
Bolivia -4.9 66.3 381.6 229.1 -338.2 -422.0 -177.3 -336.8 -514.1 -704.0
Colombia 85.6 -115.2 -717.6 1 176.5 231.8 -2 386.1 -3 056.8 -3 710.4 -2 379.1 -3 924.2
Ecuador -33.1 -83.0 265.5 909.5 534.8 407.9 152.0 70.9 1 029.4 638.4
Peru -52.5 422.7 692.2 678.8 -797.6 -1 097.0 -1 577.7 -2 607.1 -2 721.3 -2 443.4
Venezuela 1 465.7 1 556.5 8 623.7 11 436.5 1 557.3 3 756.4 8 340.7 8 023.0 13 731.0 ...
Mexico -553.9 -1 255.3 -4 149.1 -3 309.0 -15 761.6 -13 355.6 -18 662.4 6 977.7 6 120.9 -1 948.0
CACM b -140.8 -138.9 -1 557.0 -2 498.9 -4 109.6 -4 615.1 -4 605.2 -5 064.2 -5 028.8 -5 330.8
Costa Rica -66.4 -85.5 -564.9 -821.9 -961.9 -985.1 -784.9 -483.3 -766.4 ...
El Salvador -13.7 14.7 -255.8 -492.5 -982.3 -1 143.4 -1 448.9 -1 642.2 -1 646.5 -1 608.8
Guatemala -43.2 5.9 -72.9 -485.8 -1 165.9 -1 329.4 -1 144.7 -1 356.9 -1 115.5 -1 507.9
Honduras 4.6 -50.9 -195.2 -388.9 -320.3 -641.4 -721.8 -1 072.6 -1 077.6 -1 402.0
Nicaragua -22.1 -23.1 -468.0 -309.8 -679.3 -515.9 -504.9 -509.2 -422.9 -812.1
Total 1 691 724 -5 234 26 998 -8 657 -13 145 -20 005 -5 750 -4 109 -10 413
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures (see footnote 171).
a Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Common Market.
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All the countries except Mexico were divided into
three relatively homogeneous subregional groupings:
first, the countries members of the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) and Chile; second, the countries of
the Andean Community; and third, the members of the
Central American Common Market (CACM). The
External Trade Data Bank for Latin America and the
Caribbean (BADECEL)171 of ECLAC and the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
were used as a basis for the product descriptions.
Products were then classified according to the
empirical categories developed by the International
Trade Unit of ECLAC, which are based chiefly on
Guerrieri (1990 and 1994) and Guerrieri and Milana
(1990) (see technical notes in ECLAC, 1996, pp. 217
to 225).
This taxonomy was proposed by Guerrieri (1990),
on the basis of work done by Pavitt (1984), as a
Table V.2
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS IN THE TRADE BALANCE, BY COUNTRIES
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages of total trade)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 13.0 2.3 -11.4 20.2 9.1 3.7 -0.3 -5.0 -7.4 -8.5
Argentina 11.1 2.4 -13.6 50.4 -9.7 -12.2 -15.5 2.0 0.1 -7.2
Brazil 18.5 -1.9 -10.7 16.6 23.4 17.3 10.0 -7.6 -9.2 -10.7
Chile 6.5 14.0 -5.6 8.3 1.0 -7.5 -0.4 2.1 -5.8 -5.3
Paraguay 2.1 -8.0 -32.9 -16.9 -36.8 -39.9 -49.6 -54.7 -49.7 ...
Uruguay 11.9 -0.1 -21.9 9.0 -10.7 -18.5 -17.2 -15.4 -16.3 -15.6
Andean
Community 20.1 20.7 18.2 29.4 2.2 0.4 5.7 1.9 11.4 20.1
Bolivia -1.9 17.2 22.6 14.2 -18.1 -22.3 -8.1 -13.8 -19.1 -23.3
Colombia 8.6 -7.3 -8.3 9.5 1.7 -13.8 -14.7 -15.4 -9.8 -14.6
Ecuador -11.2 -17.9 5.7 20.1 9.7 7.4 2.1 0.8 12.1 6.6
Peru -3.8 25.4 11.9 11.4 -11.2 -14.9 -16.3 -20.8 -20.7 -16.7
Venezuela 33.9 32.2 28.8 46.4 5.8 14.3 34.2 27.1 43.5 ...
Mexico -21.6 -34.2 -11.8 -5.9 -14.6 -11.4 -13.4 4.6 3.3 -0.9
CACM b -8.6 -6.0 -14.8 -24.2 -30.7 -32.0 -29.5 -27.2 -25.5 -33.1
Costa Rica -22.9 -15.6 -21.5 -22.0 -20.9 -20.2 -15.0 -8.2 -12.1 ...
El Salvador -3.5 3.3 -15.1 -37.6 -46.9 -44.4 -47.1 -45.5 -44.6 -37.3
Guatemala -10.4 1.0 -2.4 -17.3 -31.0 -33.2 -27.6 -26.0 -21.5 -24.3
Honduras 1.9 -13.0 -10.7 -26.0 -17.9 -32.6 -37.1 -45.0 -38.9 -40.4
Nicaragua -7.4 -6.2 -36.1 -32.2 -59.9 -51.9 -42.1 -33.7 -24.5 -38.2
Total 9.1 2.7 -3.0 13.1 -3.0 -4.2 -5.5 -1.3 -0.9 -2.0
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Common Market.
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171 BADECEL is based on customs tapes that the countries send directly to the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) and later to ECLAC.
These are primary data that are not subsequently adjusted, whereas central banks and other entities responsible for national trade statistics do make
such adjustments. Consequently, these data may differ from the trade balance figures used by the countries’ Governments.
classification that could be  used in analysing the
relationship between countries’ technological
capabilities and their trade performance. The
classification subsequently developed by ECLAC
identifies five types of industries: (i) primary industry,
defined as all agricultural, mining and energy
industries whose products do not undergo a
subsequent stage of processing; (ii) traditional
industry, comprising producers of food, beverages and
tobacco, textiles, clothing, leather and footwear,
wood, cork, furniture, paper  and cardboard, metal
manufactures and machinery, and others; (iii) natural
resource- and scale-intensive industries, whose
products are also categorized as semi-manufactures or
industrial commodities; (iv) durable goods industries;
and (v) industries that act as diffusers of technical
progress, which include capital goods and their
components.
A. TRADE BALANCES IN LATIN AMERICA (1990-1997)
The overall trend observed in the trade balances of the
subgroup formed by the countries of Mercosur and
Chile is largely determined by the figures for Brazil,
which maintained a positive balance equivalent to
nearly 10% of its total trade until 1994. The
introduction in 1994 of the monetary stabilization plan
(theRealPlan) permitted an expansion in income and
an increase in the total amount of goods and services
purchased, while the growing overvaluation of the
local currency reduced the cost of imported goods.
Initially, in the period from March to December 1994,
the Government of Brazil turned to external
competition as a means of preventing an increase in
domestic prices. The 1994 trade surplus gave way to
a deficit equivalent to nearly 8% of the country’s trade
and, in spite of the administrative controls introduced
by the Government in the ensuing years, this deficit
had climbed to nearly 11% by 1997 (see tables V.1 and
V.2).172
All the countries of this group except Paraguay
had large trade surpluses at the start of the decade, and
in the case of Argentina the surplus amounted to more
than 50% of its total trade. Later on, from 1992 to
1994, Argentina ran a deficit (of between 10% and
15% of its total trade), but the country again built up
a small positive balance in 1995 and 1996, mainly as
a result of its transactions with its chief trading partner,
Brazil. As can be seen from table V.2, Uruguay’s
deficit has remained above 15% since 1993, when it
reached almost 20%. In Chile, there were deficits of
more than 5% in 1996 and 1997.
The average figures for the Andean Community
have been strongly affected by the situation in Ecuador
and Venezuela, which, as we have seen, have had large
surpluses in the 1990s as well as in previous decades.
The trade figures of the other three countries in this
group show a deficit. In Bolivia, the negative balance
was equivalent to more than 22% of its trade in 1993,
after which it eased somewhat in 1994 but then
gradually increased again, rising to more than 23% by
1997. In Peru, the deficit increased in relative terms
from 1992 onward, with a negative balance of more
than 20% in 1995 and 1996, although it fell to about
17% in 1997. Colombia began to run a deficit in 1993;
its negative balance remained at around 15% of its
total trade in the following years, with the exception
of 1996 (which was also a year of slow growth for the
Colombian economy).173
Mexico has been the exception to this rule, since
after recording a trade deficit of about 13% between
1992 and 1994, it achieved a surplus of nearly 5% in
1995. In 1996 the surplus was down to a little more
than 3%, and in 1997 there was a small deficit.
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172 The relative value is (X-M)/(X+M).
173 In Colombia, average annual GDP growth was around 6% between 1993 and 1995, and fell to 2.2% in 1996 (ECLAC, 1998b, table IV.1, p. 60).
and the changes this has brought about in its foreign
trade structure account not only for the trend in its
trade balance, but also for the impressive rise in the
value of its trade, which has been accompanied by an
increase in the relative weight of the manufacturing
sector in the country’s exports and imports. In 1997,
Mexican exports amounted to more than US$ 110
billion, or more than 38% of the region’s total exports.
According to various studies, there has been a
radical change in Mexico’s foreign trade structure as
it has shifted away from a trade pattern based on
exports of raw materials and a few goods involving
little added value and towards one in which
high-value-added manufactures play a predominant
role, both in imports and in exports. Since the trade
liberalization process began in 1985, the growth rate
for exports of industrial products, and especially those
with the highest value added (e.g., electrical
appliances and equipment and electronics, motor
vehicles and their parts, and capital goods), has
steepened (Salomón, 1997).174
The foreign trade performance of the countries of
Central America has been characterized by a sustained
trade deficit for several decades, and this trend has
continued into the 1990s, with even higher
percentages being registered at times. On average, the
trade  deficit  of  these countries between 1990 and
1996, measured as a percentage of total trade, ranged
from a low of 8% in Costa Rica in 1995 to a peak of
60% in Nicaragua in 1992. In 1997, all the CACM
countries except Costa Rica had negative trade
balances equivalent to over 24% of their total trade.
B. THE COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
If petroleum and petroleum imports are factored out
of the calculations for Latin America, it will be seen
that its imports are preponderantly comprised of
industrial products (see table V.3).
1. Traditional goods
The category of traditional goods includes finished
consumer goods produced by the food, beverage and
tobacco industries and by makers of furniture, leather
goods and other similar products, as well as the inputs
used in these industries (e.g., fabrics, yarns and
threads, leather, wood). Trends in Latin American
imports of these products have varied over the course
of the 1990s but, overall, they have increased as a
percentage of total imports of industrial goods (see
table V.4).
In the group comprising the Mercosur countries
and Chile, the share of traditional goods, which did not
exceed 15% of imports in previous  decades, has
gradually increased in the 1990s, reaching nearly 20%
in 1995. The highest coefficients for traditional goods
are  to be found  in Chile,  Paraguay  and Uruguay,
although the share of traditional goods in Brazilian
imports of manufactures, which was formerly no more
than 10%, had risen to more than 18% by 1995. In the
1960s, imports of traditional goods represented only a
small proportion of total industrial imports in the more
developed countries, such as Argentina (where they
averaged slightly under 14%), Brazil (9.6%),
Colombia (9.1%) and Mexico (11.3%). In Chile, the
proportion was nearly 25% in 1965, fell to about 18%
in 1970, rose to 28% in 1980, fell again in 1990 (to
less than 17%), and then rose to an average of 22% in
the following years.
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174 In presenting its data, the Banco de México breaks down the country’s foreign trade intomaquilaexports and imports and other exports and
imports. In 1997,maquilasaccounted for 41% of the value of exports and 33% of the value of imports. Themaquilasector generated a positive
balance of nearly US$ 9 billion, which was, however, offset by a negative balance of nearly the same amount in the rest of the economy (Banco de
México, 1998, table IV.2).
Several sectoral studies have provided
confirmation as to the importance of imports of
traditional goods in Chile’s production activities.
Meller and Donoso (1998) have analysed the
relat ionship between imports and apparent
consumption in various Chilean industries. According
to their estimates, between 1990 and 1995-1996, this
ratio rose from 17% to 30% in the textile industry,
from 10% to 35% in the clothing industry, and from
2% to 19% in the footwear industry. A similar study
carried out in Brazil indicates that for artificial and
synthetic fibre yarns and fabrics, this ratio increased
from 1.6% in 1990 to 17% in 1995 and then fell to
9.5% in 1996; in the case of natural fibre yarns and
fabrics, the figure rose from 3.9% in 1990 to 15.9% in
1996; and in the footwear industry, it climbed from
0.7% to 6.7% between 1990 and 1996 (Moreira and
Correa, 1997, table 2, p. 75).
Table V.3
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL GOODS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL   IMPORTS a, BY COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosurb
and Chile 81.2 88.3 87.6 91.5 92.8 93.5 93.7 93.7 92.5 93.3
Argentina 85.8 90.3 94.0 90.1 96.2 96.5 96.9 95.8 95.9 95.3
Brazil 76.1 87.8 83.6 89.7 88.8 90.8 91.3 92.7 90.3 91.8
Chile 81.4 86.3 85.6 95.5 94.2 94.3 93.7 93.7 94.4 95.2
Paraguay 87.2 90.5 96.6 99.1 97.6 97.9 96.9 96.9 94.4 ...
Uruguay 74.9 85.3 88.9 91.9 92.4 94.7 93.3 93.1 93.3 94.4
Andean
Community 90.1 91.4 91.9 92.3 92.7 93.5 93.4 91.2 91.6 92.2
Bolivia 96.3 96.2 92.9 95.5 95.0 94.9 93.2 93.7 93.5 95.4
Colombia 87.3 92.7 91.0 92.8 89.3 94.1 93.8 88.7 91.3 90.8
Ecuador 92.3 94.8 94.7 93.4 97.3 95.0 96.1 94.6 93.1 94.4
Peru 88.3 86.3 87.6 90.0 89.2 90.7 91.7 92.7 92.1 92.9
Venezuela 91.0 91.7 92.7 92.0 94.5 93.5 92.6 91.8 90.9 ...
Mexico 92.3 90.6 86.4 91.6 94.5 95.0 84.9 88.7 91.6 91.8
CACM c 92.0 92.4 90.9 88.8 90.7 94.2 93.7 94.5 91.5 93.7
Costa Rica 95.8 91.0 88.6 80.2 83.1 92.8 92.9 92.4 86.6 ...
El Salvador 88.1 91.1 88.0 92.4 93.0 95.7 93.2 95.1 93.1 93.0
Guatemala 91.8 92.6 93.8 95.4 96.0 95.4 95.1 95.7 93.3 94.9
Honduras 94.7 94.8 94.0 95.0 94.2 94.5 94.5 95.5 93.9 91.8
Nicaragua 91.0 92.9 89.7 90.0 92.7 91.6 92.8 94.3 93.6 95.5
Total 87.7 90.0 88.7 91.5 93.4 94.2 89.9 91.6 92.0 92.6
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Excluding oil imports.
b Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
c CACM = Central American Common Market..
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As can be seen in table V.4, the share of total
industrial imports accounted for by traditional goods
also grew steadily over the decade in the countries of
the Andean Community. In 1996, Bolivia, Colombia
and Ecuador registered ratios of between 17% and
18%, while Peru and Venezuela reached levels of
between 23% and 24%.
In Mexico, the share of traditional goods has been
more than 25% in the 1990s, with a peak level of
29.1% in 1994. These values contrast with the figures
for previous decades, in which this ratio fluctuated
between 11% and a little over 15%.
Appreciable changes also occurred in the
percentage  of  imports of traditional goods in the
countries of Central America. Between 1965 and
1990, their share declined in all these countries: in
Costa Rica, from 31% to 22%; in El Salvador, from
34% to 24%; in Guatemala, from 35% to 20%; in
Honduras, from 41% to 24%; and in Nicaragua, from
32% to 28% (although the figure rose in El Salvador
and Nicaragua in 1980). Nevertheless, these ratios
have  been rising again  in  the  1990s,  reaching  an
average of nearly 30% in 1997 (see table V.4).
Table V.4
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF TRADITIONAL GOODS AS A PERCENTAGE OF I NDUSTRIAL
IMPORTS, BY COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 15.5 12.4 15.3 16.4 17.7 18.6 18.5 19.8 19.2 17.4
Argentina 14.0 13.2 19.0 11.0 19.8 19.5 18.5 18.8 17.8 17.7
Brazil 9.6 9.3 8.3 16.8 13.4 15.7 16.1 18.5 17.3 15.2
Chile 24.9 17.6 28.3 16.7 20.7 21.3 21.3 21.7 22.6 22.8
Paraguay 23.1 31.9 21.5 22.7 25.6 25.7 28.4 32.5 33.9 ....
Uruguay 22.6 15.2 16.3 17.8 20.9 23.9 25.0 27.0 27.3 27.3
Andean
Community 21.4 17.2 18.4 13.9 17.4 17.2 17.6 19.2 20.3 18.9
Bolivia 37.1 32.5 25.2 21.6 21.5 18.4 20.1 18.1 18.5 15.5
Colombia 9.1 11.4 12.3 8.3 13.2 13.1 14.1 16.1 17.3 17.6
Ecuador 22.7 14.2 12.2 11.1 16.7 14.9 15.3 15.5 18.6 18.5
Peru 22.2 20.9 17.9 23.8 23.5 23.6 22.8 21.1 24.2 22.4
Venezuela 23.1 17.8 22.0 15.0 17.7 19.1 20.0 23.3 22.7 ....
Mexico 11.3 13.5 15.5 23.1 25.5 25.9 29.1 26.3 24.9 25.0
CACM b 34.4 33.7 27.8 22.6 24.9 24.4 25.8 25.6 26.7 29.7
Costa Rica 31.1 30.8 24.9 22.1 23.7 23.5 24.3 23.5 23.7 ....
El Salvador 34.0 35.4 39.2 24.1 25.1 25.6 26.7 27.5 28.8 29.6
Guatemala 35.2 34.6 22.0 19.6 21.5 21.4 24.7 23.3 23.8 26.0
Honduras 41.1 36.6 25.7 24.0 26.3 26.0 26.6 27.9 31.0 34.5
Nicaragua 32.1 32.0 35.4 28.0 36.6 33.4 31.4 30.8 30.9 31.3
Total 19.0 16.1 17.1 18.7 21.5 21.7 23.0 22.2 21.9 21.3
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Common Market.
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2. Scale-intensive goods
This category includes goods whose production
involves substantial economies of scale and an
intensive use of natural resources and that are mainly
intended for intermediate consumption.175 In
practically all the countries studied, there was a steady,
gradual decline in these goods’ share of total imports
of industrial products. The reduction was especially
sharp in the group composed of the Mercosur
countries and Chile (although in this case Chile
constitutes an exception,  since the  change in  this
variable has not been very notable in that country).
Indeed, as can be seen in table V.5, these imports have
declined in the last few years from the high levels seen
in the period 1965-1970 (40% on average) and at the
beginning of the 1990s (32%). The same is true for
Mexico.
The imports of the countries of the Andean
Community have fluctuated less markedly, for
although the average figure has declined in the 1990s
(from 38% to 31%), the coefficient for 1997 is similar
to that of previous decades. Imports of these goods
have, however, behaved differently in the subcategory
composed of the Central American countries, which,
with the exception of Nicaragua, started the decade
with high figures –above 40%– and then fell to levels
of around 36%, although this was still higher than the
levels recorded between 1965 and 1970.
3. Durable goods
The category of durable goods basically consists of
finished consumer goods, such as household
appliances, electronics and vehicles (but not their parts
or engines). Imports of these goods have generally
increased since  trade  has been liberalized, chiefly
because of the pent-up demand that had existed as a
result of administrative controls and high tariffs.
In the Mercosur countries and Chile, the average
share of total imports of industrial goods represented
by durable goods rose from 10% to nearly 17%
between 1990 and 1994, but then fell back to 15% in
1996 and 1997. The greatest relative increase occurred
in Brazil, where the ratio generally fluctuated between
4% and 5.5% throughout the period 1965-1990, rose
to nearly 8% in 1992 and then to 15% in 1995, and
then slipped to 11% in 1996 and 12% in 1997 after the
Government imposed high tariffs and other internal
controls in an effort to reduce imports of motor
vehicles. In the other countries, the ratio remained
around 18% between 1965 and 1997 (see table V.6).
In the countries of the Andean Community,
durable goods’ share of imports was 9.5% in 1990,
rose to 19% in 1994, and then fell to about 12% in 1996
and 1997,  one  of the  lowest levels  in  the  period
1965-1997. In the countries of Central America, the
ratios were also slightly higher in 1993 and 1994, but
they have not undergone any major changes in several
decades.
Mexico is the only country in which the ratio of
imports of durable goods fell in the peak year for
imports –1994– and again in 1995. The share of these
goods in Mexican trade shrank from 17% in 1993 to
9% in 1994 and then levelled off at between 11% and
11.5% in 1996 and 1997.
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175 For example, paper, chemicals, rubber, ceramics and building materials, and base metals such as pig iron and iron or steel ingots.
4. Technical progress-diffusing goods
The share of total imports of industrial goods
accounted for by the types of goods that serve to
diffuse technical progress (mainly capital goods, parts
and components) has been remarkably stable during
the period under consideration. In the region as a
whole the ratio fluctuated between 37% and 40% in
the period 1990-1997. The highest coefficients were
in the most industrially advanced countries, such as
Brazil and Mexico, and the lowest were in the
countries of Central America (see table V.7).
The average figures for the Mercosur countries
and Chile were higher than the coefficients for the
region as a whole. This was mainly because of the high
ratios registered in Argentina and Brazil and, to a
lesser extent, in Chile, since in Paraguay and Uruguay
the proportion was less than 30%. In Mexico these
goods increased their share between 1990 and 1997.
In the countries of the Andean Community, the
share of imports represented by technical
Table V.5
LATIN  AMERICA: IMPORTS  OF SCALE-INTENSIVE GOODS  AS  A  PERCENTAGE
OF INDUSTRIAL IMPORTS, BY COUNTRIES AND GROUPS
OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 43.9 39.5 36.1 32.3 28.8 28.8 26.6 28.4 27.8 26.5
Argentina 49.2 46.5 27.8 44.0 24.2 21.9 21.4 28.0 27.4 24.8
Brazil 50.3 40.0 47.1 32.6 35.4 36.6 31.4 30.2 29.7 28.4
Chile 26.7 26.4 20.6 26.1 25.2 23.6 23.9 25.2 23.5 22.9
Paraguay 30.6 20.2 31.1 21.0 23.2 23.2 20.7 17.7 21.3 ...
Uruguay 38.1 38.8 33.5 38.1 27.6 27.2 29.6 27.0 28.6 26.6
Andean
Community 26.3 30.1 31.3 38.2 29.9 27.3 28.7 32.5 30.9 31.0
Bolivia 21.8 23.7 25.6 24.8 24.3 26.2 28.0 27.7 24.2 28.2
Colombia 34.6 33.6 41.8 45.6 44.3 32.4 30.5 35.6 33.9 32.1
Ecuador 30.1 39.5 31.0 41.9 30.9 26.7 28.7 35.0 34.2 35.2
Peru 27.0 33.2 32.2 33.5 28.9 29.8 28.1 28.7 26.9 27.1
Venezuela 23.5 26.3 27.1 34.0 23.3 22.1 26.3 30.7 29.5 ...
Mexico 28.0 25.1 29.6 23.7 18.4 17.9 19.4 20.1 19.3 19.8
CACM b 28.8 29.9 38.8 41.4 36.1 33.7 34.0 35.8 36.0 32.6
Costa Rica 33.6 32.1 39.9 42.1 38.3 34.7 36.5 39.6 38.1 ...
El Salvador 27.7 31.6 33.2 43.7 34.9 30.8 30.5 31.7 33.7 33.1
Guatemala 27.5 30.6 46.5 44.5 38.0 34.1 34.7 36.9 37.0 34.4
Honduras 27.0 25.3 31.4 40.8 38.3 39.3 36.6 35.7 38.1 31.6
Nicaragua 27.4 28.9 36.9 26.2 23.0 24.2 27.2 31.0 28.0 28.3
Total 32.6 33.1 33.3 31.1 24.8 24.2 24.5 26.8 25.5 24.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Common Market.
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progress-diffusing goods has been relatively low, with
the exception of Colombia and Venezuela, where the
figures have been higher. In Colombia, the share of
these goods fell between 1990 and 1993, but rose again
(to 37% and 39%) in the following years.
C. TRADE SPECIALIZATION PATTERNS IN LATIN AMERICA
The indicator that is used here to evaluate  trade
specialization patterns in Latin America was
developed by Guerrieri (1994) and is known as the
Indicator of Contribution to Trade Balance, or ICTB.
The ICTB measures the relative contribution made by
various groups of products to the trade balance; a
Table V.6
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF DURABLE GOODS AS A PERCENTAGE OF I NDUSTRIAL
IMPORTS, BY COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 10.5 8.6 11.4 9.6 16.2 16.6 17.0 16.0 14.2 14.9
Argentina 12.8 5.4 15.2 9.9 20.8 20.6 20.3 14.4 16.5 18.5
Brazil 5.4 7.6 4.0 5.5 7.9 11.4 13.5 15.0 11.3 12.0
Chile 11.7 15.2 23.1 14.5 20.5 18.5 17.5 18.7 19.1 18.2
Paraguay 15.1 15.6 17.3 31.6 25.4 24.8 24.0 25.8 18.2 ...
Uruguay 15.1 16.2 21.2 14.4 27.4 24.1 20.9 18.8 15.1 16.5
Andean
Community 15.7 14.4 15.3 9.5 17.1 19.2 19.3 14.4 12.3 12.6
Bolivia 13.1 12.5 14.9 20.4 18.9 17.2 23.5 18.8 16.7 20.9
Colombia 11.6 15.0 13.6 8.5 8.3 20.0 18.5 10.9 10.2 11.2
Ecuador 15.0 13.0 17.5 9.8 18.4 21.0 28.3 19.5 15.7 13.7
Peru 16.9 10.6 13.0 8.3 19.8 14.5 18.3 17.6 13.0 12.5
Venezuela 16.7 15.8 16.1 9.4 20.2 19.9 16.3 14.0 12.6 ...
Mexico 17.0 15.4 15.9 17.1 17.3 17.1 8.7 9.3 11.3 11.5
CACM b 10.7 10.3 8.5 10.6 12.6 14.8 14.5 13.5 12.5 12.3
Costa Rica 9.1 11.0 9.2 9.1 12.3 13.6 13.7 10.7 12.6 ...
El Salvador 10.4 9.2 4.5 9.7 13.8 15.7 15.9 15.8 11.9 11.2
Guatemala 11.5 9.5 9.7 9.2 13.3 18.0 17.5 17.7 15.0 13.8
Honduras 10.7 12.0 11.4 11.0 10.9 11.3 10.8 9.5 10.0 11.5
Nicaragua 11.6 9.6 5.7 21.3 11.3 11.7 9.8 9.7 11.5 12.3
Total 13.7 11.7 13.4 12.4 16.6 17.2 13.9 13.3 12.7 13.1
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Mercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Common Market.
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positive (negative) value denotes the presence
(absence) of a comparative advantage (comparative
disadvantage) in the relevant product category.176
The Mercosur countries and Chile, together with
Mexico, exhibit the greatest variations in terms of their
patterns of specialization during the period studied.
They originally had a comparative disadvantage in
commodities, mainly because of the hefty trade
deficits posted by the energy sectors of these countries
during the years when oil prices were rising, together
with the fact that these deficits were not offset by trade
surpluses  in other commodities. When the  energy
sector’s  trade deficit was  reduced,  these  countries
found that they had a comparative (albeit declining)
advantage in agricultural products (see figure V.1 and
table V.8). Primary mining products enjoyed a
relatively stable comparative advantage.
Table V.7
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS-DIFFUSING PRODUCTS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL IMPORTS, BY COUNTRIES
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-1997
(Percentages)
1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mercosura
and Chile 30.1 39.5 37.3 41.7 37.3 36.1 38.0 35.9 38.8 41.2
Argentina 24.0 34.9 38.0 35.1 35.3 38.0 39.8 38.8 38.2 39.1
Brazil 34.7 43.0 40.5 45.1 43.3 36.4 39.0 36.3 41.7 44.4
Chile 36.6 40.8 27.9 42.7 33.6 36.6 37.2 34.4 34.8 36.1
Paraguay 31.2 32.3 30.1 24.6 25.8 26.4 26.9 24.0 26.6 ...
Uruguay 24.1 29.7 29.0 29.7 24.2 24.8 24.4 27.2 29.0 29.7
Andean
Community 36.6 38.3 35.0 38.4 35.6 36.3 34.4 34.0 36.5 37.5
Bolivia 28.0 31.2 34.2 33.2 35.3 38.2 28.4 35.4 40.5 35.5
Colombia 44.8 40.0 32.3 37.5 34.2 34.6 36.8 37.4 38.6 39.0
Ecuador 32.2 33.3 39.3 37.3 34.0 37.4 27.7 30.1 31.5 32.7
Peru 34.0 35.3 36.9 34.4 27.8 32.1 30.7 32.7 35.9 37.9
Venezuela 36.6 40.1 34.9 41.6 38.9 38.9 37.4 31.9 35.2 ...
Mexico 43.7 46.0 39.0 36.2 38.9 39.1 42.8 44.3 44.5 43.7
CACM b 26.2 26.1 24.9 25.5 26.4 27.2 25.7 25.1 24.8 25.4
Costa Rica 26.2 26.1 26.1 26.7 25.7 28.2 25.6 26.2 25.6 ...
El Salvador 27.9 23.8 23.1 22.6 26.2 27.9 26.8 25.0 25.6 26.1
Guatemala 25.8 25.3 21.8 26.7 27.1 26.5 23.0 22.1 24.2 25.8
Honduras 21.3 26.1 31.6 24.2 24.5 23.4 26.0 26.9 20.9 22.4
Nicaragua 28.9 29.5 22.0 24.5 29.0 30.8 31.6 28.5 29.6 28.1
Total 34.8 39.1 36.2 37.8 37.1 36.9 38.7 37.7 39.9 41.2
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
aMercosur = Southern Common Market.
b CACM = Central American Market.
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176 ICTB (indicator of contribution to trade balance) = {[(Xi - Mi)/(X + M)/2] - [(X - M)/(X + M)/2]*[(Xi + Mi)/(X + M)]*100} (Guerrieri, 1994,
p. 201).
Initially these countries also had a comparative
advantage (a positive value for the indicator) in
industrial goods, but this has turned into a comparative
disadvantage in the course of the 1990s. This average
value was strongly influenced by the positive
contribution made by traditional  goods, especially
food, beverages and tobacco, although this tended to
decl ine as t ime passed. As noted earl ier,
scale-intensive industrial goods had a comparative
advantage,  which  was maintained  principally as a
result of Chile’s performance. The largest deficits
were in durables and in technical progress-diffusing
goods.
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Between 1978 and 1997 no significant changes
were observed in the trade specialization patterns of
the countries of the Andean Community, which
enjoyed advantages  in commodities, especially in
primary energy and, to a lesser extent, in primary food
and mining products. This was, in particular, a
reflection of the influence of Ecuador and Venezuela
on  the  group’s average. The group had a strong
disadvantage in industrial goods, however, in spite of
the improvement seen in the indicator for food,
beverages and tobacco and for other traditional
industries, especially textiles. During the 1990s this
group has also had a comparative advantage in
scale-intensive products (see figure V.2 and table V.9).
Mexico constitutes a special case in this respect
owing to the magnitude of the change observed in its
trade specialization pattern. As can be seen in figure
V.3, it registered a positive value for this indicator in
the case of energy products, a certain neutrality in
other commodities, and negative values for all
industrial products. Although it has not been possible
to counteract this disadvantage entirely, except in the
case of durable goods, it has tended to decline in the
course of the 1990s (see figure V.3 and table V.10).
Finally, the countries of Central America
exhibited the greatest stability in their trade
specialization pattern up to the beginning of the 1990s
(see figure V.4 and table V.11), as well as having the
largest surpluses in both primary and processed
foodstuffs and food products. They had a comparative
disadvantage in scale-intensive industrial goods,
durables and technical progress-diffusing  products
throughout the period studied, although this has
lessened somewhat in the last few years.
Table V.8
TRADE SPECIALIZATION PATTERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR)
AND CHILE, 1978-1997
1978- 1982- 1986- 1990- 1994-
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Commodities -1.4 -3.9 -1.0 0.8 2.9
Agricultural 4.4 3.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
Mining 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.2
Energy -7.1 -9.1 -4.7 -3.2 -1.0
Industrial 1.3 3.7 0.9 -0.9 -3.1
Traditional 6.2 5.4 4.8 3.9 3.5
Food, beverages and tobacco 4.9 4.2 3.4 3.1 3.2
Other traditional goods 1.3 1.2 1.4 0.8 0.3
Scale-intensive -0.3 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.1
Durables -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -1.3 -1.7
Technical progress-diffusers -4.1 -3.4 -4.8 -5.2 -6.1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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Table V.9
TRADE SPECIALIZATION PATTERN OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY, 1978-1997
1978- 1982- 1986- 1990- 1994-
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Commodities 14.3 12.0 12.2 12.4 11.1
Agricultural 1.9 1.1 3.0 2.0 2.2
Mining 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5
Energy 11.4 10.5 8.5 9.7 8.4
Industrial -14.2 -11.8 -12.0 -12.4 -11.0
Traditional -2.4 -2.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8
Food, beverages and tobacco -0.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 0.1
Other traditional goods -1.6 -1.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9
Scale-intesive -0.4 0.7 -0.4 -1.0 0.1
Durables -3.6 -2.8 -2.4 -3.0 -2.9
Technical progress-diffusers -7.8 -7.2 -8.6 -7.9 -7.4
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Table V.10
TRADE SPECIALIZATION PATTERN OF MEXICO, 1978-1997
1978- 1982- 1986- 1990- 1994-
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Commodities 14.9 13.1 8.5 6.2 2.6
Agricultural 2.2 -1.1 0.6 0.6 0.2
Mining 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
Energy 12.4 14.1 7.7 5.5 2.4
Industrial -14.6 -12.9 -8.0 -5.3 -1.2
Traditional -0.5 -2.0 -1.6 -2.3 -1.5
Food, beverages and tobacco -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -0.3
Other traditional goods -0.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.4 -1.2
Scale-intensive -3.9 -2.9 -1.8 -1.3 -1.8
Durables -2.8 -1.8 -0.1 1.0 3.4
Technical progress-diffusers -7.4 -6.2 -4.5 -2.8 -1.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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Table V.11
TRADE SPECIALIZATION PATTERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM),  1978-1997
1978- 1982- 1986- 1990- 1994-
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Commodities 11.2 10.4 13.0 10.1 9.7
Agricultural 13.2 14.0 14.7 11.3 10.5
Mining 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Energy -2.2 -3.7 -1.7 -1.2 -0.8
Industrial -11.0 -10.3 -12.9 -9.8 -9.9
Traditional 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.8 1.3
Food, beverages and tobacco 2.0 1.5 0.9 2.0 1.5
Other traditional goods -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1
Scale-intensive -5.8 -6.3 -6.7 -5.5 -4.9
Durables -1.9 -1.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.5
Technical progress-diffusers -4.4 -3.7 -4.4 -3.9 -3.8
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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PART THREE
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1997-1998
Latin America and the Caribbean in the world economy 107
108 ECLAC
Chapter VI
ASYMMETRIES AND CONVERGENCES IN THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
A. THE CONCEPT OF CONVERGENCE AND TYPES OF CONVERGENCE
The notion of convergence, though imprecise, appears
frequently in the literature on economic integration.177
Convergence is a dynamic concept related to the static
categories of asymmetry and heterogeneity. It can be
defined simply as a process in which non-uniform
elements come together to become more of an ordered
whole. In the context of economic integration, the aim
of this process is to reduce initial differences  or
asymmetries between independent elements. This
may occur spontaneously or it may be the result of
negotiation among Governments, with some degree of
formal institutional structure coming into play.
In connection with regional integration, two types
of convergence are to be distinguished: convergence
within integration schemes and convergencebetween
them. The concept of convergence between
integration schemes may, in turn, apply to a number
of dimensions, depending basically on the depth of
commitment to harmonization driving the move
toward integration.178The progressive phases of the
process by which a larger market is created –which
may take the form of a free trade area; customs union;
common market; economic union; or economic,
monetary, and political union– involve  increasing
degrees of policy coordination and therefore
convergence. Free trade areas are characterized by
demanding  less convergence  among  the economic
policies of member countries  than other types of
integration schemes, while the opposite extreme
–economic, monetary, and political union– represents
the almost total elimination of the exercise of
independent national policy by the member countries.
In keeping with this logical sequence, a process of
macroeconomic convergence should lead to a nominal
convergence reflected in a set of parameters
corresponding to  economic variables that have an
impact on the stability of prices and interest rates, as
in the case of the Maastricht Treaty (see chapter II).
Real convergence is understood as the subsequent
long-range process of reducing disparities of
productivity and standards of living between countries
or regions (Cámara Arilla, 1996). The economic and
social cohesion that results from this constitutes
the ultimate goal of the economic integration
process.179
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177 Convergence is also used in the economic literature to refer to reduction of existing differences between countries with respect to per capita
product or productivity levels. See Romer (1994).
178 There is also interest in analysing other types of asymmetries or differences between member countries of integration schemes, such as (i) the
size and level of development of the participating countries, which affect their ability to benefit from the system (SELA, 1997a); (ii) the phase in
which countries’ economies find themselves at a given time; and (iii) the negotiating power that the various parties wield in the integration process.
179 Furthermore, to achieve economic and social cohesion within the enlarged economic arena requires persistent application of compensatory
economic and social policies to benefit disadvantaged sectors and regions.
It should be pointed out that convergence between
integration agreements depends on the nature of the
agreements. For example, convergence between free
trade areas and customs unions entails reduction of
asymmetries between such agreements with respect to
their basic trade regulations and tariff reduction
programme.
In short, the different modes of convergence that
seem relevant to projects of regional integration in
Latin America and the Caribbean are: (i) convergence
of policy and instrumentswithin the integration
agreements; (i i) convergence of policy and
instrumentsbetweenthe agreements; and (iii) degree
and complexity of convergence, which are determined
by the policies to be harmonized, such as trade
regulat ions or third-party tari f fs, or major
macroeconomic, fiscal and social policies.
With respect to their basic set of trade instruments,
as mentioned above, convergenceb tween
agreements constitutes a preliminary and relatively
loose stage of the convergence process. This makes it
possibly the one with the most bearing on the three
Latin American and Caribbean subregions. The
interregional negotiations currently being held to
establish free trade zones between the Andean
Community and Mercosur fall within its parameters.
Negotiations are  focusing on  those instruments of
trade facilitation and policy that affect access to the
enlarged market. The principal instruments include
tariffs, rules of origin, safeguards, customs valuation
and technical standards.
Once the basic systems of the integration schemes
are in place, and as trade linkages between the
integration partners intensify, it is to be expected that
there wil l be increased demand for further
harmonization of policies that affect trade between
countries or influence their ability to attract investment.
Within existing integration schemes, the
convergence of policies that go beyond trade issues
seems to belong to a more advanced stage of
convergence, one that the subregional  integration
agreements are just now entering. This variation on the
theme is exemplified in efforts by the Andean
Community, Mercosur, the Central American
Common Market (CACM),180 and the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) to flesh out their still
imperfect customs unions by coordinating and
harmonizing those policies that indirectly influence
either the dynamics and functioning of the enlarged
markets or the competition that takes place within
them.  Such policies include exchange rate  policy,
certain areas of monetary and fiscal policy, policy in
relation to competition and to attracting foreign
investment, and, in general, the unification of economic
legislation and relevant administrative regulations.181
In the various contexts where it occurs,
convergence represents a challenge that has increased
in its substance and in its relevance to the current
situation as the subregional integration schemes move
toward more advanced stages of integration or begin
efforts to enlarge. Furthermore, the proliferation of
bilateral agreements, while it has made regional
integration extraordinarily dynamic, has led to a rather
disorganized evolution of competitive conditions
within the region. Nonetheless, the factor that creates
the greatest  pressure to achieve  a  fully integrated
regional market is the recent initiation of the
negotiating process for the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), since the commitments it might
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180 With respect to CACM, a persuasive argument in favour of harmonization of differing policies and regulations can be found in Ballesteros and
Rodríguez (1997). The authors base their reasoning, on the one hand, on the small size of the Central American economies, and, on the other, on their
favourable geographical location. The idea is that creating a harmonized economic area can reduce production, management and marketing costs for
firms and can improve the efficiency of foreign investment, so that the subregion can operate as a single medium-sized integrated area and build
linkages with the global economy in accordance with the open regionalism model.
181 Macroeconomic coordination presupposes a timely exchange of information and a commitment to consider the impact of national policy on the
economies of partner countries, while harmonization would seem to imply the coordinationex anteof policy by means of negotiation. It should be
pointed out that the European Union, from the outset, undertook by means of consultation to coordinate the above-mentioned types of policy, but
achieved harmonization only gradually, in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, following the internal and external imbalances that affected the member
countries after the first oil crisis.
entail have the potential to undermine the rationale of
the push toward regional integration if the latter does
not move beyond its current state of development (see
chapter II). Then again, it has been argued to the
contrary that current conditions are favourable for
undertaking convergence,  since similarly oriented
economic policies are in place in the various countries
(SELA, 1997b).
The section that follows considers the options
and difficulties that the countries of the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA) must face
with respect to their basic trade regulations if
convergence of their agreements is to take place. The
lines of thinking developed here can also, in principle,
be applied to existing integration schemes in other
subregions.
B. PLANNED CONVERGENCE AND SPONTANEOUS CONVERGENCE
1. Previous attempts at multilateralization
Created in 1961, the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA), the precursor of LAIA,
originally aimed to achieve free trade among the 11
member countries within the 1962-1974 period
–barely 12 years.182In order to achieve its is goal of
creating a multilateral free trade area, LAFTA
employed two basic instruments: (i) lists setting forth
each country’s products and its plans for reducing
tariffs in favour of partner countries and achieving an
annual 8% reduction in the weighted average of tariffs
applied to third parties; and (ii) a common
consolidated list, negotiated every three  years,  of
products whose tariffs and other restrictions the
contracting parties were  committed to eliminating
within the transition period. This list was to be created
in four successive rounds of negotiations, each of
which would deal with 25% of the universe of tariffs
(ECLAC, 1979).
After an auspicious  beginning,  however,  both
negotiating processes stalled. The national lists
continued to be a fairly dynamic factor until 1970,
ul t imately including approximately 11,000
concessions. But very few products were added during
the 1970s. Enlargement of the list also ran into serious
difficulties in the course of the negotiations that were
to produce the list covering the second 25% of the
tariff universe. In both cases, negotiations made it
clear that the  countries had  scant will  for further
reductions. In practice, only those imports that did not
compete with domestic production were liberalized.
Furthermore, some of the third-party tariff reductions
that had been introduced forced the member countries
to renegotiate agreed preference margins.
It was the medium-sized and smaller countries
that were most critical of the stalled negotiations, and
this led to the subsequent creation of the Andean
Group within LAFTA. After various attempts to
restart the negotiating process, the original schedule
for LAFTA had to be modified, and the transition
period was extended for six years by the Caracas
Protocol, signed in December of 1969.  However,
international economic conditions in the 1970s were
not favourable to the development of regional integration.
The 1980 Montevideo Treaty, which created
LAIA, has guiding principles and mechanisms that
clearly distinguish it from its predecessor, the 1960
Montevideo Treaty. Forms of integration based on
planned multilateral tariff reduction were abandoned
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182 It should be remembered that in the decades before the Latin American Free Trade Association was created, trade among the future members
was covered by a set of bilateral agreements that had no organic relationship to each other. The withdrawal from intraregional trade that took place
toward the end of the 1950s, along with the evolution of European integration, led to a series of intergovernmental actions that ultimately led, in 1960,
to the signing of the Montevideo Treaty establishing LAFTA.
in favour of the principles of flexibility and pluralism
embodied in the so-called partial scope agreements.
The Treaty’s Article 7 defines these agreements as
“those in which not all member countries join, and
[which] will tend to create the conditions necessary to
advance the process of regional integration by means
of progressive multilateralization”.183
It  should  be  pointed out  that the mechanisms
contemplated in the 1980 Treaty to multilateralize
partial concessions have not in practice fulfilled their
purpose. The one explicitly regional instrument, the
regional tariff preference, has had little effect in this
regard, due to extensive lists of exceptions and the low
preference margins agreed on (LAIA, 1990).184The
same is true for the preferences designed to grant
differential treatment to economically less developed
countries, an approach that might have led to greater
convergence among the countries but for the fact that
the process never reached completion.
The 1980 Montevideo Treaty also created an
Evaluation and Convergence Conference, whose
prime function, according to article 31, was to “review
the functioning of the integration process in all its
aspects and the convergence of  the  partial scope
agreements through their progressive
multilateralization, and to recommend that the
Council (of Ministers) adopt corrective measures of
multilateral scope”. Section (e) of the article added the
responsibility to “carry out multilateral negotiations to
set  and advance  tariff preferences”. However, the
Conference never met in regular session, so it was not
able to impart real content to the project that had been
envisaged for it. As a result, the LAIA member
countries have shown little interest in multilateralizing
the preferences negotiated in partial contexts.
2. The components of convergence
In contrast, the member States have made extensive
use of the partial scope agreements to conclude
numerous bilateral agreements as well as some
plurilateral ones.185The initial agreements were quite
limited as to the quantity of products and the extent of
the agreed preferences, but since the end of the past
decade a new generat ion of economic
complementar i ty agreements (ECAs) has
appeared.186 In general, these commit the signatory
countries to substantially achieving free trade on a
prescribed timetable. They also contain other elements
of liberalization and of economic cooperation and
complementarity characteristic of more advanced
stages of integration,  such as liberalized trade in
services, promotion and protection of mutual
investments, cooperation on infrastructure, and
understandings relating to technical and phytosanitary
standards.
At this point, there are already 10 new-generation
ECAs, including the four-party customs union formed
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183 The new approach is clearly expressed in the introduction to the 1980 Montevideo Treaty: “The renewed desire for integration of the countries
thus finds various channels for its fulfilment, since starting by renegotiating concessions currently in effect to strengthen and balance intraregional
trade flows establishes a sphere of economic preferences that will continue to develop through various mechanisms, such as the regional tariff
preference, regional agreements, and, on a fundamental level, by a growing fabric of partial accords that will create the conditions necessary for th
Association to evolve naturally toward the desired goal of a Latin American common market” (LAIA, 1980).
184 The preferences granted under this approach are being absorbed into those that have been negotiated in the so-called new generation of
agreements.
185 In this respect, LAIA has proven to be a useful framework, allowing member countries to place their understandings under the conceptual
umbrella of the enabling clause approved in the Tokyo round of GATT. Only with the consolidation of Mercosur have voices arisen within WTO
arguing that WTO should be notified of integration agreements of similar scope, as called for in article XXIV.
186 This is true, both for the initial agreements for renegotiating concessions agreed upon under the previous treaty and for the ECAs negotiated
during the greater part of the 1980s.
by Mercosur.187 The customs union formed by the
Andean Community also comes to mind, although it
is legally independent of the LAIA scheme. These
agreements may constitute the basis of what in the
future could come to be a multilateral free trade zone.
According to this logic, these agreements create the
following integration systems: (i) the Andean
Community; (ii) the Group of Three; (iii) Mercosur;
(iv) the partnership agreement signed by Mercosur and
Bolivia and the one signed by Mercosur and Chile; (v)
the system that could be formed by the preceding
group and the Chile-Peru agreement; (vi) the set of
bilateral agreements signed by Chile; and (vii) the set
of bilateral agreements signed by Mexico  (LAIA,
1998a).
In recent years, with the web of agreements ever
denser and the corresponding planned tariff reductions
realized, the idea began to emerge at the LAIA General
Secretariat that all these  elements taken together,
improved and supplemented by some missing
agreements, could, by around 2005, bring about a large
free  trade  area comprising  the LAIA  countries.188
Thus, in a study recently commissioned by the LAIA
General Secretariat, three complementary paths are
indicated by which a free trade area embracing all the
LAIA countries could be reached. First, the web of
agreements already in existence would need to be
completed. Second, negotiations would need to be
held to eliminate the exceptions  contained in the
agreements. Lastly, it would be necessary to
renegotiate the tariff reduction schedules that are too
extensive, thus achieving free trade more quickly and
making the calendar of changes compatible with the
dates when the great majority of the tariff elimination
processes are to be complete (LAIA, 1998b, p. 9).
Current conditions seem more favourable for the
eventual convergence of agreements, given the trade
and investment liberalization undertaken by all the
member countries since the end of the past decade, and
given both the commitments made in WTO and the
countries’ willingness to open themselves to
international competition, including competition from
within the region. It is significant that the Mercosur
programme of liberalization is to reach completion in
2001; that Peru will have completed its integration into
the Andean Community’s free trade system by 2005;
and that in that year almost all trade between
participating countries will have been liberalized by
the tariff reduction programmes of the Group of Three
and by the effect of the majority of bilateral ECAs.
Besides the inexorable advance of tariff reduction
programmes, the movement towards a large free trade
area gains momentum from the countries’ evident
interest in creating the missing agreements or in
deepening existing ones.
The question remains as to why the countries have
preferred to conclude many partial agreements rather
than tying themselves to a single negotiating
framework that would gradually lead to a completely
integrated free trade area. One possible answer is that
they are more willing to negotiate in more restricted
geographical contexts, because it is easier to evaluate
the probable costs and benefits associated with
different types of agreements.
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187 The following ECAs can be considered of the new generation: No. 17 (Chile-Mexico), No. 18 (Mercosur), No. 23 (Chile-Venezuela), No. 24
(Chile-Colombia), No. 31 (Bolivia-Mexico), No. 32 (Chile-Ecuador), No. 33 (Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela), No. 35 (Mercosur-Chile), No. 36
(Mercosur-Bolivia), and No. 37 (Chile-Peru).
188 This idea is reflected in a recent publication of the LAIA General Secretariat, which maintains that “For the member countries as a group,
liberalized trade will reach a level of more than 94% by the year 2005, at which time there will virtually be a free trade zone in South America,as
well as various ones between Mexico and the other member countries” (LAIA, 1998a, p. 5).
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE SPONTANEOUS MODEL
1. Limited geographical scope
The possibility of a virtual free trade area forming
spontaneously, though attractive, since it requires little
in the way of additional multilateral effort, is not
likely, given the current status of the integration
process among the LAIA countries and the difficulties
associated with convergence. First of all, there is the
persistent problem of the missing agreements. In this
regard, it can be said that the successful conclusion of
negotiations between  the  Andean Community and
Mercosur is the greatest challenge standing in the way
of a possible South American free trade area.  If
negotiations do not go well, the current situation will
persist, with three hubs (Mercosur, Andean
Community, Chile), but various  important spokes
missing, such as bilateral agreements between
Mercosur and Colombia, Mercosur and Ecuador,
Mercosur and Peru, and a Bolivia-Chile relationship.
As for trade  linkages,  segmentation would  persist
here, too, since trade flows, relatively strong within
each subgroup, are lighter between groups, and in
general between countries that do not have agreements
with each other.
Where the sharpest discontinuity is to be seen,
however, is in the relationship between Mexico and
Mercosur. The parties still differ on the interpretation
and application of article 44 of the Montevideo Treaty,
which calls for compensations to be made by a country
that has granted preferential treatment to a developed
country, such as occurred with Mexico when it became
part of NAFTA.189 At the same time, Mexico
maintains that its preferences have been hurt by the
formation of Mercosur.
These centrifugal forces have manifested
themselves more than once in the region in recent
years. For example, the participation of Colombia and
Venezuela in the Group of Three, in addition to
allowing linkage between these countries and Mexico,
implies a breakdown of the Andean Community’s
common external tariff. The same is true in the case of
the complementarity agreement between Bolivia and
Mercosur. And the agreement between Costa Rica and
Mexico, signed in 1995, has the same effect on the
Central American Common Market common external
tariff. Though this sort of partial arrangement does not
fit the traditional concept of a customs union, it seems
to reflect the interest some countries have in
diversifying their trade relations.
2. The lists of exceptions
The so-called new generation of agreements are
different from those concluded during the past decade,
chiefly because that they entail negative lists of the
relatively small number of products exempt from free
trade provisions rather than positive lists like those
that appeared in previous agreements, which covered
all the products benefiting from tariff reduction. In
general, the new-generation ECAs establish an
automatic  schedule  of  reduction for most existing
tariffs. The remainder are reduced at varying paces
over varying time periods. While the majority of these
agreements involve relatively short  lists of items
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189 Article 44 calls for the unconditional extension to the remaining member countries of concessions granted by one member country through
agreements not contemplated in the Montevideo Treaty or the Cartagena Agreement. Mexico’s participation in NAFTA meant an initial automatic
application of this article, but complex negotiations led to the parties’ approving, in June 1994, an interpretative protocol on article 44, allowing it to
be suspended, with compensation among interested parties to be negotiated. This protocol thus opens up the possibility that the member countries
may conclude agreements with developed countries without an automatic obligation to extend the concessions to other member countries.
exempt from reduction, some recent ECAs include no
outright exceptions, but instead provide for more
extended timetables for products considered sensitive.
The partnership agreements between Mercosur and
Chile and between Mercosur and Bolivia are examples
of this.
The idea of a more perfect free trade area is based
on the notion that all products benefit from free trade.
It has therefore been recommended that lists of
permanent exceptions  be  eliminated.  Nevertheless,
this may be too stringent a requirement for countries
that have very disparate abilities to compete.
Furthermore, the understanding governing
interpretation of article XXIV of the 1994 GATT only
requires that the free trade area l iberal ize
“substantially all trade” within a period generally not
to exceed 10 years. Though reduced in scope, the lists
of exceptions provided for in ECAs usually contain
products that are highly important to the countries,
such as certain agricultural products.
On the other hand, the recommendation to shorten
some of the time periods for tariff elimination seems
to have considerable merit. A period of 18 years, for
example, as stipulated in various ECAs signed by
Chile, seems excessively long and could even send the
wrong signal to the industry in question concerning the
urgency of restructuring. If there is a real desire to
provide long-term protection for a product, it would
be more logical to include the product on the list of
permanent exceptions, leaving open the possibility
that the list could be shortened in subsequent
negotiations.
3. Institutional and regulatory weakness in the regional agreements
Among other factors that make spontaneous
convergence of the agreements difficult are the
administrative complexity resulting from the
simultaneous functioning of multiple agreements
covering different geographical areas, the fact that the
various commitments remain unconsolidated, and the
institutional and regulatory weakness of most of the
agreements.
For example, to apply a particular preference, the
importing country’s customs service not only must
determine the product’s country of origin, but must
also know on which tariff reduction list the product
figures as well as the year of the schedule on which it
appears. This task is still  feasible at the national
administrative  level, but a  potential  exporter  who
wishes to explore access to the regional market will
face high transaction costs.
In the absence of multilateral consolidation of the
concessions granted in the partial integration
agreements, Governments may change concessions
unilaterally, resorting for the purpose to safeguard
clauses or to anti-dumping measures. These changes
affect not only the interests of the parties in question,
but also the competitive situation in the region as a
whole, and they make the regional market even less
transparent and increase its instability.
It is common for ECAs to have bilateral trade and
investment promotion committees that serve as
watchdogs for the enforcement of the agreement and
deal with disputes. Mercosur and the Andean
Community, also have institutions that perform
similar roles. However, these dispute settlement
mechanisms are not very effective. In general, there
has been a preference for solut ions at an
intergovernmental level, which can be justified by
supposedly greater  flexibility and efficacy  than is
offered by some other mechanisms. Nevertheless, the
coexistence of a growing number of different
institutional frameworks not only implies high cost for
the countries involved, but also makes  for a  less
transparent and predictable regional market, in which
all these structures are superimposed.
This same argument can be applied in general to
the increasing dispersion of the basic regulatory
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structure that must govern intrazonal trade. It has been
argued, for instance, that LAIA lacks a modern set of
regulations of regional scope. Indeed, LAIA has no
instrument of general scope beyond the option
provided by a mutual consultation mechanism (LAIA,
1998c). Thus, there is no effective mechanism for
countries to resort to resolve such issues as dumping
and subsidies.
With respect to the rules of origin approved by
resolution 78 of the Committee of Representatives, the
LAIA General Secretariat itself considers that it has
fallen out of date and been of little use, among other
reasons because various ECAs have stipulated their
own rules (LAIA, 1998d).190LAIA has a safeguards
arrangement (resolution 70 of the Committee of
Representatives) that provides for this type of measure
(i) for reasons having to do with an imbalance in the
balance of payments; (ii) in cases of serious harm or
threat of serious harm to domestic production; and
(iii) to deal with a manifest  deficit in a  member
country. However, the Andean Community and
various ECAs, including the one from which  the
Group of Three emerged, have their own clauses,
while Mercosur, on the contrary, does not allow the
application of safeguards to its reciprocal trade.
Both Mercosur and the Andean Community have
made efforts to develop their own regulatory
framework. However, it is more and more common for
the  new generation  of  ECAs to  adopt regulations
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, though in many
cases these regulations are compatible with
multilateral standards.191 The regulations of the
agreements in which Mexico participates are clearly
inspired by NAFTA, which contain stricter rules than
those committed to by the WTO countries.192
In effect, LAIA has as yet no basic regulatory
structure of regional scope to govern trade relations
among its members, or one that follows modern
criteria in its content and mode of enforcement. This
lack was not felt in the first years, when LAIA
members barely concerned themselves with
renegotiating their limited traditional preferential
arrangements. The initial regulatory weakness of
LAIA has also been justified in terms of a desire to
offer the countries the greatest possible flexibility in
their handling of partial agreements. Beyond this, it
was a sovereign decision of the countries to leave these
matters relatively undefined. Nevertheless, the
intensity and diversity of the linkages covered by the
new generation of agreements has induced the
countries to incorporate in these agreements
regulations negotiated on an ad hoc basis. The
resulting dispersion of regulations complicates the
process of creating integration in a regional market
which so far seems to consist merely of the sum of the
different agreements.193
Given this dilemma, various lines of action can be
imagined. One would  be  what  the  LAIA General
Secretariat proposes, which is basically to complete
and modernize the Association’s regulations. Aware
of the limitations of the current structure, the LAIA
General Secretariat has presented concrete proposals
for improving the regional rules of origin and the
safeguards system based on WTO rules and the
particular needs of intraregional trade. Nevertheless,
the member countries have shown little interest in
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190 In this publication, the following ECAs with their own regulatory structure are identified: No. 18 (Mercosur), No. 31 (Bolivia-Mexico), No. 33
(Group of Three), No. 35 (Mercosur-Chile), and No. 36 (Mercosur-Bolivia).
191 In its proposal for the adoption of new rules of origin, the LAIA General Secretariat finds that the regulations contained in the new ECAs have
discrepancies among themselves and that the discrepancies basically have to do with terminology. The General Secretariat therefore proposes adopting
uniform terminology and establishing rules for tariff nomenclature on a category by category basis (LAIA, 1998d, p. 4).
192 For a detailed comparative analysis of the different regulatory structures within LAIA, see LAIA (1998e).
193 This problem was acknowledged by the LAIA General Secretariat itself when it noted that “the common regulations of the Association which
govern trade and other aspects of integration are of an inchoate and supplementary nature compared with those that exist on the same matters in the
agreements. Furthermore, the issues dealt with in the rules of the bilateral and subregional agreements are more numerous, more substantial in content
and entail a higher degree of commitment. There are some cases where a certain reluctance is evident, and others where the process of giving the
Association’s common regulatory framework more breadth and depth has been slow, since it depends on regulatory arrangements in the agreements
that progress at different speeds, and because there are problems in achieving compatibility” (LAIA, 1998a, p. 3).
providing effective support for this work, preferring
regulation at the level of subregional and bilateral
agreements. Another factor to consider is that existing
regulations within bilateral and subregional
agreements cannot easily be adapted to this new set of
regulations,  should  it be  approved. The countries’
hesitancy is based not only on the fact that the
regulations have been negotiated to fit each
agreement, but also on the fact that the granting party
may feel reluctant to change previously negotiated
concessions and extend them to third countries.
Another approach would be to replace the partial
regulatory systems, when  the time comes, with a
common hemisphere-wide regulatory framework that
would come out of negotiations initiated in the FTAA
context. In fact, the various FTAA negotiating groups
in principle cover all the key areas needed to establish
a free trade area in the broad sense (see section on
FTAA in chapter II).
A fully implemented and enforced FTAA might
do away with the rationale for partial free trade
agreements, even though the insti tut ional
arrangements  of the  customs  unions and  common
markets would remain valid. In any case, the creation
of a hemispheric free trade area poses no contradiction
to the desirability of a regional common market with
more ambitious objectives, which would be based on
balanced integral development of a more
homogeneous group of participating countries. Such
an argument is only strengthened by the possibility
that negotiations  towards  FTAA will not  reach a
successful conclusion within the planned time. In any
case, whatever convergence the various regional
components can reach in the meantime will help to
strengthen the region’s negotiating position.
A third (and not necessarily least attractive)
option might be for the countries to forge uniformity
out of the differing regulatory structures in the context
of LAIA or a South American Free Trade Area around
the year 2005, in the event that FTAA negotiations do
not prosper. This would be facilitated by the
experience gained in the FTAA negotiations, since at
that point the ECAs would be fully functioning. Also
helpful would be the fact that asymmetries among the
region’s countries are relatively small.
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Chapter VII
THE STATE OF REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The steady growth seen between January 1997 and
July 1998 in trade within the subregional groupings of
Latin America and the Caribbean and the
intergovernmental agreements concluded within these
subregional schemes in the same period demonstrate
how vigorous the economic integration process is in
the region. There are as yet no clear signs to suggest
that the onset and subsequent worsening of the
international financial crisis have had any effect on
this process. Nonetheless, it is perfectly possible that
the regional environment, which has hitherto been
favourable to integration, may be affected by some of
the repercussions of the crisis on international trade,
such as falling prices for the commodities exported by
the countries of the region, the competition that
products from the region may face from similar Asian
ones in domestic and other markets, and declining
export revenues due to slack demand in Asia (see
chapters I and III).
The four customs unions operating in the region
have made progress in applying their respective free
trade systems and common external tariffs, albeit at a
pace dictated by the economic situation of their
member countries. Furthermore, Governments have
made efforts to introduce reforms in related areas or
to  implement them  more  quickly, examples being
institution-building liberalization of the service sector,
and the free movement of individuals and capital.
Again, in some cases the first steps have been taken
towards designing an effective mechanism for settling
disputes.
On the other hand, there has been a decline in the
number of new free trade agreements being signed
between countries, partly because the two countries
that were the driving force behind such agreements,
Chile and Mexico, have now concluded the
agreements they were seeking, and partly because
there is growing interest in finding areas of
convergence between subregional groups, as
demonstrated by the current negotiations between the
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the
Andean Community, and by the signing of agreements
between subregional groups and non-member
countries, as in the case, for example, of the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and the
Dominican Republic. These efforts to form closer ties
can be explained partly as a response to the challenges
created by the launching of  the  hemisphere-wide
negotiation process at the beginning of 1998, but they
also owe something to the desire of countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean to enlarge these economic
areas, which are still too small to enable international
competition to be confronted successfully (see
chapter VI).
In 1997 the intraregional trade of Latin America
and the Caribbean as a whole grew by 17.5%, while
the total exports of the region grew by around 11%.
Consequently, the relative share of intraregional trade,
measured in current values, increased from 19% in
1996 to more than 20% in 1997 (see table VII.1). This
figure is an average, however, and masks the diversity
of trade relations in the region, as is illustrated by the
substantial trade between Mexico and the United
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Table VII.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORT FIGURES FOR THE REGION
AND FOR SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES, 1990-1997
(Millions of United States dollars f.o.b. and percentages)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
1 Total exportsa 112 694 167 570 204 295 229 472 254 319
Annual percentage growth 10.4 21.9 12.3 10.8
2 Exports to LAIA 12 302 28 254 35 614 38 461 45 078
Annual percentage growth 23.1 26.0 8.0 17.2
3 Percentage of exports within LAIA (2:1)(%) 10.9 16.9 17.4 16.8 17.7
Andean Community
1 Total exports 31 751 34 084 39 260 44 684 45 637
Annual percentage growth 1.8 15.2 13.8 1.9
2 Exports to the Andean Community 1 324 3 485 4 849 4 718 5 325
Annual percentage growth 27.4 39.2 -2.7 12.9
3 Percentage of exports within the Community (2:1)(%) 4.2 10.2 12.4 10.6 11.7
Southern Common Market (Mercosur)
1 Total exports 46 403 61 890 70 129 74 407 82 696
Annual percentage growth 7.5 13.3 6.1 11.0
2 Export to Mercosur 4 127 12 048 14 451 17 115 20 478
Annual percentage growth 30.7 20.0 18.4 19.7
3 Percentage of exports within Mercosur (2:1)(%) 8.9 19.5 20.6 23.0 24.8
Central America Common Market (CACM)
1 Total exports 3 907 5 496 6 777 7 332 8 764
Annual percentage growth 8.9 23.3 8.2 19.5
2 Exports to CACM 624 1 228 1 451 1 553 1 831
Annual percentage growth 18.4 18.2 7.0 17.9
3 Percentage of exports within CACM (2:1)(%) 16.0 22.3 21.4 21.2 20.9
Caribbean Community (Caricom) b
1 Total exports 3 634 3 716 4 487 4 589 4 682
Annual percentage growth 0.6 20.8 2.3 2.0
2 Exports to Caricom 467 521 691 767 671
Annual percentage growth 2.7 32.8 11.0 -12.5
3 Percentage of exports within Caricom (2:1)(%) 12.9 14.0 15.4 16.7 14.3
Latin America and the Caribbean c
1 Total exports 120 572 177 317 216 132 241 951 268 423
Annual percentage growth 10.1 21.9 11.9 10.9
2 Exports to Latin America and the Caribbean 16 802 35 176 42 814 46 518 54 666
Annual percentage growth 20.3 21.7 8.7 17.5
3 Percentage of exports within the region/total (2:1)(%) 13.9 19.8 19.8 19.2 20.4
Source:ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
a From 1992 on, Mexico’smaquilaexports are included in these figures.
b Figures refer only to Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
c Figures refer only to LAIA, CACM, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago.
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States (see chapter II). As will be shown later on, the
proportion of the total trade of Mercosur and Andean
Community member countries accounted for by
intraregional trade has increased in relation to their
trade with outside countries, while it is this latter
segment that has  been the  most  dynamic for the
countries of CACM and the Caribbean Community
(Caricom).
A. THE SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR)
In March 1999 it will have been eight years since the
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay signed the historic Treaty of Asunción, under
which they agreed to establish Mercosur. The
successes achieved by this integration scheme in the
areas of trade, investment and interaction between the
production structures of member countries have been
substantial. Other effects include increased
participation by civil society in the subregional
integration process and the  growth of  subregional
links between municipal and provincial leaders,
professional associations, employers’ associations
and labour organizations.
1. Trade in goods and investment within the subregion
During 1997, merchandise exports within Mercosur
exceeded US$ 20 billion and posted with  a  high
growth rate (nearly 20%), thus coming to account for
almost a quarter of total exports (see table VII.I). The
share of manufactured products in these exports
continued to be substantial and was higher than the
share of manufactures in the exports of member
countries to outside markets.
Although it is estimated that the pace of growth in
trade within the group slowed in 1998, intragroup
trade is still expected to grow appreciably faster than
trade  with other countries, and exports within the
group are expected to increase as a share of the total
exports of member countries. According to data from
the Mercosur administrative secretariat, in the first
half of 1998 exports  from Argentina to  the  other
countries in Mercosur stood at the same level in terms
of value as in the first half of 1997, while the country’s
total exports grew by 4%. In Uruguay, on the other
hand, the growth rates for intraregional and total trade
were 20% and 7%, respectively, and in Brazil the
figures were 11% and 3%.194 It is important to note
that the growth in Uruguayan exports to Mercosur in
the early months of 1998 was accounted for mainly by
an increase of around 70% in its trade with Argentina,
while exports to the Brazilian market grew by
only 3%.195
Furthermore, the consolidation process that has
taken place in the expanded market has stimulated
foreign direct investment from within the region itself,
although there is some disagreement as to the amount
of capital involved (see ECLAC, 1998e, pp. 95 to 98).
On the one hand, there is piecemeal information that
suggests a tendency for Brazilian firms to set up more
offices, production plants and subsidiaries in
Argentina, and vice versa (ECLAC, 1997a, p. 108;
ECLAC, 1997b, box 2, pp. 29 to 30). On the other
hand, the recorded total of Brazilian capital investment
in Argentina and Argentine investment in Brazil is
considerably lower than what reports in the financial
press would lead one to expect. According to the
Central Bank of Brazil, investments carried out by
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194 The figures for Brazil cover the period from January to July 1998.
195 See the Website of the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat:(http://www.algarbull.com.uy/secretariamercosur) .
Brazilian firms in Argentina between 1990 and
mid-1996 totalled less than US$ 270 million, although
the Production Research Centre (CEP) put the total
stock of Brazilian investment in Argentina between
1992 and 1996 at around US$ 388 million, which
represents 2% of the more than US$ 19 billion invested
in total during that period. Of this estimated US$ 388
million, 90% went to manufacturing.196 The main
destinations for Argentine investments are the
members  of  Mercosur and other South American
countries, which receive 73% of the total between
them; Brazil received around 17% of the total stock of
Argentine investments abroad between 1990 and 1996
(CEP, 1998, p. 58).
2. Market access and trade facilitation measures
Mercosur is gradually moving towards becoming
completely operational as a full free trade area. Under
the agreements reached in relation to the Mercosur
adaptation regime (Régimen de Adecuación), from
1999 onward Argentina and Brazil will be obliged to
apply a tariff preference of 100% to all goods imports
from Mercosur countries, with the exception of the
automotive and sugar sectors. Paraguay and Uruguay
must follow suit a year later.197 Since these sectors
include products that are economically sensitive for all
the countries, however, tariff reduction timetables are
expected to be set up for them during the course of 1999.
The process of creating the Mercosur Customs
Union has also followed its course, with the
convergence of national tariffs towards a common
external tariff for a limited number of products coming
from the rest of the world proceeding as planned. The
intention is to decide on a common external tariff for
the automotive and sugar sectors some time in 1999.
It should be noted that in December 1997 the Common
Market Council authorized a 3% increase in the level
of the common tariff.198This measure was requested
by Brazil as a way of controlling its trade deficit and
was adopted on a temporary basis until the end of
1999.199The Council ruled that Bolivia and Chile, as
associate members of Mercosur, would not be affected
by this temporary increase in the common tariff.
Less progress has been made as regards non-tariff
measures and restrictions, which are the responsibility
of Technical Committee No. 7 of the Mercosur Trade
Commission.200 By way of illustration, a business
opinion poll carried out  in Brazil has  shown  that
bureaucracy is the main problem faced by Brazilian
companies in Mercosur (IDB/INTAL, 1998, p. 3).
There is also a great deal still to be done in order to
harmonize technical standards and apply sanitary and
phytosanitary provisions more transparently,
especially given the diversity of regulatory systems in
the member States.
Meanwhile, Mercosur has taken the first steps
towards preferential liberalization of trade in services.
In December 1997, at the Common Market Council
meeting held in Montevideo, the Governments signed
the Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services within
Mercosur, which establishes a transitional period of
10 years during which services transactions within the
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196 See “Inversión extranjera directa brasileña en Argentina” on the Website of the Production Research Centre (http://www.mecon.ar/cep), 14
August 1998. See also ECLAC, 1998e, pp. 120 to 123.
197 The adaptation regime, established by Decision No. 24 of 1994, granted the countries an additional period of four years to remove tariffs entirely
from certain products. The programme provides that full trade preference will be achieved in four annual stages of 25% each: Argentina and Brazil
have to apply this timetable between 1995 and 1999, while Paraguay and Uruguay are to do so between 1996 and 2000 (Izam, 1997, pp. 30 and 31).
198 Decision No. 15/1997.
199 The increase in the common external tariff was also intended to compensate Argentina for abolition of the statistical duty, application of which
had been objected to by WTO.
200 At the Montevideo meeting in December 1997, the Common Market Council established rules and procedures for harmonizing non-tariff
measures (Decision No. 17/1997).
group are to be liberalized by means of compulsory
annual negotiations in the Common Market Group
(see box VII.1). Subsequently, the fourteenth meeting
of the Common Market Council approved schedules
of specific commitments regarding the initial
measures to be taken by each country, in addition to
sectoral provisions relating to the movement of natural
persons providing services, financial services,
overland and maritime transport services and air
transport services.201At the fourteenth meeting of the
Common Market Council, the Services Group was set
up as an auxiliary body to the Common Market Group,
with responsibility for services.202
3. Regulatory aspects and formation of the common market
At its meeting in December 1997, the Common
Market Council approved common rules for  trade
protection against imports  from third countries,203
better specifications for rules of origin,204 and
regulations for a future common regime for the
automotive industry.205Progress was also made on the
institutional front as regards participation by Chile in
Mercosur meetings, and an ad hoc group with
responsibility for government procurement was set
up.206 Then, at its July 1998 meeting, the Common
Market Council approved the general principles of a
common system for government procurement of
goods and services,207among other items, and it was
agreed that a common policy for the automotive sector
was to enter into force at the beginning of the year
2000.208
4. Disputes settlement
At its twenty-ninth meeting, held in Buenos Aires
from 6 to 8 May 1998, the Common Market Group, in
addition to other business, considered a number of
complaints brought by countries under article 5 of the
annex to the Ouro Preto Protocol; no consensus was
achieved regarding a satisfactory solution however.209
These complaints included two that had been lodged
by Argentina, one against Brazil in relation to
subsidies for pork exports and another against Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay alleging non-compliance with
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201 Decision No. 9/1998.
202 Creation of the Services Group (Resolution No. 31/1998). The Services Group is to organize the annual rounds of negotiation on specific
undertakings and report regularly to the Common Market Group on progress made in negotiations concerning services.
203 Regulatory Framework for Common Rules on Protection against the Dumping of Imports from non-Mercosur Member Countries (Decision No.
11/1997).
204 Specific Rules of Origin (Decision No. 16/1997).
205 Decision No. 21/1997.
206 Decision No. 12/1997; Resolution No. 79/1997.
207 Guidelines for the Creation of a Government Goods and Services Procurement Regime in Mercosur (Resolution No. 34/1998).
208 Approval was given, among other things, for the Internal Regulations of the Common Market Council (Decision No. 2/1998); the Agreement
on Commercial Arbitration in Mercosur (Decision No. 3/1998); the Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration between Mercosur, the
Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile (Decision No. 4/1998); the Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Plan for Regional Security in Mercosur
(Decision No. 5/1998); and the Understanding regarding the Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Plan for Regional Security between Mercosur, the
Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile (Decision No. 6/1998).
209 In accordance with the Ouro Preto Protocol (an additional protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the institutional structure of Mercosur), in the
annex entitled “General procedures for complaints to the Mercosur Trade Commission”, article 2 (The State party bringing the complaint shall submit
it to the chairmanpro temporeof the Mercosur Trade Commission...) article 5. (If no agreement is reached at the first meeting referred to in article
4, the Mercosur Trade Commission shall submit the various proposals to the Common Market Group for its consideration together with the joint
opinion or the conclusions of the Technical Committee experts, so that a ruling may be issued on the matter).
Box VII.1
LIBERALIZATION OF INTRAREGIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES
Mercosur
At its December 1997 meeting, the Common Market
Council approved the Montevideo Protocol on trade in
services within Mercosur. This document  consists of
three parts: a general framework, annexes on specific
sectors and schedules of specific commitments made by
the States parties. At the July 1998 meeting, the annexes
on specific sectors were approved, as were the annexes
referring to the financial services sector, movement of
natural persons providing services, overland and
maritime transport services, and air transport services
(Decision No. 18/1998). The initial lists  of specific
commitments contain proposals by the four member
countries of Mercosur to liberalize certain services and
service sectors within the subregional scheme. The policy
agreed upon for compiling these lists was to build on the
proposals made by each State party within the framework
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
of WTO.
Although it was not possible to achieve far-reaching
liberalization of trade in services at this initial stage, the
States parties have made efforts to add new sectors to the
proposals they made in WTO. Argentina, for example,
broadened the coverage of  arrangements for certain
professional services, giving them  national  treatment
with a commercial presence. Brazil included architectural
and engineering services in its schedule and granted the
right of  establishment, but  made it  conditional  on a
consortium  being formed with a  Brazilian  company,
which must hold a controlling interest. Uruguay
expanded  on its information technology proposals in
respect of business services, and included certain
professional services such as accountancy, architecture
and engineering. In the telecommunications sector, for
which Uruguay did not make any proposals at WTO,
some services were included subject to the regulatory
restrictions obtaining in the country: voice mail,
electronic mail, access to databases and on-line
information retrieval, video-conferencing services and
personal, mobile, global and satellite communications
services. Paraguay, meanwhile, offered to make
commitments in connection with certain types of
insurance, deposit-taking and loans (with a commercial
presence), and tourism services.
Andean Community
In June 1998 the Commission of the Andean Community
approved Decision  439, which establishes a  general
framework of principles and regulations for liberalizing
trade in services within the Community. The objectives
of this decision include the abolition of measures that
restrict services transactions  within  the Community,
progress towards an Andean common market in services
and, in paral le l wi th th is, improvement and
diversi f icat ion of the supply of services and
harmonization of the sectoral policies of the different
countries. Decision 439  was adopted pursuant to the
mandate given to the Andean Community at the tenth
session of  the Andean Presidential Council,  held  in
Guayaquil in April 1998, with a view to the establishment
of a free market in services within the Community by the
year 2005 at the latest.
Decision 439 covers the same means of supply as were
established within the framework of the GATS and is
applicable to trade in services between member countries
in all sectors and to the different means of supply, except
for services provided by the public sector, government
procurement and air transport services. The principles on
which this liberalization process is based are those of
access to markets by any method of supply, most favoured
nation treatment, and national treatment. The decision
also contains agreements on transparency and on the
“binding” of the relevant rates. Provision is also made,
however, for member States to avail themselves of certain
exceptions. The timetable for the liberalization process
establishes that by 31 December 1999 at the latest the
Commission of the Andean Community must issue a
decision on the inventory  of measures used  by each
member country to restrict application of the principles
of market access and national treatment; these measures
will be lifted as the negotiating rounds proceed. It was
decided to begin the process by negotiating on financial
and telecommunications services within two months
following implementation of Decision 439.
124 ECLAC
their obligation to incorporate certain resolutions
previously adopted by the Common Market Group
into their national laws. These difficulties have
highlighted the need to set up a formal mechanism for
settling disputes within Mercosur.
5. Institutional and political aspects
In July 1998 the fourteenth meeting of the Common
Market Council was held in Ushuaia, Argentina. This
meeting, at which the rotating presidency of Mercosur
passed from Argentina to Brazil, was attended by the
Presidents of Bolivia and Chile in addition to those of
the Mercosur countries. It resulted in the signing of the
Ushuaia Protocol,210 which states that fu l ly
democratic rule is an essential precondition for
integration to proceed among the signatory countries
and sets out the procedures to be followed in the event
of a breakdown in democratic order. The Mercosur
Governments also reaffirmed their determination to
continue progressing towards completion of the
Customs Union and deals with issues ranging from
institutional improvements to matters relating to legal
security in the subregion.211
6. The external relations of Mercosur
One of the most rapidly evolving areas in the recent
development of Mercosur has been its relationship
with individual countries and groups  of countries
beyond its borders.  All negotiations  focus on the
conclusion of broad free trade agreements, with the
exception of the negotiations with Mexico, which are
restricted to a limited number of products and have not
made any substantial progress (see box VII.2).
Contacts with Panama have become closer, and
Nicaragua has stated its intention of signing a free
trade agreement with Mercosur.
In the  regional sphere, on  16 April 1998  the
Framework Agreement for the Creation of a Free
Trade Area between Mercosur and the Andean
Community was signed in Buenos Aires and will
begin to operate at the beginning of the year 2000.
Another agreement is scheduled to come into force on
1 October 1998 to replace existing tariff preferences,
which were established under bilateral agreements
signed between the member countries  of the  two
groups and form part of the legacy of  the  Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA). The
definitive free trade agreement, which will cover the
entire range of tariffs, was to be negotiated between
the beginning of October 1998 and 31 December 1999.
The negotiations, have proved to be longer and more
complex than anticipated, however, and the possibility
of a six-month extension (to 31 March 1999) for the
existing bilateral agreements is being considered.
Meanwhile, on 16 June 1998 an Understanding on
Cooperation in Trade and Investment and a Plan of
Action were signed between Mercosur and Canada
with a view to liberalizing trade and identifying
measures that impede or distort reciprocal flows of
trade and investment. Representatives of both parties
have formed a consultative group, which will meet at
least once a year to review and direct the process in
accordance with the guidelines set out in the Plan of
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210 Ushuaia Protocol on Commitment to Democracy in Mercosur, the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile.
211 Subsequently, at its thirtieth meeting held in Buenos Aires on 22 July 1998, the Common Market Group decided to set up a special meeting to
analyse the situation of women, taking into account the legislation in force in the States parties to Mercosur relating to the concept of equality of
opportunity, with the objective of contributing to the social, economic and cultural development of communities in the States parties to Mercosur
(Article 1 of resolution No. 20/1998).
Action. It is interesting to note that this plan deals,
among other points, with matters relating to
consultation and cooperation in areas of mutual
interest within the Cairns Group, WTO  and other
international forums and negotiations, among them
the negotiations to set up the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), in which Mercosur is an active
participant. Mercosur is taking part in these
negotiations as a bloc and is represented at  each
meeting by a spokesman appointed by the country
holding the presidencypro temporeat the time in
question.
The preparatory work for negotiations regarding
a free trade agreement with the European Union is
being carried out by Mercosur-European Union
working groups and an ad hoc Mercosur-European
Union external relations group. These negotiations are
to begin when the bi-regional presidential summit is
held in Brazil in June 1999. At the same time, closer
contacts are being pursued  with Australia,  China,
Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, the
Republic of Korea has asked Mercosur for a meeting
in the near future with a view to forging closer
economic ties.
B. ANDEAN COMMUNITY
1. Trade and investment within the Community
During 1997 intraregional exports resumed the strong
upward trend that had been interrupted in 1996. The
growth rate of around 13% recorded in 1997, while
more modest than the annual average for the first five
years of the decade, was still substantial considering
that Andean exports to the rest of the world grew by
Box VII.2
RELATIONS BETWEEN MERCOSUR AND MEXICO
Article 44 of the Treaty of Montevideo (1980), the
legal instrument that established the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA), states that any
advantages, favours, exemptions, immunities or
privileges granted by member countries to products
originating from any other member or non-member
country, or exported to any other member or
non-member country, by virtue of decisions or
agreements not included in the Treaty itself or in the
Cartagena Agreement, are to be immediately and
uncondit ionally extended to all other member
countries. In 1994, mainly as a result of the signing
by Mexico of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United
States, LAIA approved the Protocol of Interpretation
for article 44 of the Treaty of Montevideo and
Resolution 43 (I-E), which establishes the rules for
the transitional period that is to elapse before this
protocol comes into effect.
It should be noted that each of the member countries
of Mercosur had individual agreements with Mexico, and
these had to be revised and made applicable multilaterally
to Mercosur as a whole. Negotiations were held with
Mexico for this purpose; while those negotiations were
being pursued, the bilateral agreements were extended.
Thus, both the Economic Complementarity Agreement
No. 5 (Mexico and Uruguay) and the Partial Agreement
on Renegotiation No. 38 applying to the provisions of
previous agreements (Mexico and Paraguay) were to
remain in force until 31 December 1998. Meanwhile, the
preferences established in the  Partial Agreement on
Renegotiation No. 9 (Brazil and Mexico) expired on 31
December 1997. Finally, on 9 October 1998 the
Governments of Argentina and Mexico renewed
Addi t ional Protocol No. 13 to Economic
Complementarity Agreement No. 6, and extended
bilateral  tariff preferences up to 31 December 2001,
unless a complementarity agreement is established before
that date between Mercosur as a group and Mexico.
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less than 2%, which meant that the share of
intra-Community exports rose to some 12% of the
member countries’ total exports (see table VII.1). All
the member countries except Bolivia (whose exports
to the subregion fell by 7%) made a positive
contribution to this recovery, with intra-Community
export growth rates of 49% for Ecuador, 23% for Peru,
21% for Venezuela and 15% for Colombia.
Nonetheless, bilateral trade between Colombia and
Venezuela still dominates trade within the subregion.
According to the projections of the General
Secretariat of the Andean Community, in 1998 trade
within the Community may well have continued to
grow faster than total exports, as it is expected that the
exports of all the countries may have fallen
substantially due to the drop in oil prices (Andean
Community, 1998c).
Between 1990 and 1997, the annual flow of
foreign direct investment into the countries of the
Andean Community rose from US$ 1.14 billion to
around US$ 9.8 billion, with a total FDI stock for the
period of US$ 36 billion.212 Thus far, the main
attractions for foreign investors have been the
countr ies’ l iberal izat ion programmes, the
deregulat ion of their economies, and their
privatization processes.  It  is,  however,  difficult  to
quantify the impact that the integration process has had
on flows of capital into the countries; it has even been
suggested that large foreign  investments  could  be
helping to return these economies to a position of
dependence on primary commodities, rather than
help ing to strengthen and diversi fy their
manufacturing  sector (Heirman and  Mattos,  1998,
pp. 6-8).
Intra-Community investment accounts for a very
small proportion of total investment, with a sum total
of around US$ 720 million up to 1996, and has been
channelled into different sectors from those chosen by
investors from outside the subregion. Another
distinguishing feature of intra-Community investment
is its geographical distribution, as almost 66% of it has
been between Colombia and Venezuela and another
20% between Colombia and Ecuador, while 8% is
accounted for by Ecuadorian investments in
Venezuela (Garay and Vera, 1997, pp. 16 and 17).
2. Market access and trade facilitation measures
Since the end of January 1993, a free trade area with
no exemptions has been in operation among Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, Peru
has been gradually reintegrating itself into the Andean
free trade area through a tariff rollback programme
that began at the end of August 1997 and is due to be
completed by the end of 2005.213 According to the
agreed timetable, three quarters of all Peruvian tariff
items were to have been liberalized by mid-1998.
The common external tariff of the Community is
applied by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela
to a large number of sub-items, although Ecuador is
authorized to maintain a difference of five points over
the common levels for 930 sub-items. The lists of
exceptions to the common external tariff have been
shortened each year and were to have been done away
with altogether by 1 February 1999 (Decision 370).
Bolivia receives special treatment, but may not alter
its tariffs unilaterally. Peru is to come into the common
tariff mechanism  at an earlier date than had been
thought last year.
The customs union now being formed already has
a number of complementary instruments for
regulating the internal Andean market that were
approved in previous periods. These are the
Community Nomenclature and Customs Valuation,
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Rules of Origin (Decision 293), Technical
Regulations (Decision 376), Rules on Dumping and
Subsidies (Decision 283),  and Rules on Practices
Restricting Free Competition (Decision 285).214
The  Andean Community also has an  Andean
Common Agricultural  Policy (PACA), which has
been evolving over the years and is now constituted
basically by the Andean Agricultural Health System,
the Andean System of Price Bands and the system of
Agricultural Indicators  (IASA). The first of  these
systems sets out common phytosanitary standards for
31 products which together represent 60% of
intra-Community trade in agricultural products,
measured by value, and animal health standards
covering almost all the trade conducted in livestock
and livestock products. The objective of the second
system is to stabilize the cost of importing a number
of agricultural products that are subject to
considerable instability or serious distortions on the
international market. The price system is considered
to have made a substantial contribution to reducing the
cost of importing a number of key products such as
wheat, maize, barley and soya. Finally, the IASA
system makes it easier to harmonize agricultural
policies and facilitates negotiations with other
countries and regions (Andean Community, 1997b).
Furthermore, the Andean integration process is
moving into new areas, as is demonstrated by the
recent approval of a general framework of principles
and rules for the progressive liberalization of trade in
services within the subregion, with the ultimate aim of
this framework being to establish a common Andean
market in services by 2005. The agreement covers all
forms of service provision, adopts the most favoured
nation and national treatment principles, and requires
the Governments to engage in annual negotiations
aimed at gradually eliminating any restrictions that are
contrary to these principles (Andean Community,
1998a) (see box VII.1).
3. Institutional and political aspects
On 1 August  1997 the General  Secretariat  of  the
Andean Community took over the functions of the
Board of the Cartagena Agreement. Implementation
of decisions taken by the two highest bodies of the
Community, the Andean Presidential Council and the
Andean Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, is
now centralized in the General  Secretariat,  which
serves as the Community’s sole executing agency. The
Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is
assisted by a number of Directors General with
responsibilities in particular subject areas, whereas the
Board was headed by a three-member committee.
The main function of the Andean Presidential
Council is to define and give direction to integration
policies, while the task of the Council of Ministers is
to formulate and apply the foreign policy of the
Community. Previously, the role of the Commission
of the Andean Community was limited to formulating,
implementing and evaluating the trade and investment
policies of the Community. To sum up, the task of
managing the integration process has been transferred
to the highest political authorities, while the Secretary
General has technical, legal and political powers that
enable him to act as the political spokesman for the
Andean Community (Andean Community, 1997a).
This arrangement is the culmination of an
institutional reform process begun at the eighth
session of the Presidential Council in Trujillo in March
1996, the purpose of which was to provide the
Community with the mechanisms it needs to cope with
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in 1994.
the challenges posed by the current stage  of  the
integration process. These mechanisms include
measures for consolidating the internal market,
broadening and improving external relations and
promoting integration in new areas. The Community
is following a strategy of prior coordination among its
members, and this is enabling it to establish common
positions in a number of external negotiating forums,
such as Mercosur and FTAA.
In addition, the concluding statement issued at the
tenth session of the Andean Presidential Council, held
in Guayaquil in April 1998, noted the desire of the
governments to harmonize macroeconomic policies.
The Presidents instructed the Advisory Council of
Ministers of Finance, presidents of central banks and
economic planners to “work for greater coordination
and convergence among the macroeconomic policies
of the member countries...(and) draw up an
agenda...setting forth the policy harmonization
objectives to be attained in this area” (Andean
Community, 1998b).215
At a special session held in Bogotá on 7 August
1998, the Andean  Presidential Council  signed the
Andean Community’s  Commitment  to  Democracy
and gave the Andean Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs the responsibility of preparing a draft protocol
establishing the measures to be taken “by the Andean
countries in the event of a breakdown in the
democratic order of a member country”.
4. The external relations of the Community
At the ninth session of the Andean Presidential
Council (Sucre,  April 1997),  guidelines  were laid
down for  negotiating a  free  trade agreement with
Mercosur. At that meeting, the Presidents expressed a
desire for these negotiations to be concluded before
the end of 1997. As has already been noted, however,
the  negotiations proved to be more difficult than
expected, and the parties were unable to reach an
agreement by that deadline due to disagreements on
issues such as treatment of the agricultural and
automotive sectors, rules of origin and the
establishment of a mechanism for settling disputes.
The tenth meeting of the Presidential Council, held in
Guayaquil, instructed the Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs to complete the preparation of a
framework agreement and have it ready for signing on
16 April 1998. The agreement was indeed signed on
the date set, in Buenos Aires, just two days before the
opening of the Second Summit of the Americas in
Santiago, Chile. Under this agreement, the two parties
–the Andean Community and Mercosur– undertook to
complete the renegotiation of pre-existing agreements
before the end of September 1998, so that they could
be implemented as of 1 October of that year.216
At the last meeting, which was held in
Montevideo on 6 November 1998, the Ministers of the
Mercosur Council and the Ministers of the
Commission of the Andean Community agreed upon
a number of directives designed to permit the
completion by 31 March 1999 of the first stage of
negotiation provided for by the framework agreement
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215 The Advisory Council had met for the first time on 2 and 3 March 1998 to analyse the advantages of coordination and discuss what could be
achieved in this area, basing these discussions on technical documents produced for this purpose. These documents identified the establishment of
stabilization funds for commodities, application of a counter-cyclical tax policy and a more active exchange rate policy as areas in which coordinated
action could be taken.
216 These past agreements are bilateral pacts signed by the countries of the two regional groupings within the framework of LAIA. In addition to
expanding and diversifying trade, the negotiations have the objective of creating a legal and institutional framework for cooperation and integration
with a view to developing this wider economic area; developing and utilizing physical infrastructure and creating integration corridors; promting
and stimulating reciprocal investment; furthering economic, energy, scientific and technological complementarity and cooperation; and reaching
coordinated positions on hemispheric integration and in multilateral forums generally.
for the creation of a free trade area between Mercosur
and the Andean Community.217
The Community has begun talks with Caricom,
CACM, Canada and Panama with the aim of
negotiating free trade agreements. During the Summit
of the Americas in April 1998, contacts with Panama
developed to the stage where a general framework was
agreed upon for further negotiations on a free trade
treaty.
The  Andean  Community has also participated
actively in the preparatory work and ongoing
negotiations of the FTAA, with the member countries
acting as a bloc at the meetings of the negotiating
teams. Three Andean countries have been selected to
chair different negotiating teams up to October 1999
(Colombia: market access; Peru: competition policies;
and Venezuela: intellectual property).
The Community’s relationship with the European
Union is based on the Third Generation Framework
Agreement on Cooperation, signed in 1993, and on the
Joint Declaration of Rome  (June 1996).  The  two
parties have pledged themselves to cooperate with one
another, particularly in the sphere of economic
integration, and to institutionalize political dialogue
by holding regular meetings at different levels.
Accordingly, on 12 February 1998 the foreign
ministers of the member countries of the two
groupings met in Panama for the Eighth
Institutionalized Meeting of  Ministers  for Foreign
Affairs of the Rio Group and the European Union.218
C. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM) 219
1. Trade within the CACM area
In 1997, trade within the CACM area grew by 18% in
current values, a slightly lower rate than for  the
member countries’ total exports (19.5%). The
percentage of total exports accounted for by exports
within the area therefore remained stable, at 21%,
which is roughly the same proportion as has been
recorded ever since 1992 (see table VII.1).
Intra-CACM trade continued to be affected by certain
structural weaknesses, including the very limited
participation of Honduras and Nicaragua, the large
deficits that these countries tend to have with other
members, and the high degree to which trade is
concentrated in final consumer products and some
light manufactures.220
2. Institutional and political aspects
At the Nineteenth Summit of Central American
Presidents, which was held in Panama City on 12 July
1997, major decisions were taken with the objective
of rationalizing and strengthening the institutional
structure of CACM. Presidential meetings became the
highest authority for taking political decisions and
setting strategy. Subsequently, at a special meeting
held in Managua on 2 September 1997, the Presidents
decided to move towards an economic and political
union with the objective of contributing to the
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218 The Andean countries are beneficiaries of the Special System of Preferences granted by the European Union to support the efforts of these
countries in combating drug production and trafficking. This system has already produced tangible results in the form of export growth.
219 This section is largely based on ECLAC (1998f).
220 Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala account for 90% of exports within the area and 70% of imports from within the area. The main
manufactures traded are chemical products, food, beverages and tobacco.
economic development of member countries and
reinforcing democratic institutions in the region. To
this end a high-level group was established to draw up
the articles of agreement for a Central American union.
Among the reorganizational measures that were
approved, particular mention should be made of the
decision to consolidate the existing secretariats into a
single General Secretariat for the Central American
Integration System (SICA), with its headquarters in El
Salvador. The Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs is responsible for coordinating SICA, which
has brought together the Secretariat for Social
Integration (formerly in Panama), the Secretariat for
the Integration of Tourism in Central America, or
SITCA (previously in Managua) and the Central
American Commission on Environment and
Development (CACED).221
3. Market access and trade facilitation measures
In 1997 the member countries opened their economies
still further to international trade by progressively
reducing tariffs, although they did lag somewhat
behind the timetable for tariff reduction adopted in
September 1996. Under the programme, tariffs are
gradually to be brought down to match the common
external tariff of CACM, which has four final tariff
levels: 0% for raw materials, intermediate goods and
capital goods when the same goods are not produced
in the subregion; 5% for raw materials competing with
those produced in the subregion; 10% for intermediate
goods and capital goods competing with goods
produced there; and 15% for finished products.222On
6 June  1997,  the Deputy Ministers  for  Economic
Affairs agreed to extend the tariff reduction period by
five years in order to give some sensitive sectors time
to adjust to the new conditions of international
competition.223As a result, the deadline for alignment
with the common external tariff was put back to 2005.
According to information from SIECA, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua were maintaining
a tariff of 0% on capital goods and raw materials, while
Costa Rica and Honduras applied a tariff of 1%, thus
complying with the agreed tariff reduction timetable.
All the countries have adopted tariff reduction
timetables for intermediate tariffs and tariff ceilings
except Costa Rica, which has suspended application
of its reduction programme (SIECA, 1998).
Other steps favourable to  the development  of
trade within the area were also taken during 1997.
Almost all tariffs applying to inter-CACM trade in
agricultural products were eliminated, the use of
safeguard clauses was reduced,224 and virtually all
limitations on currency trading and import payments
were lifted.
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221 As of November 1998 the proposed merger still had not taken place, and the Secretariat for Economic Integration (SIECA), formerly known as
the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, is still responsible for the economic side of CACM.
222 For information on the tariff reduction timetable, see ECLAC, 1997a, table V.2, p. 118.
223 These sensitive products include certain textile products, tyres, milk, potatoes and onions.
224 The Central American Regulations on Safeguards were approved in July 1996. These measures may be applied only to imports from third
countries. The safeguard clauses were renewed at the end of 1996 until mid-1997, and were then renewed again, up to 31 December 1998. The
Regulations are currently being revised to bring them into line with WTO rules.
4. Regulatory aspects
On 1 January  1997 the  countries  commenced  the
implementation  of the new version of the Central
American Tariff System (SAC), which includes the
second amendment to the Harmonized System.
Customs authorities approved draft legislation for
Central America on the customs valuation of goods,
under which the procedures to be used in
implementing the agreement on the application of
article VII of GATT would be harmonized across the
region (SIECA, 1998).
SIECA is drafting regulations for Central
America covering trade in services with a view to
bringing about a gradual liberalization of this trade
among member countries; these regulations will also
establish the parameters for negotiations on this
subject with countries outside the subregion.225
However,  the preliminary draft of regulations  for
Central America on administrative procedures  for
settling intraregional trade disputes has not yet been
approved.
5. The external relations of CACM
At their second special meeting, held in Santo
Domingo between 5 and 7 November 1997, the
Central American Presidents and the President of the
Dominican Republic reached agreement on the
procedures for negotiating a  free trade  agreement
between CACM and the Dominican Republic. This
agreement, which was then signed on 16 April 1998,
is a broad one which not only includes virtually the
whole gamut of merchandise tariff items,226but also
deals with other major issues, such as trade in services,
reciprocal investments, intellectual property,
competition policy and dispute settlement. The treaty
is to come into effect in 1999, although some matters
are still pending, such as the final list of products to be
excluded from the treaty.
On 18 September 1997, meanwhile, Nicaragua
signed a  free trade  agreement with Mexico. This
agreement provides immediate access to the Mexican
market for 77% of Nicaragua’s exports and to the
Nicaraguan market for 45% of Mexico’s exports to
that country. Tariffs on the remaining categories will
be removed within a period of 10 years in the first case
and 15 years in the second. Costa Rica and Mexico
already have a similar free trade agreement, which has
been in operation since 1 January 1995. Since the third
meeting of the Presidents of Central America and
Mexico (Tuxtla III, held in San Salvador in July 1998),
renewed efforts have been made to conclude another
agreement between Mexico and the three  Central
American countries that together form what is known
as the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras).
The countries of Central America, acting as a
group, are also currently negotiating free trade treaties
with Chile and Panama. During their nineteenth
summit meeting, the six Presidents finalized a
framework agreement which recognizes the need to
liberalize trade flows, promote reciprocal investment
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225 The procedure for taking compensatory and anti-dumping measures is set forth in the Central American Regulations on Unfair Trade Practices,
which was approved on 12 December 1995.
226 The treaty between CACM and the Dominican Republic, which was to como into force on 1 January 1999, provides for reciprocal free trade
immediately and covers virtually all tariffs, provided that products are in compliance with the rules of origin stipulated in the agreement. The few
exceptions to the free trade rule had to be negotiated within 120 days following the signing of the agreement and would then be subject to progressive
tariff reductions, with complete free trade to be achieved in 2004.
and promote cooperation among CACM, Chile and
Panama.227
Relations with countries outside the area have also
been very dynamic. For example, the dialogue
conducted with the European Union in the context of
what is known as the San José process has sustained a
high degree  of  cooperation and has  permitted the
continued application of previously agreed tariff
preferences, although the Central American countries
have expressed  an interest  in  progressing towards
more comprehensive agreements on financial  and
trade issues.
D. THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
The Caribbean Community (Caricom) and the
Caribbean Common Market are the result of 15 years
of efforts to achieve subregional integration, a process
that began in 1958 with the creation of the British
Federation of the West Indies, which lasted only four
years. In December 1965 the Caribbean Free Trade
Association (Carifta) was  created, the participants
being Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago. Caricom was established by the
Treaty of Chaguaramas, which was signed by
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago
and entered into effect on 1 August 1973.228
The Caribbean Common Market was created on
the basis of a common policy of protection, with high
tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports from third
countries. The explicit objectives  of the  Common
Market are: (i) to protect the industrial and agricultural
output of the subregion; (ii) to support the
development of international ly competit ive
production activities in the common market; (iii) to
simplify the tariff structure; and (iv) to  stimulate
competition within the subregion. Later, in 1993, a
new programme for the common external tariff was
devised, whereby the Governments of the member
countries, while recognizing the need to increase the
international competitiveness of their economies,
made known their concern about the adverse impact
which economic liberalization could have on
employment and the public finances.
At the tenth Conference of Heads of Government
of Caricom, held in Grand Anse, Grenada, in July
1989, the Heads of Government stated their intention
of creating a single economy and market within a short
time period. The first steps that would need to be taken
towards this objective were the establishment of four
basic  freedoms  (free  trade  in goods, free trade in
services, free movement of people and free movement
of capital) and harmonization of the macroeconomic
policies of member States. At the eleventh conference,
held in Kingston in August 1990, the Heads of
Government, after reviewing the progress made,
decided to extend the deadlines within which the basic
instruments for creating a common market were
supposed to be in operation. These instruments
included the common external tariff, with the
scheduled reductions in tariff rates to be completed by
the end of 1998.229
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227 During the first negotiating session between the Central American and Chilean delegations (Miami, September 1998) and at the negotiating
session between Central America and Panama (Panama City, 17 and 18 September 1998), there was an exchange of general information about the
national legislation of each of the countries as it applied to the subjects under negotiation, and the proposals submitted by the parties involved were
explored and commented upon.
228 Other Caribbean countries subsequently joined Caricom (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). The Bahamas became the thirteenth member in 1983 and Suriname the fourteenth in 1995 (see the
history of Caricom on the Caricom Website http://www.caricom.org). The Caribbean Common Market was also created in 1973 under the terms of
an agreement annexed to the Treaty of Chaguaramas.
229 For the tariff reduction timetable, see ECLAC, 1997a, table V.3, p. 122.
1. Trade within the Community
The main exports of the Caricom member countries
are commodities such as hydrocarbons and sugar in
the  case of Trinidad  and Tobago, aluminium and
bauxite in the case of Guyana and Jamaica,  and
bananas in the  case of the smaller  countries (see
chapter III). Exports of commercial services, among
which tourism is a prime example, generally account
for a substantial proportion of export earnings
(ECLAC, 1997a, table VIII.2, p. 153). The smaller and
less developed countries also receive significant
amounts of financial aid from abroad.
By contrast, trade within the Community includes
a higher proportion  of light  manufactures,  among
them prepared foods, since these products enjoy an
appreciable margin of preference in the Community
market. Three quarters of intra-Community exports
come from the four most highly developed countries:
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago.230
Thanks to the progress made in integrating the
Community market and the gradual opening of these
economies in general, trade within the Community
recovered substantially in the first half of the 1990s.
Data from the Caricom Secretariat show growth in
intraregional trade, due mainly to transactions
between the more highly developed countries
(Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad
and Tobago).
2. Market access and trade facilitation measures
Most non-tariff restrictions have been lifted, but a
number of countries still apply restrictive licensing
arrangements and import quotas, particularly to
regulate the entry of agricultural products and
beverages which compete with local products
(Caricom, 1997a). Likewise, countries such as the
Bahamas, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines apply stamp taxes, while others such as
Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados, as well as
Dominica, impose import surcharges which  range
from 3% to 10% of the c.i.f, value. The fourth and final
stage in the programme of reductions and convergence
towards the common external tariff should essentially
be completed by the end of 1998, with the exception
of Belize, which has been given up to the year 2000.
As of mid-1998, however, only Barbados, Saint Kitts,
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had
implemented this final stage.
The tariffs applied to foreign trade are still a major
source of public revenue, especially for the smaller
countries, where they may account for almost half of
total current revenue (ECLAC, 1997a, pp. 125-130).
The Caricom Secretariat is carrying out studies to
ascertain the extent to which tariff reductions will
affect the tax revenues of member countries, so that
the common external tariff may be applied without
delay.
Since 1989 Caricom has been working to promote
the free movement of labour within the subregion. As
of mid-1997, 8 of the 14 member countries accepted
travel documents other than passports  (Barbados,
Dominica,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Jamaica,  Montserrat,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, and  Saint  Vincent and  the
Grenadines). Seven countries also have legislation that
enables university graduates to practise their
profession within the subregion without having to
obtain work permits (Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Trinidad and Tobago). This right will soon be
extended to artists, athletes and members of the media
(Caricom, 1997a).
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The efforts being made to establish and refine the
design of the single market and economy include the
negotiation of a number of protocols, to be
implemented by the year 2000, which represent a
genuine reform of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The
first of these, which provides for restructuring the
organizations and institutions of Caricom, came into
provisional effect on 1 July 1997. This was also done
in the case of Protocol II, which deals with the
provision of services, the right of establishment and
capital movements.
During the nineteenth Conference of Heads of
Government, which was held in Saint Lucia from 30
June to 4 July 1998, and which celebrated the
organization’s twenty-fifth anniversary, Protocol III,
dealing with industrial policy, and Protocol V, relating
to the agricultural policy of the Community, were
signed.231The countries have not yet, however, been
able to harmonize their treatment of foreign
investments, competition policy or intellectual
property protection (Caricom, 1998).232
3. The external relations of Caricom
During the Second Summit of the Americas, held in
Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, the Caricom Bureau
formulated a number of recommendations for
conducting negotiations jointly with third countries by
means of what is known as regional negotiating
machinery.233 Caricom successfully completed
negotiations to extend its economic and trade
agreement with Colombia, and this was signed on 1
June 1998 by the Governments of Colombia and of the
States members of Caricom. Joint negotiations with
the Dominican Republic have also recently been
brought to a successful conclusion with the signing on
22 August 1998 of a framework agreement on free
trade which entered into effect on 1 January 1999 and
should be fully operative by 2005. Likewise, the Joint
Caricom-Cuba Commission, which was set up in 1993
to hold discussions on promoting trade and mutual
cooperation, has met on a number of occasions
(Caricom, 1997b).
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231 Protocol IV, dealing with trade liberalization, is to be ready for signing at the tenth inter-sessional meeting.
232 Protocol VI provides for a common policy on international transport; Protocol VII deals with the issues facing disadvantaged countries, regions
and sectors; Protocol VIII covers the dispute settlement mechanism; and Protocol IX concerns protection against competition. The Heads of
Government have also accepted in principle an agreement to set up a Caribbean supreme court. Some countries still have difficulties in accepting the
appeal function of the Court, however, due to differences in their legal structures.
233 The Bureau is a consultative group which was set up in 1992, its members being the current chairperson of the Conference of Heads of
Government, the preceding chairperson and the chairperson-elect. The function of this body is to consider more urgent matters in advance of regular
sessions of the Conference and formulate proposals regarding these issues.
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Chapter VIII
TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES SINCE THE URUGUAY ROUND:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES
OF EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 234
Introduction
Economic literature in recent decades has helped to
disseminate information on the economic policy
successes achieved by the Governments of East Asia,
which have enabled them to correct various market
failures, thereby speeding up the process of capital
accumulation, technical progress and structural
transformation of the economy. In other words, State
intervention has resulted in a higher level of economic
growth than could have been achieved  through a
policy of laissez-faire. For this and other reasons, the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have
turned their attention to East Asia in an attempt to draw
lessons from that region’s experience.
However, following the financial crisis that swept
through the economies of East Asia, radical changes
have had to be introduced  in the  regulations  that
protected various of its markets from international
competition. In particular, countries that have had to
resort to borrowing from multilateral financial
agencies will have to speed up the process of
deregulation and liberalization of product and factor
markets in order to comply with the conditions laid
down by those agencies.
Moreover, other factors make it less likely that
selective industrial and trade policies similar to those
applied successfully in East Asia can be adopted
elsewhere. First, globalization of markets is forcing
national companies to engage in intense competition
both internally and externally, and the rules of this
competition are dictated by the big transnational
corporations. As a result of the globalization of
production and finance, there is an increasing
tendency within the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and other negotiating forums to work towards
harmonization of national policies and standards
based on multilaterally agreed criteria. Moreover,
neither the new multilaterally negotiated disciplines
emerging from the Uruguay Round nor those arising
from plurilateral, subregional, regional or hemispheric
agreements would  allow the adoption  of  selective
industrial and trade policies that are as far-reaching as
those applied in the past in the East-Asian countries.
The new round of multilateral trade negotiations
scheduled  to start  towards the end  of  1999 could
impose even greater restrictions on selective policies.
And even if that round were not to take place, WTO
member countries have already committed themselves
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234 This chapter is based on the summary document of the project, “Comparative study of development strategies of selected East Asian and Latin
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Trade Unit of ECLAC under the direction of Mikio Kuwayama (ECLAC, 1998). Six comparative studies were conducted on the following countries:
Argentina (Casaburi, 1997); Brazil (Delorme Prado, 1998); Chile (Agosin, 1997); Indonesia (Nasution, 1998); Malaysia (Zainal-Abidin, 1998), and
Republic of Korea (Yeom, 1998).
to engaging in dialogues by the year 2000 on
disciplines still pending in relation to the protection of
intellectual property rights and further liberalization
of trade in agricultural products and in services.
Similarly, WTO will need to examine the progress
achieved by the working groups set up in 1996 on trade
and investment, competition policy and public-sector
purchases.
Nevertheless,  many analysts consider  that the
room for manoeuvre that Governments have enjoyed
with respect to their policies is by no means a thing of
the past.235 Developing countries should strive to
strengthen policy measures, consistent with the
standards established in the Uruguay Round and other
international agreements, designed to improve their
endogenous capacity. The experiences of the six
countries examined in this chapter may give an idea of
ways of designing and administering such measures.
A. THE ENDOGENOUS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
State intervention in the structure of incentives for
private agents is justifiable, affirm its advocates, on
the grounds of externalities and failures existing in
product, labour, capital and information markets. With
respect to the labour market, for example, although
many skills are only acquired with practice,
companies do not  invest sufficiently in  personnel
training because of high staff turnover. On product
markets, companies that experiment with new
technologies or new markets provide valuable
information to the rest and when they are successful
may be imitated. These externalities, related to
information and technology, are not easy to internalize
within the company, so that the associated benefits
cannot be appropriated individually. Moreover, in the
absence, for example, of developed capital markets, it
is highly unlikely that the financial market will yield
very favourable results in terms of financial
intermediation, especially as regards long-term
investments or channelling of loans  to small and
medium-sized companies. Nevertheless, it has been
shown that trade policy is not the most appropriate
mechanism for correcting factor and capital market
distortions. The problems mentioned should be
tackled at the root.
Recent growth theory emphasizes investment in
human capital and in technology as the main growth
factors over the long term. The argument is that capital
stock is a composite good, in which the knowledge
component yields increasing returns to scale  that
offset the diminishing returns of physical capital stock.
This has two  consequences: on the one hand, the
incentive for capital accumulation can persist
indefinitely, and, on the other, technological change
becomes an endogenously determined input.
Therefore, public policy should, justifiably, be geared
towards the development of those sectors that lead,
separately or simultaneously, to the creation or
assimilation of knowledge.
New theories on international trade also
emphasize dynamic externalities, both internal and
external to the company. According to these theories,
the increase in productivity is considered to be the
outcome of a gradual, long-term process of
learning-by-doing based on the assimilation of past
and recent experiences with  production. However,
some sectors display a greater capacity for
technological innovation, while others are strategic
sectors which transmit strong externalities to the rest
of the economy. Public policies should therefore
promote the development of those industries believed
to hold great potential, subject to rigorous selection
criteria and relevant incentives offered for a limited
time only and on the basis of actual performance.
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Various experiences in this regard point to the
conclusion that success in the application of such
policies depends on the existence of certain conditions
at the national level, in particular a favourable
macroeconomic context, an adequate physical
infrastructure, a literate and skilled labour force and
an institutional framework which ensures  the  full
operation of the production and financial systems. In
addition, the support provided by the State in the area
of productive development should guarantee the
systemic competitiveness of the economy as a whole.
It is also possible that policies designed to correct
some market failures may not be selective but
horizontal or neutral. For example, exports give rise to
important externalities when they comply with
international market standards, specifications relating
to product quality and objectives relating to
distribution and marketing, externalities which, once
achieved, can be extended to other products  and
processes.  In this regard, integration  in  the  world
economy can be conceived of as a public good. As far
as imports are concerned, the externalities have to do
with the learning opportunities provided by the
importation of capital goods and intermediate goods
with embodied technology (Bradford, 1991, p. 99).
The public sector’s capacity to provide credit and
sufficient trade guarantees can be decisive in
correcting capital market failures. If external trade is
to function as a cumulative process of learning and
technology absorption, both for entrepreneurs and for
the country as a whole, it would be advisable for the
State to lend support to the private sector while
ensuring that the country’s integration in the global
economy satisfies the criteria of a public good.
The distinction between selective and horizontal
policies is not always clear. When a selective policy is
applied to a group of economic activities and not to a
given company or sector, this distinction becomes
blurred. For example, selective policies have been
applied to the promotion of industrial complexes,
technological parks or resource-based production
complexes (clusters). Economic incentives for
creating broad backward and forward linkages may be
highly selective or may encompass a whole range of
productive activities. Moreover, inasmuch as the
selective policies seek to identify the most promising
area or even to constitute it, horizontal policies are
usually applied on a selective basis.236
B. EVALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICIES
APPLIED IN THE PAST
1. Export-led growth or growth-led exports?
The controversy over the causal relationship between
growth and exports (that  is,  export-led  growth as
opposed to growth-led exports) is a complex issue that
is far from resolved.237However, depending on which
of these two hypotheses is correct, the implications
will be significant for public policy. If the key to
growth lies in the second hypothesis, that is, in the
accumulation of physical and human capital and
tech-nological transformation, it will be worthwhile to
gear policy towards promoting these factors. If, on the
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237 Since exports are included in GDP, an increase in exports automatically affects the GDP growth rate, without there necessarily entering into
play any specific causal relationship. By the same token, there is no reason why an export orientation should result in greater investments. In many
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other hand, the key lies in the first, policies should be
applied that stimulate export expansion and
diversification.
Some analysts have stressed the importance of
exports as an engine of growth.238According to this
model, using trade liberalization to harmonize
domestic  prices  with world  market  prices implies
efficient use of domestic resources since it reduces the
cost of imports, thus releasing resources for producing
and purchasing national products and generating
tradable goods. Therefore,  if the  purpose of trade
pol icy reform is   to achieve international
competitiveness, the economy can respond to external
demand by setting appropriate prices. Reform could
include liberalization of the import regime, unification
of the exchange rate, together with devaluation, and
various other measures designed to boost  exports
(particularly tax refunds) in order to counter  the
anti-export bias. As a result, in a context of
macroeconomic stability, exports should lead to
specialization of the economy based on comparative
advantages and give rise to an increase in earnings,
investment, savings and productivity.
Exports are justifiable,inter alia, on the grounds
that they lead to improvements in efficiency and
increases in productivity. In practice, however, what
prompts developing countries to export is, above all,
the need to overcome balance-of-payments
constraints. While capital flows can be used
temporarily to finance imports, a vigorous increase in
exports is needed to maintain high growth rates.
Another link between exports and growth is market
size: access to world markets enables the economy to
achieve minimum production scale. Moreover,
exports provide a range of externalities that arise at the
industry level, such as economies of specialization and
agglomeration.
Other analysts claim that development is
investment-driven.239According to this paradigm, the
chain of causality begins with investment, which
raises the rate of structural transformation and
productivity  improvement, factors which, for their
part, lead to expansion of  exports  and supply-led
international competitiveness. When the rate of
investment is high, the return does not necessarily
decline. On the contrary, if technological change is
built into new capital goods, high rates of investment
speed up technological progress, intensify practical
learning and give rise to a virtuous circle of greater
competitiveness and more dynamic economic growth.
As cautioned in box VIII-1, there are different views
with respect to the causal relationship between growth
and exports.
The recent  experiences of East Asia seem to
indicate that in those countries, it has become more
difficult to channel investments into productive uses.
This was predicted by Krugman (1994), who claimed
that economic growth in East Asia could be attributed
simply to accumulation of capital and labour and not
to any increase in productivity, a situation that would
inevitably result in diminishing returns on both
factors, ultimately leading to a slowdown in growth.
The problem could also be due to  the  quality of
investment, much of which is geared to the
non-tradables sectors, which yield low returns, rather
than towards productive sectors. It may also be
inferred that accessibility to foreign capital together
with a more liberal and permissive financial
framework lacking appropriate regulation and control
will lead the private sector to invest and become too
heavily indebted, causing the formation of speculative
bubbles on real estate and stock markets (ECLAC,
1998, p. 16). Excessive lending by financial
intermediaries caused inflation not as a result of price
rises for securities rather than of products. When the
bubble burst, the resulting fall in the price of stocks
proved that the intermediaries were  insolvent and
obliged them to suspend operations, forcing down
further the price  of  stocks  (Krugman, 1998a and
1998b).
140 ECLAC
238 See, for example, Krueger (1985); World Bank (1987).
239 Rodrik (1995); Singh (1995); UNCTAD (1994); Akyüz and Gore (1994).
Box VIII-1
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROWTH AND EXPORTS
Brazil, according to Delorme Prado (1998), is an example
of a country where exports are “growth-led”, since the
main factors contributing to growth are domestic
variables, while exports are necessary to generate the
foreign exchange required for importing essential capital
goods, services and technology. For a country with a vast
domestic market like Brazil’s, the normal tendency, he
claims, is to adopt a growth-based model. Recent events
in some large economies, such as the United States and
the People’s Republic of China, where growth during the
last few years has been export-driven, show that the
author’s thesis is more limited in application.
Agosin, on the other hand, in his analysis of Chile
(Agosin, 1997), maintains that, while both exports and
investment are significant factors in the country’s steady
long-term GDP growth,  Chile’s  situation, especially
since the mid-1980s, is best explained by the hypothesis
of export-led growth.  However, he  cautions that  the
second phase  of the  development  strategy based  on
exports will be more problematic, since the country will
be obliged to diversify its  exports to include more
processed goods, instead of just basic commodities.
According to Zainal-Abidin (1998), growth in
Malaysia, depending on the stage of economic
development involved, has been alternately export-led or
investment-driven. Initially, exports were a source of
growth, since they generated income, diversified and
intensified industrial activity and created employment.
Beginning in 1980, investment, first in the public sector
(1980-1985) and then in the private sector, assumed this
role; this phase was accompanied by large inflows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and an intense wave of
privatization. Major investments were channelled
towards expenditure on machinery and equipment in the
manufacturing sector, which, in Malaysia, is very much
export-oriented. When the accumulation of human
capital and technological innovation occur in the export
sector, the distinction between the two models may be
less obvious.
In his study on Indonesia, Nasution (1998) states that
the country adopted a highly outward-oriented
industrialization strategy based on  the expansion  of
exports. A substantial  portion  of the  investment was
channelled into export-based manufacturing industries,
and FDI also helped to stimulate export-based economic
growth. As in the case of Malaysia, when most of the
investment and related technological innovation occur in
the export sector, the distinction between the two models
tends to become blurred.
According to Casaburi (1997), growth in Argentina
cannot be said to have been export- or investment-led. In
his view, no single or predominant development strategy
can be discerned that has lasted more than three or four
years. Moreover, the chief macroeconomic incentives
offered in the last 30 years not only had an anti-export
bias (for example, export taxes and the negative relative
price of exports), but also were a deterrent to investment
(for example, the high price of capital goods, restrictions
on foreign investment and constraints on financial
markets). Growth in exports has been strong only in the
last few years, and exports still account for a very small
proportion of GDP. Overall, Casaburi considers that, in
the final analysis, recent growth in Argentina can be said
to have been based on investment.
Although the question of a causal connection is not
addressed directly, Yeom (1998) shows that the
Government of the Republic of Korea adopted a set of
industrial and trade policies (consisting, above all, in high
tariffs and other import restrictions, together with tax and
preferential credit systems and administrative support)
geared equally to export industries and import
substitution. Through this approach, combining exports
and import substitution, the State sought to eliminate a
series of investment barriers and to foster a substantial
increase in returns on private investment capital (Rodrik,
1995).
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2. Evaluation of the industrial and trade policy applied in the past
In general, the six studies referred to above maintain
that while an industrialization policy based on import
substitution has helped to form the industrial base and
in some phases has served to deepen it, its application
has imposed serious external and internal restrictions
on countries. Moreover, contrary to expectations,
neither in East Asia nor in Latin America were these
policies, least of all those applied in the second phase,
successful in replacing labour-intensive, natural
resource-based or semi-specialized industries by
specialized, capital-intensive industries fully
competitive on the international market. Dependency
on imported inputs showed no tendency to diminish
either. Moreover, these policies were often blocked by
foreign exchange restrictions, which successively
demanded the unilateral liberalization of economies in
each of these regions. Furthermore, this model
allowed specific groups to secure extraordinarily high
rents.
It should be pointed out that, in the six countries
in question, reforms had already been introduced in
response to the economic situation, even before the
start of the Uruguay Round. Generally, the policies
currently being applied are even more liberal and less
interventionist than those authorized by the World
Trade Organization. Current tariffs are considerably
lower than the consolidated levels established in the
Uruguay Round and, in the early 1990s, direct export
subsidies considered to be precluded by, or actionable
under, the terms of the agreement were unilaterally
abandoned.
As the experience of these countries has shown,
incentives for import substitution should, ideally, be
moderate at first and granted for a given period and
exceptions to the principle of policy neutrality should
be few and far between and awarded in a very selective
manner. During a subsequent stage of development,
incentives could appropriately be granted to the major
industries (that is, to those that have best chance of
producing dynamic benefits not internalized by the
market), rather than to given beneficiaries.
Accordingly, countries should seek, first and
foremost, to apply public policies that stimulate
systemic competitiveness of the economy as a whole.
These should include the adoption of measures
designed to perfect the educational system; support
industry (through training and product development);
complement the capital market, especially for small
and medium-sized enterprises; attract foreign
investments towards new sectors that provide possible
comparative advantages; improve physical and social
infrastructure and carry out effective skills training
and research and development programmes. The
adoption of neutral policies, viewed by Governments
as appropriate and authorized by WTO does not mean
that incentives are superfluous.
C. ADAPTING NATIONAL POLICIES TO THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS
1. Export subsidies
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
defines subsidies as financial contributions by
Governments (including forgiveness of taxes which
would otherwise have been due) and specifies the rules
for their  use.  Subsidies  are currently  classified  as
prohibited, actionable or non-actionable. Any
developing country having a per capita gross national
product (GNP) of less than US$ 1,000 may grant
export subsidies. The agreement also allows a certain
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degree of flexibility, since developing countries may
subsidize exports if their share of the market in the
importing country is relatively small  (de  minimis
clause).
The category of  prohibited subsidies covers a
wide range of export promotion instruments,
including the reduction of tariffs on imported inputs to
an amount equivalent to the value of the exported end
products. One example of this would seem to be the
situation  in Argentina  and Brazil, where imported
components used in the assembly of motor vehicles
are exempted from tariffs up to an amount equivalent
to the value of the exported vehicles (Casaburi, 1998,
p. 33). Chile also applies a system of rebates based on
the f.o.b. value of the exports which does not comply
with WTO provisions on customs drawbacks (Agosin,
1998, p. 32).240
A major exception is exemption from or
forgiveness of indirect taxes which normally apply to
the production and distribution of like products
marketed for domestic consumption (sales tax or value
added tax, for example, but not direct taxes such as
those levied on wages and profits). A system of this
type has been introduced in Argentina that provides
for rebates on indirect taxes on exports (Casaburi,
1998, p. 35). In Chile, exporters can recover any value
added tax they have paid on raw materials and
intermediate inputs (Macario, 1998b, p. 4).
Many countries in East Asia and Latin America
and the Caribbean provide a package of tax incentives
for industries located in free trade areas or export
processing zones; these incentives are usually linked
to outward processing ormaquilaactivities. A large
proportion of exports from some Central American,
Caribbean and East Asian countries originate in such
zones. Depending on the nature of the tax exemptions
and other incentives provided for activities located
within them, developing countries may have to adapt
their legislation to comply with WTO provisions by
the year 2003 (WTO, 1997, p. 51).
The  non-actionable subsidies category  enables
developing countries to subsidize activities  which
produce externalities, provided that they are not
specifically export-oriented and that the subsidies are
granted to all industries. In principle, this permits
subsidies to be provided for training and retraining
activities, which are essential to increased productivity
and international competitiveness, and for research
and development activities, including product quality
improvements, local adaptation of foreign technology,
and consumer preference studies. General subsidies
also include support for less-developed areas,
government assistance for compliance with
environmental protection standards and certain
privatization programmes when they are carried out
by developing countries.
In Argentina, Brazil and Malaysia, the gradual
elimination of subsidies is not expected to give rise to
major problems. On the other hand, certain subsidies
in the Republic of Korea that are granted in order to
promote exports and encourage purchases of national
products will have to be replaced with non-actionable
subsidies; it will also be necessary to reduce  the
amounts  and scope  of subsidies  during the grace
period provided for in the Agreement. The
Government of the Republic of Korea has in fact
reported that the five categories of subsidies which are
contrary to WTO provisions will be replaced with
export insurance, long-term export credits, drawback
programmes and systems for the issuance of
commercial promissory notes permitted by WTO
(Yeom, 1998, p. 33).
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those payments. Both this provision and the simplified drawback are considered subsidies by WTO and will have to be eliminated by the end of the
year 2002 (Agosin, 1998, p. 32).
2. Countervailing measures applicable to imports and exports
Anti-dumping measures  and countervailing duties
have become the main commercial defence
mechanisms for both industrialized and developing
countries.241 The Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures states  that  countervailing
duties may be applied for a maximum of five years
unless, upon review, it is found that their elimination
would be likely to result in the continuation of the
subsidization and the injury (sunset clause).242
In 1986, of the six countries studied, only the
Republic of Korea had adhered to the Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties approved during
the Tokyo Round. In 1994, Argentina, Brazil,
Indonesia and Malaysia began to modify the
corresponding legislation to bring it into line with
WTO rules (Casaburi, 1998, p. 37; Delorme Prado,
1998, p. 25; Nasution, 1998, p. 40; Mahani, 1998, p.
35); in Chile, the appropriate amendments are in the
process of being made (Agosin, 1998, p. 39).
However, further changes are needed. In Malaysia, for
example, the relevant legislation needs to be revised
in order to incorporate the legal definition of dumping,
broaden the excessively restrictive definition of
national industry and require that any request for a new
dumping investigation should be supported by
enterprises representing at least 25% of the total output
of the national industry concerned (Mahani, 1998,
p. 35).
3. Trade-related investment measures (TRIM)
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIM) reaffirms the 1947 GATT
provisions relating to national treatment (article III)
and prohibition of quantitative restrictions (article XI).
Strictly speaking, the clauses in the Agreement dealing
with local content and trade balancing requirements
(export performance) are incompatible with the
provisions of article III, while those referring to trade
restrictions, currency balancing and domestic sales
requirements are incompatible with the provisions of
article XI.
Fulfilment of obligations under the Agreement
will affect some of the policy instruments used for
the promotion of certain industries, such as the
automotive industry, where local content provisions
and export balancing requirements are widely used.
For example, the automotive regime in the member
States of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur)
will have to be modified by 1999 to bring it into line
with WTO standards (Casaburi, 1998, p. 36; Delorme
Prado, 1998, p. 24). It will also be necessary to change
export performance and local content requirements for
the Chilean automotive industry by 1999 (Agosin,
1998, p. 37). Measures to protect Malaysia’s
automotive industry also contravene the TRIM
agreement (Mahani, 1998, p. 35). The special tax,
customs or credit privileges formerly granted under
Indonesia’s controversial national automotive
programme were discontinued as of January 1998
(Nasution, 1998, p. 35).
There are also a number of instruments designed
to improve domestic technological capacity through
foreign direct investment which are compatible with
the TRIMs agreement. For example, the Government
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242 The Agreement also includesde minimisprovisions relating to the dumping margin and the volume required to terminate dumping investigations:
anti-dumping cases are to remain without effect when the dumping margin is less than 2% or when the share of the countries concerned in the importing
market is less than 3% (or, cumulatively, 7% among a number of exporters whose individual shares each amount to less than 3%).
of the Republic of Korea grants financial and tax
incent ives to foreign investors who set up
high-technology enterprises  in the country. These
investors can also buy large areas of land, and there
are plans for two new industrial complexes for foreign
investors in the Kwangju and Chunan areas. The local
authorities in these two areas will be called upon to
establish a centre to assist foreign investors, and all the
various sorts of institutional support needed by small
and medium-sized enterprises, including research and
development, will be provided (Yeom, 1998, p. 31;
Pyo, Kim and Cheong, 1996, pp. 4-5).
The TRIMs agreement does not apply to
public-sector purchasing. Most developing countries
have not signed the Agreement on Government
Procurement that was drawn up during the Uruguay
Round and are therefore not subject to restrictions in
that area.
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs)
Some countries have already modified the relevant
regulations to bring them into line with the TRIPs
agreement. Argentina enacted new industrial property
legislation in December 1994, and Brazil followed suit
in May 1996. Among other things, the new legislation
contains provisions on  the  granting of  patents  for
inventions and prototypes, on industrial designs and
trademarks, and on prevention of the fraudulent use of
geographic designations. These laws were enacted not
only for the purpose of complying with international
agreements, but also to resolve outstanding
disagreements with the United States; the legislation
also includes stricter requirements and shorter
transition periods  than those laid down by WTO
(Casaburi, 1998, p. 30; Delorme Prado, 1998, pp.
27-28). In May 1996, Brazil enacted provisions to
protect products on which patent applications  are
pending; other countries did likewise in mid-1997
(WTO, 1996, pp. 121-127).
Chile,  Indonesia and Malaysia have modified
their legislation on copyrights, patents and
trademarks. In Chile and Malaysia, for example,
copyrights will now be protected for a period of 20
years starting from the date on which the application
is submitted, instead of 15 years from the date on
which it is accepted. In Chile, provisions regarding
geographical origin will also be applied more strictly
(Agosin, 1998, p. 40). New laws will be enacted in
Indonesia and Malaysia for industrial designs
involving integrated circuits, protection of new plant
varieties, and trade secrets. These countries will also
have to modify compulsory licensing provisions to
bring them into line with article 31 of the TRIPs
agreement (Ariff, Mahani and Chye, 1996, p. 46).
Steps are being taken in the Republic of Korea to
minimize the impact of the TRIPs agreement (Pyo,
Kim and Cheong, 1996, p. 15). One such measure
provides for sharing information on patents among
business enterprises, research institutes and
universities; another involves helping firms to develop
their own brands, improve their design capabilities and
protect endogenous technology. Another course of
action would be for the authorities to improve the
coordination of TRIPs agreement implementation
among the various government departments.243
Despite the limitations imposed by the agreement,
the developing countries still have some room for
manoeuvre. They can take advantage of the fact that
the agreement is transitional and that its application
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provides for a 10-year grace period. There is no reason
why patent royalties on imported technology should
obstruct technology transfers to developing countries.
The information built into any patent or,  for that
matter, any imported product is public knowledge and
there is nothing to prevent business enterprises from
using it as a starting point for introducing other
innovations. Indeed, all innovations have to be
adapted to local conditions and are subject to ongoing
improvements. For  example, if items  which have
come into common use or which constitute advances
of minor importance can be excluded from the various
countries’ patents legislation, and if general scientific
principles can be excluded from copyrights, the
international legal system will offer considerable
manoeuvring room for re-engineering and the
adaptation of existing technology (Agosin, 1996,
p. 164).
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
For the developing countries, GATS is a fairly
well-balanced instrument whose main advantage is
that it  establishes a flexible  framework  for future
negotiations. Since service activities involve the
movement of factors of production across national
borders, GATS enables countries to avail themselves
of a series of exceptions and positive lists that allow
them to maintain a considerable level  of national
autonomy. GATS also enables developing countries
to reach concrete agreements with foreign enterprises
to strengthen the efficiency and competitiveness of the
services they offer at the national level as well as
agreements relating to access to technology, channels
of distribution and information networks.
The countries of East Asia and Latin America and
the Caribbean have generally been very selective in
terms  of the commitments they have made  under
GATS.244 For example, Indonesia has made
services-related commitments in respect of five major
sectors: telecommunications, industrial services,
tourism, non-banking financial services and banking
services (Nasution, 1998, pp. 26-32). These
obligations are subject to certain limits in terms of
market access and national treatment. However, the
Government of Indonesia reached an agreement with
IMF in April 1998 that greatly reduces its margin for
manoeuvre in applying these selective policies. It will,
for example, have to eliminate the 49% ceiling on
foreign ownership of share capital in the enterprises
appearing on the list, and restrictions on foreign
investment  in retail  and wholesale commerce will
have to be ended.245
Malaysia permits a foreign commercial presence
in most service activities provided that it is in the form
of a locally-incorporated joint  venture  with either
Malaysian nationals or enterprises controlled by
Malaysian interests. A foreign financial institution is
allowed to maintain a commercial presence only
through the creation of a locally-incorporated joint
venture in which foreign ownership does not exceed
30% (rising to 49% in the year 2000) (Mahani, 1998,
p. 33). It is noteworthy that the Government of
Argentina submitted no schedule when the new WTO
financial services commitments were adopted in
December 1997 (Casaburi, 1998, p. 34).246
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6. The Agreement on Agriculture
The Agreement on Agriculture gives special treatment
to exporters in the developing countries regarding the
de minimisclause, export subsidies and exemptions
for certain subsidies.247 For example, developing
countries will be exempt from the obligation to reduce
export marketing subsidies, including those applied to
such items as handling costs, product improvements
and other processing-related expenditures, and
subsidies for international or domestic freight costs.
“Green box” measures include State support for
research and development, disease and pest control,
infrastructure development, food security, structural
adjustment, implementation of environmental
programmes and regional assistance programmes. For
example, the Government of Indonesia has registered
all national support programmes in the “green box” to
ensure their exemption from reduction commitments
(Nasution, 1998, p. 23).
In the case of Argentina and Brazil, the
Agreement on Agriculture does not entail major
changes (Casaburi, 1998, p. 33; WTO, 1996).248For
Argentina, whose main exports are agricultural, the
agreement represents an important step towards
dismantling protectionism,  particularly that  of the
United States and  the  European  Union  (Casaburi,
1998, pp. 29-31). The Republic of Korea, however,
will have to implement policies to minimize the
short-term impact of the Uruguay Round and protect
the welfare of its farmers (Yeom, 1998, pp. 14-16).
Countries finding themselves in a similar position may
have  to restructure and refine their legislation on
subsidies, including those based on dual pricing and
cereal production management systems and
agricultural subsidies. Emergency measures may also
have to be introduced to alleviate the impact of
imports, and health and phytosanitary inspection
procedures applying to imports of agricultural
products may have to be improved. In all these cases,
progress needs to be made in restructuring the
agricultural sector and increasing its productivity.
D. INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICY FOLLOWING THE URUGUAY ROUND
1. Macroeconomic policy options
WTO standards permit a broad range of fiscal,
monetary and foreign-exchange policies and place no
limitations on policies aimed at achieving high levels
of saving and investment.  Under  the  new trading
system, the developing countries will have to make
sure that they impose fiscal discipline in the public
sector and implement appropriate credit and
interest-rate policies in order to take maximum
advantage of investment based on personal and
corporate savings.
For example, Agosin points out that the
investment surge in Chile after the 1982-1983 crisis
was given an additional boost by the 1984 tax reform,
which replaced taxes on corporate profits with a single
tax on income from all sources. Nasution (1998, p. 54)
argues that, on the one hand, the tax reforms
introduced in Indonesia between 1983 and 1985 and
revised 10 years  later streamlined  tax procedures,
increased the precision and progressiveness of the tax
system and eliminated legal loopholes which had been
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be reduced by 21% within 10 years, based on the average level for the 1986-1990 period (for the developed countries, the figure is 36% within 6
years).
248 Subsidies for tobacco producers in Argentina have been challenged by WTO (Casaburi, 1998, p. 32).
used for tax evasion and that, on the other hand, they
enabled the State to collect revenue not only from the
petroleum industry and foreign trade but also from
other business sectors. This increased revenue, in turn,
permitted higher spending on basic human needs such
as primary education and health services. As  for
Malaysia, Mahani emphasizes that the 1986
legislation to promote investment provides for a series
of tax incentives and other inducements for pioneering
activities by business enterprises wishing to become
involved in activities or to manufacture products
covered by the legislation (Mahani, 1998, pp. 65-66;
Ariff, Mahani and Chye, 1996, p. 13).
The six studies on this subject cited here show that
trade and industrial policy mechanisms, including the
investment regime, have a pronounced influence on
foreign-exchange policy and vice versa. When the rate
of exchange is stable and realistic, an appropriate
proportion of investment will benefit the tradable
goods sector. There is also less need for aggressive
measures, such as special lines of credit, insurance
programmes and export subsidies, to compensate for
the anti-export bias resulting from other policies.
2. Pre-competitive measures in support of
systemic competitiveness
(a) Human resources development
The positive externalities  generated by the
availability of a large number of highly skilled
workers and the negative externalities resulting
from under investment in labour training are well
known. In Chile, for example, the training of
engineer s and managers at State universities,
together with pr ogr ammes to develop human
capital in the agr icultural and forestry sectors,
have been decisive factors in the growth of the
cor responding expor ts (Agosin, 1998, p. 36). By the
same token, the high level of unemployment in
Argentina may be due to deficiencies in education
and difficulties in providing suitable training to
redundant workers in labour -intensive sectors
such as textiles, plastics and toys (Casabur i, 1998,
p. 53). Casabur i argues that any policy aimed at
solving such problems should be demand-driven so
that the training provided will match actual labour
market demands. As for Chile, Agosin (1998, pp.
42-43) ar gues that the tr aining pr ogr ammes
su b sid ized b y t h e Na t ion a l T r a in in g a n d
Employment Service (SENCE) need to be adapted
in order to meet the real needs of workers in small-
and medium-sized enterpr ises more satisfactor ily.
Brazil will also need to boost social spending on
human r esour ces quick ly in or der to cr eate
favourable conditions for sustainable economic
development (Delorme Prado, 1998, p. 34).
In East Asia, although academic education and
skills training have expanded rapidly, the actual
quality of training has not improved. In Indonesia,
for example, State teaching institutions have little
autonomy or flexibility in resource use, and their
links with industry are weak (Nasution, 1998,
p. 46). Malaysia has good pr imary education, but
university-level technical and professional training
is limited. Industr ial modernization has been
slowed by the shor tage of high-level technical and
engineer ing specialists, and the country lacks an
effect ive syst em for t h e d evelop m en t an d
dissemination of industr ial technology (Mah ni,
1998, p. 41). In the Republic of Kor ea, the
Government has emphasized human resources
training and research and development activities,
but has given greater pr ior ity to the former , as can
be seen from the growing propor tion of the total
r esou r ces of t h e in d u st r ia l in fr ast r uct u r e
development programme being allocated to such
items (Yeom, 1998, pp. 35-37).
148 ECLAC
(b) Technology
The countr ies ar e faced with numer ous
b ot t lenecks in the spher e of technologica l
innovation and technology transfer . In Indonesia,
for example, technological progress has been
concentrated in agr iculture, natural resources and
impor t substitution manufactur ing industries. The
fact that these str ategic and r esour ce-based
industr ies constitute what might be descr ibed as an
enclave r estr icts the diffusion of technology
(Nasution, 1998, p. 48). The shor tage of computer
specialists has also made it difficult for banks to
acquir e infor mation technology. In Malaysia,
technology transfers have been confined to a
limited number of sectors, such as electr ical spare
par ts and electronic components (Mahani, 1998,
p. 42).
There are, however , some exper iences which
should be emulated by other countr ies. The Chile
Foundation,  a non-profit institution which was
or iginally State-subsidized, has developed new
expor t technologies (Agosin, 1998, p. 34). Its
act ivit ies ar e a good example of successfu l
cooperation among the pr ivate sector , the State
and other institutions. The Brazilian Agr icultural
Research Enterpr ise (Embrapa) has succeeded in
improving the productivity and quality of var ious
crops and in transfer r ing these improvements to
the pr ivate sector (Delorme Prado, 1998, p. 22).
In the Republic of Korea, the Government has
realized that innovation is the decisive element in
sustained economic growth and has therefore
provided a ser ies of tax incentives and subsidies for
pr ivate r esear ch and development act ivit ies
(Yeom, 1998, p. 35). The Government also feels that
State-run research bodies, including universities,
shou ld compete with pr iva te r esear ch and
development or gan iza t ions for gover nment
resources, and has endeavoured to minimize the
r ole of r esearch and development institutions
a ssocia t ed wit h t h e cou n t r y ’s lea d in g
con glom er a t es (k n own a schaebols) . The
Government of Malaysia provides numerous tax
incentives to strengthen the public and private sector’s
research and development capacity. In addition, the
mandates of various bodies specializing in
technological development, such as the Standards and
Industrial Research Institution, require them to
provide technological outreach services, particularly
to small- and medium-sized enterprises (Mahani,
1998, p. 67).
(c) Infrastructure
The aforementioned six studies recognize the
impor tance of infrastructure in improving the
systemic competitiveness of the economy as a
whole. The modernization of Chile’s infrastructure
in the 1960s, for example, played a major role in its
subsequent expor t boom (Agosin, 1998, pp. 35-36).
I n t h e sa m e vein , C a sa b u r i n ot es t h a t
decentralization and pr ivatization of por ts and
railways in Argentina (Casabur i, 1998, p. 42)
tr iggered a spectacular upsurge in productivity in
the shor t space of five years. However , much
remains to be done to ensure that services meet
modern standards and that pr ices are competitive
on the inter nat ional mar ket . The Ar gent ine
Government could, for example, apply preferential
policies by subsidizing major infr astr uctur e
projects in the country’s least developed regions.
In Brazil, increasing infrastructure demand is for
the most par t being met through the use of pr ivate
resources, some of which are being provided by
pr ivatized companies. Other State bodies, such as
the National Economic and Social Development
Bank, have also decided to allocate increased
resources to infrastructure (Delorme Prado, 1998,
p. 34).
(d) Market information
Information is considered a public good and,
since the information market is asymmetr ical
future users and purchasers generally do not invest
sufficient ly in developing it . To r ect ify th is
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situation, the Government of Chile has been
investing heavily in this area since 1974, especially
for the purpose of gathering information on foreign
markets. Prochile  is a division of the Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs and is responsible for export
promotion; with the help  of  38  offices  in foreign
countries, it coordinates market studies and
collects trade information of interest to exporters.
Recently, it has been conducting an aggressive
campaign to create a positive image of Chile in
other countries. Prochile will shortly become an
independent mixed enterprise with considerable
private-sector participation. Together with a
number of business associations, the Production
Development Corporation (Corfo), a State body, is
carrying out a similar programme under which it
provides partial subsidies for administrative costs
for a specified period (Agosin, 1998, p. 34; Macario,
1998b, p. 16).
In the Republic of Korea, a number of
State-run bodies, such as the Korea
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Kotra),
play a major role in providing business and
industr ia l in formation to exporters and in
conducting market research (Yeom, 1998, p. 41).
The Malaysian External Trade Corporation
(Matrade) was set up in 1994 to carry out trade
promotion activities. It maintains offices in the
world’s major cities which provide information to
Malaysian exporters and carry out promotion
activities in export markets (Mahani, 1998, p. 49).
(e) Small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs)
The great major ity of instruments  used to
promote business development do not contravene
the WTO rules on subsidies. Generally they are
pre-competitive, are provided to enterpr ises in all
sectors and do not directly influence the final pr ice
of products.
To encourage the development of SMEs, the
Government of the Republic of Korea has used
indirect mechanisms such as tax exemptions and
soft loans. It also provides resources for structural
improvements in SMEs which are sited in rural
areas or are of a technological nature. In 1996, the
body responsible for SMEs was  upgraded and
designated the Office for Industr ial Advancement.
It cur rently provides SMEs with technical advisory
services, staffing-related assistance and financial
suppor t ; it a lso pr omotes sales of pr oducts
manufactured by SMEs and provides them with
marketing and distr ibution services (Yeom, 1998,
p. 38).
The Malaysian author ities have created the
Small and Medium-Scale Industr ies Development
Corporation (SMIDEC) to formulate development
pr ogr ammes and coor dinate the act ivit ies of
var ious bodies which promote the development of
SMEs (Mahani, 1998, p. 43). A fund for technical
assistance to industry was set up in March 1990 to
help SMEs in the areas of consultancy services,
product development and design, improvements in
quality and productivity, and market development
(Ar iff, Mahani and Chye, 1996, p. 14).
In order to be effective, however , suppor t
programmes should cater to the central interests
and aspirations of SMEs, in other words, focus on
the demands of the SMEs themselves (Casabur i,
1998, p. 49). In Ar gentina, for example, the
substantial financial suppor t provided to SMEs
has not borne fruit to the degree expected because
the var ious programmes (44 in number) did not
take account of the end users’ real needs.
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3. Trade facilitation and other measures
(a) Trade
Bu sin ess en t er p r ises h a ve n u m er ou s
difficulties with customs rules and procedures,
som e of wh ich h a ve t o d o wit h a la ck of
t r a n sp a r en cy a n d in eff ic ien t cu st om s
infrastructures. Trade promotion can be improved
b y sim p li fy in g a n d h a r m on izin g cu st om s
formalities and standardizing the cor responding
regulations. For example, Brazil’s introduction in
1993 of Siscomex, an integrated computer ized
system for foreign trade, has made it possible to
streamline expor t procedures and the processing of
customs documents (Delorme Prado, 1998, p. 30).
In addition, since 1992 improvements have been
introduced in the development and administration
of regulations and in testing and cer tification
pr ocedur es. Indonesia enacted new customs
legislation in 1995 in order to  comply  with its
Ur uguay Round ob ligat ions and modify its
inspection system. Since 1985, Indonesia has used
a pr ivate firm for customs clearance of impor ts at
their point of or igin (Nasution, 1998, p. 23). In the
Republic of Korea, the average amount of time that
impor ted goods are held at the por t of entry has
been cut from 15 to two or three days. Customs
clearance has also  improved greatly,  thanks  to
electronic data interchangesystems (Yeom, 1998,
p. 31).
(b) Foreign direct investment (FDI) policies
Over the past 10 years there has been a clear
trend towards  the liberalization of FDI.  Many
countr ies in both regions have raised the limit on
foreign ownership to 100% in most sectors not
classified as  being of public interest. Also, the
requirements for obtaining national treatment
have been made even mor e flexib le. Many
countr ies have moved from an impor t  licensing
system to one based on the submission of customs
entry forms.  Other measures  in the same area
include double-taxation protection and investment
guarantee ar rangements.
T he Ind u st r ia l Developmen t Au thor it y
(MIDA) of Malaysia has  become  an impor tant
centre for coordinating foreign investments in the
countr y. Investor s have only to r equest the
author izations required at the federal level from
the  Author ity  (Mahani, 1998,  p. 48). A  similar
administrative procedure and a centralized service
system were introduced recently in the Republic of
Korea as well. The Government of that country
announced a foreign investment liberalization plan
in September 1993 under which the licensing
system was r eplaced with one based on the
su b m ission of a p p l ica t ion s. Ad d i t ion a l
liberalization measures were introduced in June
1994 and in 1996 that increase the  number of
industr ies  covered and broaden the  investment
framework. Since 1997, FDI applications can be
submitted at any bank having a foreign cur rency
desk, rather than, as former ly, only at the Bank of
Korea, and the institution has to process the
application quickly instead of taking from 20 to 30
days (Yeom, 1998, p. 25). In Chile, Decree Law 600
of 1974 gr ants national tr eatment to for eign
investors, has opened up most of the economy to
FDI, provides for automatic approval of relatively
simple pr ojects, and guar antees unr estr icted
r emittance of profits at any time and capital
repatr iation after three years (Agosin, 1998, pp.
32-33).
(c) Export credit insurance and guarantees
Governments can play a considerable role in
expanding and improving expor t financing, expor t
credit and expor t credit guarantees. Expor t credit
and related guarantee and insurance programmes
are prohibited by multilateral rules when they are
provided below cost, but not when the pr ice is
higher than cost but lower than market rates.
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Export credits and insurance programmes, such as
Brazil’s export incentive programme  (Proex) and
machinery and equipment export programme
(Finamex), fulfil these requirements and are therefore
not considered to be subsidies. However, preferential
taxation rates on income and profits and preferential
customs treatment of imported materials and capital
goods are considered to comprise an element of
subsidization. These cases will require a thorough
review of the national taxation system.
The  Government of Chile has  created a  fund
which covers up to 50% of the guarantee  which
commercial banks require from firms exporting
non-traditional products. Corfo administers a fund for
foreign buyers of capital goods and consumer durables
and of Chilean engineering and consulting services; it
also administers a long-term credit line to finance
investments in export projects by firms whose annual
sales do not exceed US$ 30 million. Corfo also
provides export insurance subsidies to small and
medium-sized enterprises having annual sales of less
than US$ 10 million (Macario, 1998b, pp. 9-11). The
Malaysian Export Credit Insurance Berhad
(corporation)  provides  export  credit  insurance  and
guarantees to f i rms that market or export
manufactured goods. It also guarantees loans provided
by lenders in Malaysia to foreign buyers or banks for
purchases of Malaysian products (Mahani, 1998,
p. 49). In the Republic of Korea, export financing is
provided in the form of post-shipment export loans,
tax-free reserves and export credits. In addition, the
Korea Export Insurance Corporation provides
insurance for exports and overseas investments





Recent studies show that the trade liberalization
policies implemented during the present decade have
helped to increase the region’s external trade in goods
and services, although imports have grown more than
exports (see chapter V). In an effort to boost exports,
the Governments of Latin America and the Caribbean
have introduced promotional instruments designed to
change the export specializations of their countries,
while being careful to maintain the comparative
advantages they derive from their abundant natural
resources. Among the new export items are fisheries
products, with Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru,
Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, in that order, being the
main Latin American exporters (ECLAC, 1995, table
3, p. 9). Shrimp exports are one of the items on which
countries such as Ecuador, Colombia and Honduras
have concentrated their diversification efforts.
The United States is one of the world’s largest
importers of fisheries products and is a destination of
preference for Latin American exports. Over recent
years, however, the United States has been applying
measures that limit imports in an effort  to force
exporters to adopt production processes that comply
with the endangered species protection laws and other
environmental regulations applying in that country.
This has given rise to a number of conflicts between
environmental policy and trade. The first conflict of
this sort involved an embargo that the United States
Government placed on imports of tuna caught using
methods that endangered dolphins. Since then, the
United States Government has also taken measures to
restrict shrimp imports, since with drift nets, which is
one of the methods used to catch shrimp, sea turtles
are often trapped in the nets by accident, and a number
of studies have shown that this is one of the factors
driving this species, which is protected under United
States federal law, towards extinction.
Concern about the harm shrimp trawling is doing
to sea  turtles has  led a number  of environmental
groups, among them the Earth Island Institute, to urge
the United  States Government to embargo  shrimp
imports in order to force exporters to change their
harvesting methods.249Besides this, other regulations
have been applied to shrimp reared in farms
(aquaculture), since this method, if not properly
conducted, also causes harm to the environment by,
for example, destroying nearby wetlands, and for this
reason there has also been great pressure for a ban on
imports of cultivated shrimp into the United States.
Protecting the environment is a legitimate
objective for all countries, whether industrialized or
developing. Nonetheless, it is disturbing that
environmental regulations should operate as
significant barriers to international trade and result in
new conditions being imposed on exporters seeking
access to the markets of industrialized countries. To
assist in analysing the issue, this chapter will provide
information about the embargo on shrimp exports to
the United States and the legal arguments put forward
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249 The Earth Island Institute also participated in the campaign to control imports of tuna caught using methods harmful to dolphins.
at WTO in relation to this  unilateral  measure.  In
addition, preliminary data will be presented from a
current ECLAC research project which is looking at
the methods that have been used by two Latin
American countries, Colombia and Ecuador, to adjust
to United States environmental policy.
A. UNILATERAL MEASURES BY THE IMPORTER
At the urging of environmental protection groups, the
United States Government enacted a law prohibiting
the importation of shrimp caught using methods that
endanger sea turtles. At first this ban applied only to
shrimp trawling in Pacific waters, but the measure was
subsequently extended  to include the  Atlantic.  At
around the same time, a fishing mechanism that
prevents sea turtles from being caught accidentally,
known  as a turtle excluder device (or TED), was
developed in the United  States. Later on, specific
legislation was enacted to oblige companies to use this
or a similar device.
The taking of sea turtles has been banned in the
United States since 1973 under the Endangered
Species Act. Following this ban, the National Marine
Fisheries Service designed the TED, which has an
estimated efficiency of 97% and a negative impact on
shrimp fishing of 2% to 3%. In 1983, in the light of a
number of studies showing that shrimp trawling was
one of the factors threatening sea turtles with
extinction, the National Marine Fisheries Service
proposed to United States shrimp producers that they
use this device voluntarily.250 In 1987, a regulation
issued pursuant to the Endangered Species Act and
stated for full implementation in 1990 made the use of
TEDs mandatory for all United States shrimp boats
that use drift nets. Subsequently, in 1989, section 609
of Public Law 101-162 prohibited the importation of
shrimp from tropical or warm-water countries (i.e.,
countries off whose shores sea turtles live) if they have
been caught with drift nets.251 Compliance with the
law is monitored jointly by the United States Customs
Service, Department of State and Coastguard.
To receive the necessary certification from the
United States Department of Commerce, the
Government of the exporting country has to prove that
TEDs (or a similar device) are being used, or provide
documentary proof that its shrimp fishing activity does
not harm sea turtles, either because there are none in
the waters concerned or because the fishing system
used does not endanger them. Failing this, the Customs
Service is legally empowered to prohibit imports of
shrimp from that country.252
In pursuance of section 609, the United States
Government, using the 1991 Guidelines, limited the
geographical scope of the import ban to the countries
of the Caribbean and the western Atlantic area, and
gave them a three-year  grace period in which to
gradually introduce a regime comparable to that of the
United States; this measure had a particularly notable
effect on Mexico.253 On 19 April 1996 the United
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250 According to research carried out in the 1970s, five of the seven existing species of sea turtles were threatened with extinction because of human
action. Most of these species inhabit tropical or subtropical waters (WTO, 1998a).
251 See the American University’s Academic Web Server page [http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu]. The ban does not apply to manual fishing, as the
nets used are very small and do not harm sea turtles.
252 1991 Guidelines (56Federal Register1051, 10 January 1991); 1993 Guidelines (58Federal Register9015, 18 February 1993); 1996 Guidelines
(61 Federal Register17342, 19 April 1996) (WTO, 1998c, p. 3, note 11). First, certification is granted to countries whose fishing environment is
such that there is no danger of turtles being taken as bycatch in the course of shrimp harvesting; second, certification is given to harvesti g nations
which provide documentary evidence that they have introduced a regulatory programme governing the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course
of commercial shrimp trawling which is comparable to the programme in force in the United States, provided that the average bycatch rate for sea
turtles taken by vessels from the harvesting country concerned is comparable to the average bycatch rate for sea turtles taken by United States vessels
(Article 609 b) 2) A) and B)) (WTO, 1998c, p. 3).
253 Imports into the United States of shrimp caught using commercial fishing technologies that could endanger sea turtles have been banned under
paragraph b) 1) of section 609 since 1 May 1991. Paragraph b) 2) of this section stipulates that the shrimp import ban will not apply to harvesting
nations that have received the relevant certification (WTO, 1998c, pp. 2-3).
States enacted the 1996 Guidelines, which extended
the scope of  section  609  to  shrimp caught by  all
harvesting nations (WTO, 1998c, p. 5).
According to information from the Earth Island
Institute, by 1998 the United States Department of
State had  certified 43 shrimp  exporting countries,
although more than 40 are barred from exporting until
proof that the TED is in use is forthcoming.254Of the
43 countries certified, 19 use the device, among them
Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico;255 another 16
nations256 fish in cold waters where  there  are no
turtles, and in 8 countries257shrimp fishing is carried
out manually.
The 1996 Guidelines provide that all shrimp and
shrimp products imported into the United States must
be accompanied by an exporter’s declaration form
attesting that the shrimp was harvested either in the
waters of a nation currently certified under section 609
or under conditions that do not adversely affect sea
turtles (WTO, 1998c, p. 4). The certification issued by
the United States is valid for one year and can be
withdrawn at any time (as happened with Colombia
and Ecuador in 1997), which is a source of uncertainty
in economic and commercial activity.  Brazil and
Venezuela received certification in 1997, but not in
1998 (Andrade, 1998, p. 35).
According to information provided by the United
States, the cost of a United States excluder device,
including installation, is between US$ 300 and US$
400, and the cost could be less if it is manufactured in
the exporting country (WTO, 1998b). Although this is
not a large amount of money in international terms, it
often seems high when compared to the average
annual income of fishermen in many developing
countries. Furthermore, other specific costs have to be
added in: in some developing countries, for example,
fishermen employed by shrimp producers receive a
cash wage that they supplement with money earned in
the local market by selling the fish that are caught
along with the shrimp and discarded by their
employers. The National Marine Fisheries Service of
the United States acknowledges that a secondary
effect of using TEDs is that other fish are excluded
(WTO, 1998b, annex I); however, the impact of this
on the earnings of fishermen has not been factored in
to the cost to developing countries of using the device.
Other costs associated with the introduction of
TEDs are training and installation costs. A technology
transfer process is needed for the device to be adapted
to national fishing industries, and this takes time. If the
training is poorly assimilated by fishermen and the
device is not properly used, debris and sediment tend
to be dragged in, which reduces the shrimp haul and
increases fishing time. Complying with the United
States rules also entails additional administrative and
inspection costs, since national authorities and boat
owners must supervise the use of the device on an
ongoing basis.
Although many countries share the concern of the
United States in ensuring the survival of sea turtles,
they do not agree with the policy of imposing
extraterritorial environmental measures, as in the case
of section 609. They believe that protection for sea
turtles should be achieved through multilateral
negotiations,  rather than by  unilateral  action. The
Convention on International Trade in  Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has covered
all species of sea turtles since 1975. However, the
United States considers that the Convention has been
ineffective in  halting  the  extinction of sea turtles,
specifically because it does not provide for
commercial sanctions to enforce compliance.
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254 A country that does not receive certification can appeal and request a second inspection.
255 The 19 countries are: Belize, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
256 The 16 countries are: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.
257 The eight countries are: the Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Oman, Peru and Sri Lanka.
B. LEGAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE SHRIMP EMBARGO IN WTO
It has already been pointed out that, just as in the case
of tuna and dolphins, the unilateral measure taken by
the United States relates to the process used to produce
shrimp rather than to the product itself, and it was on
these grounds that in 1991 the Government of Mexico
requested that a Panel be established under the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism.258 In the case of
dolphins, in very much the  same way as is now
happening with the shrimp embargo, the United States
Government initially enacted a law to protect marine
mammals, including dolphins, and subsequently
decided to ban imports of yellow-fin tuna taken using
purse-seine nets, which catch tuna and dolphin
indiscriminately. The panel ruled that the embargo
applied by the United States was contrary to article III
of GATT, among others, since the comparison should
be made between the products of the exporting country
and the importing country rather than between the
production processes of the countries (Larach, 1998,
pp. 43 and 44).259
A group of countries submitted formal complaints
concerning the shrimp embargo to the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. In January 1997, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan and Thailand applied for a WTO panel260to
decide whether section 609 of United States Public
Law 101-162 was compatible with the most favoured
nation principle, and with the following paragraphs of
GATT 1994: paragraph 1 of article XI, which requires
all quantitative restrictions on imports and exports to
be lifted; paragraph 1 of article XIII, which also relates
to the application of quantitative restrictions;  the
exceptions provided for in Article XX (letters b and
g); and paragraph 1 (a) of article XXIII, which deals
with measures applied by a member that nullify or
impair  the  rights and benefits of another  member
(WTO, 1998b, chapter III).261
In its report, which was distributed on 15 March
1998, the panel ruled that the ban on imports of shrimp
and shrimp products applied by the United States was
incompatible with paragraph 1 of article XI of GATT
1994 and that it could not be justified under article XX
of the same Agreement (WTO, 1998b). The United
States appealed the ruling as it related to the
interpretation of article XX, since although it accepted
that, where countries which were not certified under
section 609 were concerned, this was tantamount to a
restriction on shrimp imports falling within the terms
of paragraph 1 of article XI of GATT 1994, it believed
that it was nonetheless entitled to apply a quantitative
restriction on the basis of the exceptions provided for
under letters (b) and (g) of article XX.
The report of the Appellate Body, which was
adopted on 8 October 1998 and distributed on 12
October 1998, was at variance with the one issued by
the panel, since this time it was accepted that the
United States measure did meet the conditions for
provisional justification under letter (g) of article XX.
Nonetheless, it was decided that the measure did not
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258 India, Pakistan and Thailand argued that the embargo on shrimp and shrimp products was incompatible with the most favoured nation principle
set forth in paragraph 1 of article I of GATT 1994 because physically identical shrimp and shrimp products from other countries, were given different
treatment by the United States when they were imported into that country on the basis of the method used to harvest them (WTO, 1998b, E).
259 The embargo imposed on Mexico by the United States had a devastating impact on its tuna industry. In 1994 exports were just over 1,000 tons,
as against more than 83,000 tons in 1989. The tuna fleet, which had been one of the biggest in the Pacific, shrank by 46% (ECLAC, 1998d, p. 21).
260 On 8 October 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand made a joint request for consultations; Malaysia and Thailand, in a communication
of 9 January 1997, and Pakistan, in a communication of 30 January 1997, asked the Dispute Settlement Body to set up a special panel to heartheir
complaints regarding the import ban imposed on certain types of shrimp and shrimp products by the United States under section 609 of Public Law
101-625 and the relevant regulations and court rulings (WTO, 1998c, p. 1).
261 Letters (b) and (g) of article XX state that: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on internati al
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... b) necessaryto
protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption...” (GATT, 1994, p. 540).
meet the requirements set out in the chapeau of article
XX and, consequently, was not justified under article
XX of GATT 1994 (WTO, 1998c, VII). The Appellate
Body ultimately recommended that the Dispute
Settlement Body request that the United States bring
the measures which had been found to be inconsistent
with article XI of GATT 1994 in the panel’s report and
which it had ruled were not justified under article XX,
“into conformity with the obligations of the United
States under this Agreement” (WTO, 1998c, VII).
The fact that shrimp imports from certain
countries were limited while those from others were
not arose out of the need to preserve sea turtles, which
are threatened with extinction throughout the world.
Thus, it was justifiable for section 609 to draw a
distinction between countries  whose shrimp  boats
operated without TEDs, and thereby endangered sea
turtles, and countries that did use them. However, the
Appellate Body concluded that although section 609
referred to measures designed to conserve an
exhaustible natural resource, under letter (g) of article
XX of GATT 1994, and although the measure was
applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
fishing activities, its application constituted
“unjustifiable discrimination”.
The report adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body concluded that the way in which section 609 had
been applied constituted a “means of unjustifiable
discrimination” between countries where the same
conditions prevailed. Furthermore, it noted that the
most conspicuous flaw in the measure’s application
was its intended and actual coercive effect on specific
policy decisions made by WTO member governments.
“Section 609, in its application, is, in effect, an
economic embargo which requires all other exporting
Members, if they wish to exercise their GATT rights,
to adoptessentially the samepolicy (together with an
approved enforcement programme) as that applied to,
and enforced on, United States domestic shrimp
trawlers” (WTO, 1998c, II, C.2).262
C. THE CASES OF COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR 263
1. Colombia
(a) Trawling
Shr imp fishing began on the Pacific coast of
Colombia in 1957 and was introduced along the
Car ibbean coast in the ear ly 1970s. Shr imping was
for some time the mainstay of the fishing industry,
but it has since declined somewhat in impor tance.
According to the National Institute for  Fisher ies
and Aquaculture (INPA), shr imp catches have
fallen by up to 50% in recent decades, especially in
the Pacific.264Shrimp is still the third most important
export product of the Colombian agricultural sector,
however, being surpassed only by bananas and
flowers. In all, 70% of these exports go to the
European market (Spain, Italy and Portugal) as whole
shrimp, and 30% to the United States and Japan as
shrimp tails.
Use of the TED is now compulsory throughout
Colombia. Initially, in 1992, it was limited to the
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262 The report of the Appellate Body stressed the distinction between measures to protect the environment and unilateral trade measures: “In reaching
these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we havenot decided in this appeal. We havenot decided that the protection and preservation of the
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We havenotdecided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the
WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we havenotdecided that
sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to prtec
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.” (WTO, 1998c, II, C.3).
263 Information obtained in interviews with private sector and government sources in these countries.
264 The decline in shrimp catches along the Pacific coast has been due to a disease affecting shrimp in that area.
Pacific  coast,  but in  1993 it  was extended  to  the
Caribbean coast of Colombia. The Government of
Colombia introduced the device for Pacific shrimp
fishing following a joint decision by INPA and the
private sector which was based on the conviction that
any embargo on shrimp imports into the United States
would lead to serious employment problems along
Colombia’s Pacific coast, where fishing and the wood
industry are the main economic activities.
One of the functions of INPA, which is a public
body attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, is to turn
fishing and aquaculture into a strategic, competitive
and sustainable industry. It is also responsible for
training the employees of shrimp producers how to use
the TED, and for issuing licences for fishing and
aquaculture activities in the country.
The owners of the Colombian shrimping fleet are
not opposed to the TED being used in areas where the
water is clear, as it is in the Atlantic. The Pacific
fishing grounds have more turbid water, however, as
more torrential rivers discharge into it. In this area, the
device picks up shoals and organic matter in large
quantities which block up the nets and ultimately lead
to a considerable decrease  in productivity,  longer
working hours and higher costs.
Every year the United States sends inspectors to
both coastal areas to check whether companies are
using the device. In 1996, companies operating in
Pacific waters finally obtained certification from the
United States authorities, thanks to the effort made by
shrimp trawlers to adopt the system.  In the 1997
inspection, however, it was decided that companies
were not complying with the measure satisfactorily in
the Pacific, and consequently an embargo was
imposed on exports that lasted for around two months.
Subsequently, the Colombian authorities succeeded in
having a new inspection held. This time, officials from
the United States Embassy and the National Marine
Fisheries Service inspected all the boats of the three
companies265 that export shrimp to that country and
were able to confirm that the TED was being used in
the vessels and that effective supervision was being
carried out by the Colombian authorities.266
(b) Cultivated shrimp
Shr imp farming is a relatively recent activity
in Colombia but, given its great economic potential,
it has been growing in scale. With the exception of
1995 and 1996, it has grown continuously dur ing
the 1990s. At present, aquaculture is one of the
fastest-gr owing industr ies in the agr icultur al
sector . In the second half of the 1980s, the
Government of Colombia created the conditions
needed to make this activity attractive to investors.
These included subsidized interest rates for fixed
investment and capital, the provision of grace
per iods by means of tax reimbursement cer tificates
(CERT), advance rebates of 20% of taxes on
expor ts, and exempt ion fr om impor t taxes
(Republic of Colombia, 1997).267
As mentioned earlier, the incorporation of section
609 into United States Public Law 101-162 does not
affect cultivated shrimp, and these are therefore not
subject to embargoes  or  restrictions.  Nonetheless,
aquaculturalists in Colombia are worried about the
possibility that  importing countries  may  introduce
new laws and measures unilaterally under which they
may require, for example, an environmental seal of
approval for cultivated shrimp. In order to represent
farmed shrimp more accurately in the international
market, the nomenclature for the harmonized shrimp
tariff applying since the beginning of the 1990s has
been split into two different categories. Furthermore,
every exporter of cultivated shrimp must obtain a
certificate from INPA to confirm that the product
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265 Agropesquera Industrial Bahía Cupica, Impesca and Arpecol.
266 As of the date of re-certification, fines totalling close to 60 million Colombian pesos had been levied on 13 trawlers.
267 Subsequently, during the economic liberalization process, export incentives and subsidies were reduced, and in some cases abolished. Thus,
CERT fell from 20% to 8.7% between 1985 and the second half of 1997. The Government plans to abolish CERT by the year 2002 at the latest and
replace it with a productivity fund.
being exported is farm-reared shrimp.  Colombian
environmental protection legislation has  also  been
extended to include mangrove swamps, and
authorization to construct aquaculture facilities is
refused if it is shown that they would be damaging to
these wetlands.268
2. Ecuador
Although shrimp production and exporting is a
relatively new activity in Ecuador, this item is already
the  country’s  third-largest  export,  being surpassed
only by oil and bananas, and shrimp exports account
for 20% of all  Ecuadorian exports by value. The
country produces sea shrimp and farmed shrimp, the
former accounting for 10% of total production. Over
60% of all the shrimp it produces is exported to the
United States, more than 20% to Europe, and between
8% and 12% to Asia, but the country is seeking new
markets.
(a) Trawling
As noted ear lier , United States legislation has
obliged the country’s shr imp fishing companies to
use the TED, since otherwise Ecuador would lose
its access to the United States market. The National
Mar ine Fisher ies Service of the United States
rejected the Government of Ecuador ’s argument
that, unlike the Car ibbean countr ies, it had almost
no tur tles in its fishing grounds because this claim
was not backed up by scientific studies. The reason
no such studies were available was that the time
elapsing between the announcement that use of the
TED was being made compulsory and the date set
for implementation of this requirement was not
long enough for the required scientific proof to be
obtained.269
The Government of Ecuador made use of the TED
a legal requirement in April 1996, even though its
adoption boosted operating costs, which were then
absorbed by the owners of the fishing fleet. Ecuador
was not a member of WTO when the embargo began,
and its Government was therefore unable to lodge a
formal complaint with that organization. However, the
private sector subsequently supported the complaint
submitted to WTO by the Asian countries.
In March 1997 Ecuador was visited by officials
from the National Marine Fisheries Service of the
United States who came to check whether the
country’s shrimping fleet had the TED installed and in
use. The outcome of the inspection was that the United
States officials found the Ecuadorian measures to be
unsatisfactory, and an embargo was therefore imposed
on its exports of sea shrimp to the United States. In the
case of exports of farmed shrimp, it was ruled that their
origin had to be verified by means of certification from
an inspection company and approval from the
Ecuadorian Department of Fisheries before they could
be exported.
After a second inspection, carried out a month
later, the embargo was lifted. Brief as this ban had
been, the measure had a major impact on the shrimping
industry and the 300,000 people working in it, because
fishermen could no longer supplement their earnings
in the domestic market by selling fish caught in the
drift nets and because sea shrimp fetch higher prices
than  cultivated shrimp. The Ecuadorian  shrimping
fleet consists of 193 boats, and around 10% of total
shrimp production is exported. Losses for the month
during which the embargo was applied were estimated
at over US$ 6 million.
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268 Environmental conservation efforts are being strengthened by the participation of shrimp producers in meetings organized by a private body,
Global Aquaculture Alliance, which analyses and proposes methods for developing the aquacultural industry in a way that is not environmentally
harmful.
269 The Government of Ecuador claims that no more than three or four turtles a year are taken as bycatch.
(b) Cultivated shrimp
Aquaculture began to r ise to prominence as a
new industry in Ecuador dur ing the 1970s, and the
country eventually became the biggest producer of
farm-reared shr imp in the Amer icas and the
second biggest in the wor ld, after Thailand. At
present, around 90% of output is expor ted; shr imp
farms cover some 150,000 hectares and have an
output of 200,000 tons a year , and around 68 expor t
firms are in operation.270 The main destination
market is the United States, which absorbed 57% of
exports in 1997, while the European Union bought
28% and the Asian countries 13% (Instituto Nacional
de Pesca, 1997, p. 54).
Since the end of 1997 Ecuador has been applying
a new “hazard analysis critical control point”
quality-control programme, so that it may export
fishery and aquaculture products to the United States.
This  programme,  which is  also widely  applied in
Europe, is used to control the environmental
conditions of production plants and ensure that the
products processed there are not harmful to
consumers.
Aquaculture does entail environmental problems,
such as the destruction of mangrove swamps, the poor
quality of water after it has passed through farms,
excessive use of chemicals in production and
increased sedimentation. In May 1998 the Ecuadorian
or Council of Shrimp Industry Organizations, rejected
a warning from Greenpeace International  about  a
possible international boycott of Ecuadorian shrimp
exports because of the indiscriminate clearing of
mangrove swamps. The Council argued that the
destruction of the mangrove swamp area of Ecuador
predated development of the aquaculture industry.271
However, it has been shown that the construction of
aquaculture facilities has resulted in the deforestation
of about 12% of the country’s mangrove swamps, and
it is estimated that 40,000 hectares of mangrove
swamp have been destroyed since 1969 (G. Ormaza,
1997, p. 23).272
Subsequent research has shown shrimp
companies that mangrove swamps actually play an
important role in improving shrimp farm production.
Since 1990 the destruction of mangrove swamps has
been forbidden in Ecuador by law,273but the public
sector acknowledges that responsibi l ity for
monitoring compliance is spread among several
institutions, and the law is not adequately enforced.
As already mentioned, the temporary embargo on
sea shrimp also made it difficult to export farmed
shrimp, since shipments have to be accompanied by a
certificate from the Government of Ecuador
specifying their origin. The certificate has to be signed
by both the producer and a Government official, which
has increased the paperwork involved and led to
higher transaction costs.
The National Chamber of Aquaculture has been
looking ahead and is taking precautionary steps to deal
with the possibility of an embargo on shrimp exports
from countries where mangrove swamps are not
properly protected. Among the priorities of the
Chamber are to ensure that aquaculturalists manage
mangrove swamps in an environmentally sustainable
manner and to make them aware that the destruction
of these wetlands runs counter to their own interests.
To this end, the Chamber has produced a reforestation
manual and carried out other activities aimed at
encouraging producers to maintain high standards of
quality.
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270 The shrimp industry provides employment for approximately 500,000 people, besides other jobs in related areas, i.e., larva laboratories, factories
making shrimp-based foodstuffs, packaging plants, domestic transport and other support services.
271 See http://www.sea-world.com.
272 In 1969 there were 204,000 hectares of mangrove swamp, and this has now fallen to less than 150,000 [http://www.earthsummitwatch.org/
shrimp/ecua96.html].
273 Executive Order No. 824 A of 17 June 1985.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
The tables included in this appendix provide data on the imports and exports of most of the countries in the region
for the period 1965-1997.  This information is organized on the basis of the categories proposed in the first issue
of this Overview, which was published in Spanish only under the titlePanorama de la Inserción Internacional de
América Latina y el Caribe(ECLAC, 1996, pp. 217-225). The table entitled “Classification system” outlines these
categories and gives the complete heading for each group of products. These headings are abbreviated in the
statistical tables themselves in order to save space.
As shown in the above-mentioned table, the product categories are based on the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC), Rev. 1, at the three- and four-digit levels. The product information presented in the tables
has been obtained from the External Trade Data Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (BADECEL) (as of
23 December 1998) and the International Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE) (as of 13 November 1998).
Export data are given in current prices, f.o.b., and import data in current prices, c.i.f., except in the cases of
Mexico and Venezuela, where import statistics are expressed in f.o.b. values from 1980 and 1970 onward,
respectively. In addition, since 1992 Mexico has been recording the statistics for itsmaquilaindustry under the
heading of merchandise trade; prior to that time these data had been recorded under services.
Statistical tables
The appendix includes two types of tables: a total of six tables covering a large group of countries (tables 1A
through 2C); and tables on individual countries (tables 3A through 27C).
With regard to the tables on individual countries, it should be noted that, as shown in table 1, which provides
information on the availability of foreign trade statistics for 32 countries in the region over the period 1965-1997,
sufficient data could not be obtained on seven of the countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominican
Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Montserrat, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). Consequently, the appendix includes
individual country tables on the remaining 25 countries only: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Of the six tables covering a large group of countries, three (tables 1A, 1B and 1C) correspond to the 25 countries
listed above; the other three (tables 2A, 2B and 2C) do not include Mexico and therefore refer to 24 countries.
The tables referring to the destinations of regional exports (tables B and C, 1-27) may give a percentage
distribution for such markets even if the value of the corresponding exports is shown as zero due to the fact that,
when measured in terms of millions of dollars, the value of those exports is negligible. It should also be noted
that certain conventions have been used in these tables because of the limited amount of space available.
Accordingly, figures for Latin America and the Caribbean appear under the heading “Region”, which in this case
refers to the 25 countries mentioned above plus Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. By the same token, the generic heading “Asia”
encompasses the following countries and territories:  Australia, China, Philippines, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Chinese province of Taiwan.
Any differences between the sum total of percentages and 100% is due to rounding.
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CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM









Agriculture: 001, 025, 031, 041, 0421, 043, 044,
045, 051, 054, 0711, 0721, 074, 075, 121, 211, 212,
2211, 2212, 2213, 2214,, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218,
2311, 241, 242, 244, 261, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2625,
2631, 264, 265, 2711, 291, 292.
Mining: 2712, 2713, 2714, 273, 274, 275, 276, 281,
283, 285, 286.







Dairy products, edible oils,
fabr ic, tools, furniture,
footwear, printed matter,
leather
Final Food, beverages and tobacco:011,012, 013, 022,
023, 024, 032, 0422, 046, 047, 048, 052, 053, 055,
061, 062, 0713, 0722, 0723, 073, 081, 091, 099, 111,
112, 122, 2219, 411, 422, 431.
Other traditional manufactures: 2313, 2314, 243,
2511, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2632, 2633, 2634,
267, 551, 611, 612, 613, 621, 631, 632, 633, 642,
6511, 6512, 6513, 6514, 6515, 6518, 6519, 652, 653,
654, 655, 656, 657, 662, 663, 665, 666, 667, 691,
692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 733, 812, 821,
831, 841, 842, 851, 892, 893, 894, 895, 897, 899.
2. Scale- and natural
resource-intensive
goods
Petrochemicals,  paper, pulp,
cement, basic metals (basic
manufactures)
Intermediate Scale- and natural resource-intensive goods:2312
2512, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 266, 282, 284,
332, 421, 512, 513, 514, 515, 521, 531, 532, 533,
554, 561, 571, 5811, 5812, 5813, 5819, 599, 629,
641, 6516, 6517, 661, 664, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675,
676, 677, 678, 679, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686,
687, 688, 689.
3. Durables (and parts
and components)





Durables: 7241, 7242, 725, 731, 732, 735, 891.
4. Diffusers of
technical progress




Diffusers of technical progress:541, 553, 7111,
7112, 7113, 7114, 7115, 7116, 7117, 7118, 712,
7141, 7142, 7143, 7149, 715, 717, 718, 719, 722,
723, 7249, 726, 729, 734, 861, 862, 864, 9510.
Source:ECLAC, El comercio de manufacturas de América Latina: evolución y estructura, 1962-1989, Estudios e informes de la CEPAL
series, No. 88 (LC/G.1731-P), Santiago, Chile, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.92.II.G.12; J.C. Ferraz and others,
Made in Brazil: desafíos competitivos para a indústria,Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus, 1996; J.C. Ferraz, D. Kupfer and
L. Haguenauer, “The competitive challenge for Brazilian industry”,CEPAL Review, No. 58 (LC/G.1916-P), Santiago, Chile, April
1996; P. Guerrieri and C. Milana,L’Italia e il commercio mondiale: mutamenti e tendenze nella divizione internazional del lavoro,
Rome, Il Mulino, 1990.
a SITC = Standard International Trade Classification (Rev. 1).
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Appendix - Table 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVAILABILITY OF
FOREIGN TRADE DATA, BY COUNTRY, 1965-1997
Reporting country Table 1965 1970 1980 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997
1 Antigua and Barbuda —- ... ... M X M X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
2 Argentina 3 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
3 Bahamas —- ... X M X M X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
4 Barbados 4 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
5 Belize 5 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
6 Bolivia 6 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
7 Brazil 7 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
8 Chile 8 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
9 Colombia 9 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
10 Costa Rica 10 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X ... X
11 Dominica 11 ... ... M X M X M X M X M X M X ... ...
12 Ecuador 12 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
13 El Salvador 13 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
14 Grenada 14 ... ... M X M X M X M X M X M X ... ...
15 Guatemala 15 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
16 Guyana —- M X M X M X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
17 Haiti —- ... ... M X M X ... X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
18 Honduras 16 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
19 Jamaica 17 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X ... ...
20 Mexicoa 18 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
21 Montserrat —- ... ... M ... M X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
22 Nicaragua 19 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
23 Panama 20 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
24 Paraguay 21 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
25 Peru 22 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
26 Dominican Republic —- M X M X M X ... ... ... X ... X ... ... ... ...
27 Saint Vicent and
the Grenadines —- M X M X ... ... M X M X ... X ... X
28 Saint Lucia 23 ... ... M X M X M X M X M X M X ... ...
29 Suriname 24 M X M X M X M X M X M X ... ... ... ...
30 Trinidad and Tobago 25 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
31 Uruguay 26 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
32 Venezuelab 27 M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
M = Imports, c.i.f.
X = Exports, f.o.b.
aFrom 1980 onward, statistics on Mexico’s imports are expressed in f.o.b. values.
b From 1970 onward, statistics on Venezuela’s imports are expressed in f.o.b. values.
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